Kevin Rudd (Griffith, Australian Labor Party, Leader of the Opposition) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

My question is again to the Prime Minister, on Iraq. Given that the mission statement of our troops in Iraq has been first to find weapons of mass destruction, then to secure a regime change, then to protect Japanese troops and then to perform security overwatch, given these changes, will the Prime Minister precisely define for the parliament what is the current mission statement of our troops in Iraq and what reasonable, precise benchmarks have been set in terms of the numbers of Iraqi forces which need to be trained?

John Howard (Bennelong, Liberal Party, Prime Minister) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I have already indicated in answer to the last question what, to use the Leader of the Opposition’s expression, mission statement. In an earlier question it was ‘exit strategy’. I think, ‘mission statement’, is a better term to use. It is a rather more hopeful expression, and I am into hope; I am not into surrenders—so I think it is a rather more hopeful expression. I noticed this morning on radio that the Leader of the Opposition was sort of saying, ‘Oh, well, we only have this number of people.’ Yes, we only have just under 1,500. They are making a wonderful contribution in a very difficult situation, and it ill behoves the Leader of the Opposition to give any credence to the proposition that our contribution is inadequate.

But what we want is a situation where the Iraqis can reasonably provide for their own security. They plainly cannot do that at the present time, and all the intelligence assessments suggest that. It stands to reason that if participants in the coalition from the very beginning—and that includes Australia—start nominating so-called exit dates, it will only encourage those who want to prevent the Iraqis being in a position to look after themselves to continue the mayhem and maintain the chaos, maintain the sectarian strife and the sectarian violence in the full knowledge that, eventually, nations having nominated an exit date will give fulfilment to that prediction.

It seems to me to be an elementary exercise in common sense that when a nation that was in the coalition from the beginning stands up and says, ‘We want to be out by X month in X year,’ those who are opposed to our interests are going to say, ‘All we’ve got to do is keep the mayhem going until that particular date and then we know we’ve got them.’ That was really, in a sense, the starting point of some observations that I made at the weekend. I think it is very unwise in the extreme, if you are interested in a strategy that produces a positive result for the people of Iraq, to be nominating the benchmarks that the Leader of the Opposition is calling for. And he knows that. Part of the Leader of the Opposition’s dilemma in this matter is that in his heart he knows what I say is right about the consequences of a precipitate coalition withdrawal. He must understand that if the coalition leaves before the Iraqis are able to look after themselves, the place will descend into greater conflict and into total civil war, and the consequences of that will be enormous.

I say again to the Leader of the Opposition: our position has been clear. Our position has been forthright. We know it is not popular with a lot of Australians. We know it is not popular with the opposition—but at least we have the courage to state our position. At least we have the courage to state it and argue it. But all the Leader of the Opposition can do in response to my challenge is to go on radio this morning and try and cherry pick the Baker-Hamilton report and, when he is finally confronted on the third or fourth occasion with a question about the consequences of an American defeat in Iraq, he says, ‘Oh, it would be bad.’ It would be more than bad, let me say to the Leader of the Opposition. It would be, to use one of his expressions, a ‘rolled gold’ catastrophe for the security interests of our own nation.