Craig Kelly (Hughes, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

This evening I continue, from 28 June, my comments on the Judicial Misbehaviour and Incapacity (Parliamentary Commissions) Bill 2012 and the Courts Legislation Amendment (Judicial Complaints) Bill 2012. The purpose of these bills is to provide a mechanism to assist the parliament in its consideration of the removal from office of a judge or federal magistrate. The bills will allow for the establishment of a parliamentary commission, in the event a resolution is passed by each house of parliament, to investigate a specific allegation about a specific Commonwealth judicial officer or federal magistrate. The commission is to investigate the allegation and report to the houses of parliament on whether there is evidence that would let parliament conclude that the alleged misbehaviour or incapacity is proved. The legislation attempts to maintain the important balance between judicial independence and judicial accountability.

We would all like to think that our judges possess integrity, impartiality, a strong sense of fairness and a willingness to put aside any existing prejudice when sitting on the bench. But our Constitution correctly recognises that judges are human. Given that our judges are not appointed, nor required to seek reappointment by popular election—as they are in the USA—our Constitution provides a mechanism for the houses of parliament to remove a judge from office. However, recent experiences of allegations of misconduct on the part of judges, although extremely rare, have demonstrated that current arrangements for parliament to remove a judge from office are inadequate.

Sir Anthony Mason, formerly Chief Justice of Australia, noted:

The central element of judicial independence is the freedom of the judge to hear and decide cases without interference and uninfluenced by an outsider—be it government, pressure groups or anyone else. The purpose of that independence, it should be emphasised, is to serve as a protection and a privilege of the people, not of the judges.

These comments remind us that we live in a democracy and that the authority of judge s ultimately arises from the public and, t herefore , our judiciary must be representative of society and ultimately accountable to th at public. This is reflected by our concept of trial by jury, in which a panel of jurors is regarded as representative of the community and is therefore deemed to speak with the voice of authority on community standards. A lthough judicial independence is a central pillar of the rule of law, equally important is judicial accountability . T herefore , in a democracy , we rightfully expect our judges to apply community standards.

J udicial independence does not mean that our judges are above criticism for decisions which potentially have, or which are potentially a ffected by , political implications and media pressures. N owhere is this more importan t that in our family law courts, where j udges are required to exercise a variety of judicial discretions. As a member of parliament, arising out of cases I have had constituents speak to me about, I have great concern about many decisions made in our family law courts, especially in those cases where judges contract out the decision-making process to a so-called 'single expert' who is unaccountable to anybody. We must have concerns when we read Family Court decisions such as the one in which one parent had been previously convicted of three child pornography offences, had invited one of his daughters into his bed and, according to the judge, had:

… demonstrated affection toward her in a way that was, in all the circumstances, inappropriate for a child of that age …

Yet that same court still ordered those two young girls to spend weekends with their sex offender parent, provided he put doors they could lock on their bedrooms. The judge stated that the girls 'needed some protection, particularly at night', but said the risk of sexual abuse was 'diminished when they are awake and alert and when the children are together'. When we see decisions like this, we can question whether our family law courts are applying community standards.

Although it is important that we strengthen the mechanisms for accountability to ensure that our judges continue to decide cases fairly, fearlessly and impartially, there are some concerns with this legislation which will only be tested when next a parliament is required to consider a serious complaint about a federal judicial officer and faces the procedural high bar for the establishment of a commission—the requirement that both houses of parliament agree to do so in the same session. We would be better served if the federal government were to establish a federal judicial commission modelled on the Judicial Commission of New South Wales. The coalition does not oppose the legislation.

Mark Dreyfus (Isaacs, Australian Labor Party, Cabinet Secretary) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Australia is very well served by its judiciary. Removal from judicial office for misconduct has been very rare. There were a few colourful instances of removal of judges of superior courts in the 19th century but, since the adoption of our Constitution in 1900, no federal judges have been removed. In fact, only one judge has been dismissed from a superior court—that is, from a state supreme court—and that was Angelo Vasta. He was dismissed from the Supreme Court of Queensland in 1989.

The constitutional provision to which the Judicial Misbehaviour and Incapacity (Parliamentary Commissions) Bill 2012 and the Courts Legislation Amendment (Judicial Complaints) Bill 2012 relate is section 72 of the Australian Constitution. There are no detailed provisions in the Constitution which deal directly with the discipline of judges, but section 72 says:

The Justices of the High Court and of the other courts created by the Parliament:

(i) shall be appointed by the Governor-General in Council;

(ii) shall not be removed except by the Governor-General in Council, on an address from both Houses of the Parliament in the same session, praying for such removal on the ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity;

(iii) shall receive such remuneration as the Parliament may fix; but the remuneration shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.

Originally, the justices of the High Court and of other federal courts were appointed for life. But, as a result of a constitutional amendment in 1977, the last occasion we had a successful referendum in this country, a maximum age of 70 has been fixed for federal judges.

The Constitution having indicated that it is a matter for this parliament to remove judges from office for misconduct, we have not, up until now, had any standing arrangement for receiving, investigating or determining complaints of misconduct, corruption or similar conduct on the part of federal judicial officers.

There are a range of mechanisms that might be adopted. People wishing to make a complaint could write to the federal Attorney-General, to members of parliament, to the chief judge or chief magistrate of a particular court; they could raise it in the media or with non-governmental organisations—but there is no clear system provided for the handling of such complaints. What these two bills seek to do is regularise a system, a transparent system at that, for handling complaints against the judiciary.

A couple of events might be said to have provided the impetus for this legislation. The first worth mentioning is when complaints of misconduct were made against Justice Lionel Murphy as a judge of the High Court of Australia. I do not think I need to go through the tortuous history of the multiple parliamentary inquiries—both Senate and other—or the multiple trials that took place in New South Wales in 1985, but it is worth mentioning that, ultimately, what was an ad hoc parliamentary commission of inquiry was established by special legislation to investigate the 42 allegations that were made against Justice Murphy. It was a commission that comprised three retired judges. In July 1986, the commission determined that 28 of the allegations against Justice Murphy were completely lacking in substance but decided that it would go on to investigate the remaining 14 allegations. Then, tragically, it was discovered that Justice Murphy was in fact dying of incurable cancer. He returned to the High Court to sit for one week. The commission halted its work, and subsequently the statute under which that parliamentary commission of inquiry had been established was repealed. Justice Murphy died in October 1986. We will never know how the commission would have gone on to deal with those allegations. However, the ad hoc nature of the inquiry was criticised, and that can be seen to have provided some of the impetus here to establish a regular system, one that is known in advance—not one that is devised in the heat of some political controversy but, rather, an established system, so people know what will happen when a complaint is made against a federal judge and needs to be investigated.

Equally, the events surrounding the removal of then Justice Angelo Vasta from the Supreme Court of Queensland, because of the manner in which they unfolded, demonstrate the usefulness of having an established procedure. Angelo Vasta was removed under a constitutional provision similar to that which is found in the federal Constitution, following the vote of the single house of the Queensland parliament. That vote was taken after a debate, after hearing from Angelo Vasta in his own defence and after the report of a commission of inquiry established by the Queensland government and headed up by a former Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia, the Rt Hon. Sir Harry Gibbs. The inquiry was lengthy, going for three months, with a large volume of evidence. It looked at a whole range of allegations that had come to light during the Fitzgerald inquiry, partly as a result of the diaries of Sir Terence Lewis, the then Queensland police commissioner, who was one of the primary focuses of the Fitzgerald inquiry.

The commission of inquiry chaired by Sir Harry Gibbs looked at those allegations, which included the involvement of Angelo Vasta in a family trust company, a toilet paper manufacturing company. There was evidence given about a mysterious Sicilian benefactor, a very generous brother-in-law, a beachfront Gold Coast unit, overseas trips and a range of luxurious German cars. The inquiry went on to find that Angelo Vasta, along with Cosco Holdings Pty Ltd, the makers of the toilet paper, had misled the tax office—to their respective and sometimes mutual advantage—and that Justice Vasta was an unreliable witness. The inquiry chaired by Sir Harry Gibbs ultimately found—and I stress that these were not allegations of misconduct in relation to decisions that Justice Vasta had made in court; rather, they were allegations of misconduct more generally—that Angelo Vasta had committed an act of misconduct, and the state parliament then voted in favour of his removal, on 7 June 1989.

Again, as was the case when Justice Murphy was the subject of complaints never resolved, after the dismissal of Angelo Vasta from the Supreme Court of Queensland there followed a range of criticisms of the procedures that had been followed. They focused on the role of the parliament and the role of the commission of inquiry. There was criticism of the Queensland government's failure to pay the legal costs that Angelo Vasta had incurred in defending himself and his office. But the focus was on the absence of a procedure that people knew in advance would be followed in the event of a judge being the subject of a complaint of misconduct that might lead to their removal from court.

The two bills that are before the House build on work done by the Hon. Duncan Kerr as a private member. When he was member for Denison in February 2010 he brought before this House a private member's bill called the Parliamentary (Judicial Misbehaviour or Incapacity) Commission Bill 2010. It was not ultimately proceeded with before the last election but was something Duncan Kerr had pursued with tremendous vigour because he saw the need to legislate in this area, to provide, as I have indicated, a clear procedure which was going to be available in the event—and it is acknowledged by everybody participating in this debate and it is acknowledged by people who have publicly commented that we do not expect these provisions to be invoked at all frequently. Indeed, the history of a near complete lack of judicial misbehaviour leading to dismissal would suggest that these provisions are likely to be used extremely infrequently. Nevertheless, it is helpful that there be a clear framework in place.

This parliamentary commission bill is going to provide for the establishment, as needed, of a commission. It will not be a standing commission; it will be a commission established following the making of specified allegations of misbehaviour or incapacity of a particular Commonwealth judicial officer. It would be available to inquire into the conduct of any federal judicial officer, including a justice of the High Court of Australia. It would comprise the three members appointed by force of the bill on the resolution of the houses of parliament.

It is intended that the process to be followed by this commission would, on every occasion, be as bipartisan as possible. Two members, including the presiding member, would be appointed on the nomination of the Prime Minister and one would be appointed on the nomination of the Leader of the Opposition in the House of Representatives, and at least one member will need to be either a former Commonwealth judicial officer or a current or former judge of a supreme court of a state or territory. No current Commonwealth judicial officer would be eligible to be a member of the commission.

The commission would investigate the allegation, or allegations, and report to the parliament its opinion of whether or not there is evidence that would let the houses of parliament conclude that the alleged misbehaviour or incapacity is proved. It needs to be stressed that, under the bill, the role of the commission would be to inquire into allegations and gather information and evidence so that, in the very rare event that the parliament needs to make a decision, it can be well-informed in its consideration of the removal of a judge from office.

The processes to be followed are set out in the Judicial Misbehaviour and Incapacity (Parliamentary Commissions) Bill 2012. The commission would have investigative and inquiry powers, including the power to summon witnesses, take evidence on oath, conduct hearings in private, require the production of documents and issue search warrants. The commission will provide a report to the houses of parliament through each of the parliamentary providing offices.

The accompanying bill, the Courts Legislation Amendment (Judicial Complaints) Bill, will support the implementation of a largely non-statutory reform framework to assist heads of jurisdiction, other than the High Court, to manage complaints about judicial conduct which are referred to them. Again, it is going to be a transparent process. Australians will be able to see how complaints are to be handled and how, if there is any suggestion that a judge needs to be removed, that will be dealt with by this parliament through the means of the appointment of a commission.

I commend both these pieces of legislation to the House and note again the helpful work on which this is based, being the work done by Duncan Kerr as a backbencher in this parliament in 2009 and 2010.

Judi Moylan (Pearce, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I am pleased to have an opportunity to speak on the Judicial Misbehaviour and Incapacity (Parliamentary Commissions) Bill 2012 and the Courts Legislation Amendment (Judicial Complaints) Bill 2012 because earlier this year they came before the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Social Policy and Legal Affairs and I had a chance only to speak briefly to that inquiry at the time. A key element of Australia's separation of powers is an independent judiciary which enjoys a strong security of tenure. Removal of judicial officers is deliberately difficult, primarily to ensure that their decisions are not influenced by the threat of removal from office. But, as public officers, those appointed to the judiciary are expected to maintain the highest of standards. To reconcile these positions, the drafters of the Constitution settled on the amorphous phraseology in section 72 that removal is by a resolution passed by both houses of parliament, on the grounds of 'proven misbehaviour or incapacity'.

Constitutional scholars have since grappled with what constitutes 'proven' and 'misbehaviour' and the process through which these should be investigated. Also, with the expansion of the federal judiciary well beyond what was first contemplated under the Constitution, there is the difficult question of how complaints against officers of other courts are to be dealt with, particularly as referring these claims, many of which are vexatious, to the federal parliament would be extremely cumbersome.

These concerns were canvassed in a wide-ranging Senate inquiry by the Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee, whose report Australia's Judicial System and the Role of Judges was tabled in 2009. A recommendation of that inquiry was to establish formal mechanisms dealing with complaints handling and investigation. The recommendation is the foundation of the two bills before this House—namely, the Courts Legislation Amendment (Judicial Complaints) Bill and the Judicial Misbehaviour and Incapacity (Parliamentary Commissions) Bill. Both bills have recently been the subject of inquiries by the House of Representatives Social Policy and Legal Affairs Committee, as well as the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee. So the matters that are the subject of these bills have been well canvassed.

The first bill sets out an enabling framework to give legislative basis for the internal complaints-handling systems currently in use by most federal courts and to confirm their validity.

The current complaints-handling process of the Family Court was set out in the 2009 report of the Senate committee, and it is a useful guide to all federal complaints-handling processes. Broadly, the process is this: a designated complaints-handling adviser reviews all complaints that are sent into the Chief Justice; complaints regarding delays or the slow handing-down of judgements are referred to the Law Society, as that has traditionally been an area they investigate and provide counsel to the judiciary on; procedural complaints or complaints that outline potential grounds of appeal are immediately responded to, outlining that the grounds should be perused through the court process; and information is given regarding how to appeal decisions or make further applications.

The Family Court has found that many people incorrectly believe that the Chief Justice can personally intervene or overturn decisions without a hearing. Queries are responded to quickly, with the complaints officer advising people of their rights straightaway. The actual number of complaints alleging impropriety of judicial officers is low. They are initially reviewed by the complaints adviser, and a detailed response is drafted by the officer and then reviewed by the Deputy Chief Justice. If there is sufficient evidence or if the complaint is of a serious nature, the complaint may be further investigated by the Deputy Chief Judge or referred to a panel of judges superior to the justice the complaint has been made against. This ensures that vexatious complaints are weeded out and that all genuine concerns are dealt with in a transparent manner.

The judicial complaints bill sets out a legislative basis for such procedures, enshrining a flexible and efficient approach to dealing with the diversity of complaints received by courts. A full system cannot be mandated, as this could potentially conflict with the procedures under chapter III of the Constitution and, if challenged, could invalidate the whole complaints-handling process currently being utilised. I know from being involved with the Standing Committee on Social Policy and Legal Affairs that the committee found that the non-legislative system enabled by this bill has enough safeguards to ensure that legitimate complaints are not sidelined or stifled.

The second bill in this cognate debate, the Judicial Misbehaviour and Incapacity (Parliamentary Commissions) Bill 2012, establishes a procedure for the investigation of alleged misbehaviour. Where allegations of misbehaviour arise, both houses of parliament would adopt a resolution to establish a commission of inquiry. Such an inquiry can investigate any federal judicial officer. It would consist of up to three officers appointed by the Prime Minister after consultation with the Leader of the Opposition. One member must be either a former federal judicial officer—this member cannot be a current federal judicial officer—or a current justice of a state or territory supreme court.

A concern which has been raised regarding such a commission is its inquisitorial style, which is similar to that of a select committee. The bills allow the commission to service warrants and compel witnesses to appear. However, the commission will not pass judgement on the individual. The commission's role is to investigate and report on the threshold question of whether there is evidence of misbehaviour or incapacity. The commission can be assisted by outside organisations such as the police or forensics officers where the commission deems it necessary. Whilst it is explicit that the role of the commission is only to help inform the parliament, there are legitimate questions of where that role ends and where such a commission starts along the path of making a decision about guilt. A particular problem may be encountered where a single piece of evidence which is in dispute would indicate potential misbehaviour. If the commission is called upon to make a decision as to the veracity of that information and ultimately decides that it is true, that is possibly a breach of their informing-only function and strays into the constitutionally-enshrined role of the parliament, which is to decide upon those matters.

Another ambiguous area relates to what actually constitutes misbehaviour. It is not defined in the Constitution; the drafters of the Constitution deliberately left this open to interpretation as they realised that what constitutes misbehaviour would change with the times and could also be dependent upon the circumstances of allegation. Whilst the commission can act as an effective evidence-gatherer, it will suffer the deficiency of not knowing exactly what standard it is applying as it investigates. This may result in difficulties, but, as it stems from the Constitution, resolving the definition cannot be remedied in this bill.

Another concern about this bill is a fundamental aspect of our democracy: the separation of powers. This is the idea that power should be divided between the executive, the legislature and the judiciary so that no one branch of government can hold too much power. Constitutionally the power to remove a judicial officer lies with the parliament to ensure that the executive does not interfere with decisions by threatening to remove the judicial officer, but the proposal to allow a judicial officer on the commission does raise the question of whether it will simply be a matter of the judiciary investigating itself, which is not consistent with the doctrine of the separation of powers.

Further, no guidance is given as to whom the second two officers of the commission should be, and it appears likely that they too will be drawn from the legal profession. As legal or investigative professionals, their experience in determining complex legal questions would be invaluable to help steer the commission through the tricky constitutional issues that such a commission presents; but it may also present a suggestion of bias, as it will appear that the profession is investigating itself. These concerns have led some commentators to suggest that a standing provision for a commission is unnecessary and possibly undesirable. The Law Council of Australia, in its submission to the 2009 Senate inquiry, noted:

It appears that the community's perception of judicial accountability now demands that there should be a procedure enshrined for receiving and investigating complaints against the judiciary. The Law Council believes the existing procedures adopted by the courts perform this function adequately, without incurring unnecessary cost or diverting judicial resources …

There is also argument that the parliament should be allowed the flexibility to respond to the unique circumstances of each case and determine the most appropriate investigation mechanism.

But the Hon. Duncan Kerr SC, in his submission to the 2009 inquiry, noted that:

Any ad hoc procedure put in place after a specific allegation of judicial misconduct or incapacity has been brought to light can, and almost certainly will, be criticised as lacking at least some of the institutional attributes appropriate for a fair hearing and respect for the rule of law.

But through this legislation, with a standing procedure in place, should any allegation arise there would be more confidence in the due process as it will already be known.

In conclusion, while there is merit in all the concerns raised by these bills, there is also good reason to have in place a standing procedure should the need arise. The powers of such a commission are necessarily broad to ensure confidence in the judiciary through a thorough and transparent investigation process. Whilst that fact-finding role may come under scrutiny as to whether it digresses into making a determination of guilt, in the end the final power lies with the parliament to remove a judicial officer from office. And, as the member for Isaacs pointed out in his speech just now, this is a power that, thankfully, has rarely had to be used in this place. Although others have pointed out that the removal of a judicial officer is reasonably rare, it is recognised that, when such an occasion arises, there is a need for an enabling framework and that that enabling framework should be given a statutory basis, and that is what these bills seek to do.

Nicola Roxon (Gellibrand, Australian Labor Party, Attorney-General) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I thank members for their contributions to this debate. I also thank the House Standing Committee on Social Policy and Legal Affairs for its advisory report, and for its work considering these bills, in which it recommended that the House pass the bills unamended. I also thank the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs for its advisory report and recommendations.

The Courts Legislation Amendment (Judicial Complaints) Bill and the Judicial Misbehaviour and Incapacity (Parliamentary Commissions) Bill are both important reforms to ensure that complaints against federal judicial officers are handled fairly and transparently in a manner consistent with the constitutional independence of the judiciary. These bills also form an important component of this government's wider court reforms, which will ensure that the federal judicial system provides accessible, equitable and understandable justice for the community.

The Gillard Labor government has acted to ensure that our courts are able to serve individual one-off complainants to the same level that large corporate players enjoy. For example, earlier today I announced changes to court fee structures and a funding increase to the federal courts of $38 million over four years so that our courts can deliver key services, including regional circuit work, which is vital for disadvantaged litigants and small businesses.

Our courts deal with complex and difficult matters every day, and court users have the right to expect that they will be treated fairly and impartially, with their legal rights protected and with matters dealt with quickly and thoroughly. The bills support and augment existing complaints pathways, both within the federal courts and before the houses of parliament, in the rare even of a serious complaint being considered under section 72(ii) of the Constitution. The seriousness and nature of complaints may vary widely, and together these bills provide a range of options for the way complaints about judicial officers may be appropriately handled. This legislation will serve to strengthen the community's confidence in our courts and our judiciary by ensuring that these complaints processes are fair, robust and transparent.

I want to turn to some specific comments raised by honourable members. People have raised similar issues in this debate, so forgive me if I do not identify each member. Earlier on, the member for Berowra and the member for Macquarie queried the need for this legislation. I want to recognise that there has not been a serious complaint warranting parliament's consideration for several decades, and I think that is a good thing. It means that Australia's courts are held in the highest regard and that our judiciary take very seriously the responsibility entrusted to them as holders of judicial office. Despite this, circumstances giving rise to a referral of an allegation to parliament are unpredictable and could occur at any time. A number of members mentioned this. And of course a number of honourable members in this debate mentioned the circumstances relating to the late Justice Murphy in the 1980s and highlighted the uncertainty about how serious complaints about judges could be fairly and appropriately investigated by the Commonwealth parliament.

A very attractive feature of these bills is that they are pre-emptive. They provide a framework that is capable of withstanding any criticism that it may lack objectivity or is politically driven precisely because its constitutional, procedural and governance arrangements have been determined in the absence of an existing allegation. Having a framework in place would mean that any future allegation could be investigated expeditiously and competently and would preserve public confidence that a future process being undertaken by the parliament is fair, objective and apolitical.

Other members expressed concerns that the mechanisms in these bills might invite unmeritorious complaints, especially in the family law context. But I note that these measures are moderate and carefully framed. They allow complaints handling to be tailored to the circumstances of each individual case. For example, a head of jurisdiction may summarily dismiss an unmeritorious complaint if it is appropriate to do so. Independently of the processes outlined in the parliamentary commissions bill, parliament has the ability to deal with unmeritorious complaints appropriately and at an early stage. As the Clerk of the Senate stated during the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs hearing into the bills earlier this year, the houses of parliament are well capable of exercising their constitutional duties; they do it every day. As representatives of the people, they represent the highest source of authority in our system of government. That is why, if a serious complaint against a judge were brought before the parliament for consideration, I am confident that the parliament would fully comprehend the gravity of its constitutional role. It would consider the complaint on the evidence and not be coloured by any purely political considerations.

The member for Macquarie also asked me to advise what the procedure would be for complaints about justices of the High Court. The parliamentary commissions bill applies to the High Court as it does for all federal courts. If a serious complaint is made against the conduct or capacity of a High Court justice, it is entirely appropriate for parliament to consider the need to establish a commission to inquire into that conduct to aid the parliament's consideration.

In contrast, though, it is not appropriate for the judicial complaints bill to apply to the High Court, due to its position in the Australian judicial system. The role of the Chief Justice of the High Court is constitutionally described and is characterised differently from that of heads of jurisdiction of other federal courts. Given the court's position and the Chief Justice's defined role, he or she would not be in a position to establish a conduct committee to investigate allegations without the involvement of the parliament. Others asked me to advise whether strengthening complaints mechanisms might affect the reputation of the judiciary, but it is this government's view that clear, appropriate and effective complaints mechanisms will actually support public confidence in the federal judiciary and its continuing high reputation.

The member for Banks raised the importance of respect for the separation of powers and the non-politicisation of parliament's constitutional role. The parliamentary commissions bill will not replace or interfere with parliament's power or take away the parliament's role in determining whether conduct of a judicial officer amounted to prove misbehaviour or incapacity. The commission would simply investigate an allegation about a Commonwealth judicial officer and provide its findings and evidence to the parliament for its consideration.

It also provides a useful tool that parliament may employ to avoid potential politicisation of a complaint. The bill therefore reflects the importance of a non-political approach to parliament's role in the nomination process for members of the commission. Members of the commission would be appointed on nomination by the Prime Minister following consultation with the Leader of the Opposition. Although each member has not been identified, that has raised the range of issues that were put forward in the debate.

These bills represent important reforms to the federal judicial complaints handling process. The reforms have a long history which has been informed by reflection and consultation with the judiciary, academia and legal research bodies, as well as within government and parliament over the course of the years. I particularly acknowledge the Honourable Duncan Kerr—formerly a member of this parliament, formerly a minister and formerly Attorney-General and now President of the AAT and a Federal Court judge—for his work developing many of the proposals that now appear in this legislation. The bills have been developed taking into account this accumulated history and in close consultation with the federal courts to ensure they appropriately meet the expectations of the community, the courts and individual justices who may be the subject of a complaint.

Policy development in the area of judicial complaints is undoubtedly complex. Reforms need to balance the need to support the independence, impartiality and integrity of the judiciary against a reasonable community expectation of judicial accountability. Again, I need to emphasise how incredibly well served Australia is and has been by its judiciary. Some might consider that the current system of managing complaints continues to serve us well, while others might contend the reforms should go further. I am confident that the government has struck the right balance in its judicial complaints reforms. The reforms achieve real and meaningful advances, for example, in providing for serious complaints to be considered by conduct committees in the courts and parliamentary commissions in the parliament, but all the while the reforms are respectful of the bedrock constitutional principle of the separation of powers between the judiciary and the other arms of government. I commend the bills to the House.

Question agreed to.

Bill read a second time.