Arch Bevis (Brisbane, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Minister for Homeland Security) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise to speak on the AusCheck Bill 2006. The bill seeks to establish a regulatory framework for the conduct of a centralised background-checking service to be conducted by the Attorney-General’s Department. The bill provides authority for the department to coordinate background criminal and security assessments for applications for the aviation security identification card, the ASIC, and also the maritime security identification card, the MSIC. Labor note with some concern any subsequent schemes, and that is a matter I will comment on later in this debate.

The bill also provides authority for the department to maintain a database of applicants and card holders, to collect, use and disclose information and to recover costs for conducting background checks. That sounds reasonable enough, but in these matters the devil is often in the detail. As the name of the bill implies, the concept of background checks is not something that this parliament should be legislating for without careful consideration to ensure that the civil liberties of Australian citizens are not unduly impinged upon.

Clause 5 of the bill in fact defines a ‘background check’ as an assessment of information relating to an individual person. It includes an assessment of information about the person’s criminal history; information about the security assessment that ASIO makes of the person; and information about the person’s migration status if the person is not an Australian citizen. We should not blithely pass over the invasiveness of these assessments. They are important assessments, particularly for the aviation and maritime industries in a post-2001 environment. It is critically important that people in these sensitive areas are properly and thoroughly checked for the safety of all involved. But these are not simply identity checks; these are exhaustive, quite invasive security checks on a person’s background. That is what is required in those sensitive security areas. We in this parliament should understand that, and I am sure the people of Australia would want to have attention drawn to the fact that these are significant security assessments and personal background checks. They should not be conducted lightly and they should not be conducted on citizens frivolously or vexatiously.

It is important that, in adopting and considering this bill, we establish a framework that not only ensures the security and safety of the Australian public, which we all expect as one of our basic rights, but also protects the civil liberties, individual rights and freedom of citizens and safeguards unwarranted and obtrusive investigations into their personal lives, which these sorts of security checks involve.

Another concern emerges when looking at clause 5 of the bill. The explanatory memorandum to this bill also defines a background check as:

... other ... information about the person that may be described in regulations.

That is, apart from the matters listed in this bill, the government is seeking the power to establish by regulation other information that it may wish to obtain. I appreciate that they are disallowable instruments; I received that assurance from the Attorney’s office during the past week. But I think the government does need to explain the sorts of information that it anticipates it needs that power for. One of the things that we will be seeking to have further explored in the Senate and to a lesser extent during the consideration in detail stage here is the nature of the information that the government thinks it might want to collect beyond that provided for in this bill but which it thinks it needs the power by regulation to establish.

We see a number of references to criteria to be set out in regulations. For that reason, this AusCheck bill does go further than Sir John Wheeler’s recommendations. Sir John Wheeler, of course, was the United Kingdom expert engaged by the Howard government to conduct a review of aviation security. His review, a public report, is a 50-page chronicle of the things this government has got wrong in aviation security. It was a 50-page report of what it should have been doing since 2001 and unfortunately had neglected. He did make a number of recommendations and comments about the problems of security at the airports in Australia and the problems about security checking of staff, but I think the scope that this bill establishes goes beyond that provided for by Sir John Wheeler in his report.

In fact, the bill allows the government to slip new criteria in by regulation, and even a new scheme into the regulations, that need not be related to national security. I am not certain that the safeguards in this bill go far enough to protect the basic rights of Australians in dealing with that. The bill’s purpose is sound and good and we support it, but as I mentioned before the devil is in the detail. We will be seeking from the Attorney-General, here and in the Senate, assurances and further information about those matters.

I acknowledge that there are some safeguards in the bill, but I am concerned about their adequacy. As the bill currently reads, clause 14 is a safeguard on the retention and subsequent use of information in the AusCheck database. Information can only be used in an incident that poses a threat to national security, and the dissemination of criminal intelligence or security intelligence is restricted. The identities of people are safeguarded, and I understand the arrangements that are intended to apply for statistical and research purposes are sound. It is desirable that the database be available for research purposes, and that is provided for in the bill.

What Sir John Wheeler intended by a centralised data collection agency was improved aviation security and, as I have acknowledged, that is an important thing that we support. Sadly, the government’s track record in this field is very poor. The ASIC system and aviation security in Australia in general need reform.

In 2005 the minister for transport, who has responsibility for the ASIC, set an arbitrary cut-off date for ID card applications of 31 December 2005, failing to take into account the time taken for pilots to pay for and receive police checks. In fact, that deadline was not able to be met, and at the time the government acknowledged that problem, claiming that the deadline could not be met because of ASIO’s workload associated with security matters around the Commonwealth Games. Well, surely with proper management the government would have foreseen any difficulties there. The Commonwealth Games was not a surprise event; it had been in the planning for many years. The government and ASIO had full knowledge of the nature of the security checks required for the Melbourne Commonwealth Games; they established a time frame for the ASIC assessments that should have been well informed by the demands of ASIO at that time with the Commonwealth Games. They simply got it wrong and mismanaged the system. The minister for transport was subsequently forced to change the deadline to 31 March 2006, and even that has not fixed the problem. Pilots who missed the original December deadline but submitted their applications by the March deadline still have not received the ASICs and in some cases are therefore not able to access their aircraft air side.

There is perhaps a more worrying aspect of the operation of the ASIC by this government, and that is the lost ASICs. This has been a problem since the system began. In the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit on 23 November 2005, evidence was given that 384 ASICs had been either lost or stolen—384 high-security passes to our aviation industry could not be accounted for. That is a pretty alarming statistic when you consider that at that time not a lot of ASICs had actually been distributed. I have to say, in the current context of a smartcard debate, one can only imagine the chaos that will be the lot of Australians under the mismanagement by the Howard government in its attempts to look after a nationwide smartcard distribution. The fact of the matter is there are about 10,000 or 15,000 ASICs—aviation security identification cards—and about 400 of them have already been lost. The government does not know where they are and cannot account for them. Imagine what is going to happen with 15 million smartcards. There are going to be tens of thousands of these smartcards lost. The government is making a great play about the importance of this card in solving identity theft, and we all want to ensure that identity theft is properly addressed. But this government’s mismanagement in the security area shows great incompetence.

The thought of 15 million smartcards being managed by the Howard government does not instil a great deal of confidence when you consider that, with just a few thousand security cards in the aviation industry, they have already managed to lose 300 or 400 of them. It will be interesting to watch how they go about the development of the smartcards. Hopefully they will not make the same mistakes they have made with the management of the security cards in the aviation industry.

In July 2006 the aviation industry magazine Australian Aviation had a very interesting article about the mismanagement of the aviation security cards by the Howard government. There was an article in it that quoted Mr Kerans, who was the Australian Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association vice president, I believe. It quoted him as saying that when he went to collect his ASIC from Qantas in Canberra, he was shown a box of red plastic cards that were all on lanyards and was left to sort through them unsupervised to pick out the one that was his. He said in the article, ‘I could have pocketed any quantity of ASICs I wanted.’ Those cards are the high-security passes that guarantee people access to the sensitive security areas of our airports and aircraft.

The government’s mishandling of this extends not just to the calling for applications, the processing of applications, the management of the system and the recovery of lost cards but even to the process of how they distribute them. Can you imagine a bundle of high-security cards being placed in a large box and someone being left in the room by themselves with that large box and told, ‘Go and get the one that’s yours’? There was nothing stopping that person picking up half a dozen of them if he wanted to, other than his own good sense and honesty. That is the high-security system that this government is managing.

This bill will establish a central agency—and that is a good thing. We support that. John Wheeler recommended it and we have been advocating it. We support that purpose of this bill, but having a central agency is not going to help improve security if we have the level of incompetence that this government has shown in the way in which it subsequently goes about handling the administration.

The threat to Australia following 11 September 2001 is genuine, but the mismanagement of the aviation sector by this government has simply been dangerous. The Howard government have been in power now for far too long—more than a decade—and it is long past the time that they should have seriously addressed the problems that beset security in Australia’s aviation and maritime industries. They rolled out a maritime security identification card system, and that is something that is also supported by the industry and by this side of the House. That involves detailed background checking of Australian maritime workers. That is a necessary thing. The industry understands it and the unions understand it. It has improved security amongst Australian-flagged ships.

I say ‘Australian-flagged ships’ deliberately, because whilst this government has required Australian crews to undergo thorough, invasive security and criminal background checks it does none of that with foreign crews. That is a problem that should be ringing alarm bells for a government in any situation, but for this government it is an even bigger problem because they—like no government before them—have misused and abused the process of giving permits to foreign-crewed ships to travel around Australian ports.

There has been a system in place for many years to enable foreign-flagged, foreign-crewed ships to operate the Australian coastal route by special permit. That is a sensible enough mechanism to deal with the ebb and flow of demand and supply of ships on the Australian coastal route. This government have used it as a tool to attack the Australian-crewed ships and their economic viability around Australian ports. The simple fact of life is that this government, as I have commented before, have handed out these permits like tickets in a Friday pub chook raffle. If you want to get permits to travel around the Australian coastline with foreign crews on foreign-flagged ships all you have to do is ask. This government do not do any of the security checks on those crews that are done on Australian crews.

In fact, it is worse than that. Not only do they not do the checks; they do not even enforce their own laws. The government have a requirement that ships coming to Australian ports from overseas have to advise of their crew and cargo 48 hours before arriving in port. That is a sensible law; we support it. The incompetence of the Howard government, though, does not implement it. The truth is that there are a significant number of ships that come to Australian ports without ever having provided that information. And that number has grown in the last 12 months. The figures demonstrate that the number of ships arriving in Australian ports without advising of their crew and cargo has increased over the last 12 months of available data.

So the situation is getting worse, not better. The mismanagement of the Howard government in these matters is jeopardising security. In 2005 the Australian Strategic Policy Institute published a damning report on the state of Australia’s security arrangements called Future unknown: the terrorist threat to Australian maritime security. That report identified the danger of foreign-flagged vessels carrying dangerous goods around the Australian coastline. Labor has warned the Howard government about this problem on many occasions. We have specifically warned about the dangers of foreign-crewed, foreign-flagged vessels for which there has been no security check carrying ammonium nitrate around Australia’s coastline.

I can recall a couple of years ago being at the Gladstone port with Kim Beazley, the then leader of the Labor Party, conducting a press conference, and a foreign-crewed ship, carrying 300 tonnes of ammonium nitrate, was in the background. The government had done no checks on the security of that crew or the vessel’s owners. Ammonium nitrate is a highly volatile material. When it is mixed with fuel, it becomes a very seriously dangerous explosive. It has been the explosive of choice for terrorists around the world for some years.

This is not a fanciful proposition. Indeed, there have been explosions involving ships carrying ammonium nitrate that have occurred by accident. Those incidents have occurred without the problems that we confront in a post-2001 world. The most notorious of those incidents occurred just after World War II, when the French freighter the SS Grandcamp, carrying 2,300 tonnes of ammonium nitrate, was docked at Texas City. On 16 April 1947, the ship’s decks caught fire and the ammonium nitrate exploded. That explosion was so great that it was heard 150 miles away. It produced a mushroom cloud that rose 2,000 feet in the air. The locals thought there had been a nuclear bomb attack and that the United States was at war. In fact, the explosion was so severe that the SS Grandcamp’s anchor, which weighed 1½ tonnes, was thrown two miles and ended up embedded 10 feet underground. That was the size of the explosion caused by that ship carrying ammonium nitrate. Yet, virtually every week of the year, without conducting anything like the security check required of Australian seafarers, the government hands out voyage permits authorising foreign crews on foreign-flagged ships to travel our ports while carrying dangerous chemicals like ammonium nitrate.

The proper course of action is that Australian seafarers, who have had those security checks done on them and who are fully trained and appropriately equipped to deal with these situations, should be carrying those goods. But the Howard government, for other reasons and agendas, is happy to let that unfold. Frankly, it is irresponsible and typical of this government that it has arrogantly avoided any serious probe of foreign-flagged vessels carrying dangerous goods around our coastline. The example I gave of the Texas City incident involving the French freighter the SS Grandcamp would have devastated any Australian port, but still the government refuses to heed the warnings.

It is not just in these areas that Labor have sought to raise concerns. We have also pointed out that, in our region of the world, Abu Sayyaf and Jemaah Islamiah have acquired the skills and have the opportunities to launch a maritime terrorist attack. These groups operate in South-East Asian waters, near to our borders, and in waters in which the incidence of piracy is the highest in the world. Again on the last available figures, there are two acts of piracy per week in the waters just to our north-north-west—exactly the area in which those terrorist organisations operate.

These concerns are compounded by the knowledge made available by United States intelligence sources that the al-Qaeda group is suspected of owning or having a long-term charter fleet of between 15 and 18 bulk general cargo vessels. This American intelligence assessment is publicly available. Whilst it is believed that these vessels are used to generate revenue to support the group or to provide logistics for the terrorist network, it is also feasible that one of these vessels could be used as a floating bomb on a suicide mission, making use of an explosive just like ammonium nitrate. Against that background, the failure of the Howard government to ensure that these dangerous chemicals are handled by crews who have been properly checked and cleared—and at the moment that applies only to Australian crews—is a great disgrace. Let us think about the consequences of that for a moment. Al-Qaeda has access to maritime vessels, it has expertise in maritime terrorism, it has expertise in explosives and it has access to those explosives, yet the Howard government runs at a snail’s pace in upgrading maritime security.

Labor keeps a watchful eye on the bills presented by the Attorney-General. His bills have become somewhat notorious for undermining important rights or for simply being poorly drafted. Who can forget the Attorney-General’s bill introduced into this parliament that included a number of quite offensive provisions, subsequently removed? In 2005, he introduced into the parliament a bill that included things like the strip-searching of minors. There was also the one-word bill that changed ‘the’ to ‘a’ to overcome a drafting problem in a hastily prepared earlier piece of antiterrorism legislation. Quality, considered and well-balanced laws have not been the hallmark of this government when it comes to dealing with security matters.

We will seek to refer this bill to the Senate legislative committee for closer scrutiny, particularly the possible future applications of the powers conferred in it beyond the ASIC and the MSIC. As I have commented, the purpose of this bill in establishing a central checking agency for ASIC and MSIC is supported; it is a sensible provision. We have been calling for it for some time, and the sooner it is up and running the better. It will not solve the maladministration of aviation and maritime security that has been the hallmark of this government, and it is because of those concerns that I move the following second reading amendment:

That all words after “That” be omitted with a view to substituting the following words:

“whilst not declining to give the bill a second reading, the House condemns the Government for its failure to provide necessary security upgrades to protect Australians, including:

(1)

its careless roll-out of the Aviation Security Identification Card (ASIC) scheme. That flawed roll-out included the loss or theft of ASICs and a history of airport security bungling;

(2)

its delays in rolling-out the Maritime Security Identification Card (MSIC) scheme and its careless and widespread use of single and continuing voyage permits for foreign vessels with foreign crew who do not undergo appropriate security checks;

(3)

permitting foreign flag of convenience ships to carry dangerous goods on coastal shipping routes without appropriate security checks; and

(4)

failing to;

(a)

ensure ships provide details of crew and cargo 48 hours before arrival;

(b)

x-ray or inspect 90 per cent of containers;

(c)

establish and properly fund an Australian Coastguard; and

(d)

establish a Department of Homeland Security to better coordinate security in Australia”.

There are a number of aspects of the second reading amendment that time has not permitted me to address. I should make a couple of quick comments before I conclude, though, about one aspect of it. We have here a bill, to be administered by the Attorney-General’s Department, dealing with security, largely in the transport department. Therein is highlighted one of the difficulties that Labor has been pursuing for the best part of the last six years. Our view on this side of the parliament is that the best solution to the modern threat of non-state terrorism is to have a dedicated department, a department of homeland security, where all of the agencies involved in providing that web of protection for Australians are administered under one minister and under one department.

At the moment, this government has those responsibilities divided up over half-a-dozen different ministers and even more departments and agencies. You need only look at an airport to find that three or four ministers are all responsible for the security that goes on in that one place. Where you have that degree of overlap it invites error, it invites omission and, of course, it invites a waste of resources. We can afford none of those things in responding to the threats that we now confront in this world. Labor has for years argued the importance of having this single department with responsibility and a clear chain of command. The odd thing is that, when the chips are down and there are important events to be held, the government actually understands that and adopts what would be Labor’s approach.

When Australia was charged with looking after the Olympics, for example—perhaps the most challenging security event in the world—it gave all security command to one person: the New South Wales Police Commissioner. So, although we had, for example, federal police and military personnel, for the purposes of their tasks at the Olympics the military personnel were under the command of the police commissioner in New South Wales. They knew there had to be one structure, one line of command, and to make it work in the most challenging of environments, at the Olympics, they did that. One wonders why, in the years since then, and particularly since 9-11, the government have not seen fit to establish an ongoing structure that mirrors that same rationale.

I also draw attention to a concern I have in relation to clause 8 of the bill, relating to the establishment of the scheme. Subclause (2) sets out the purposes for which background checks may be conducted. It is an extraordinarily broad list of items. Most of them are straightforward and to be expected. Of course we expect security checks to be done for the prevention of the carrying out of a terrorist act, for national emergencies, for national security, for the defence of Australia or for a number of the other things that are listed. But that provision seems to give scope for the Commonwealth to do background checks for any purpose whatsoever which may have no relationship at all to issues of security, defence or dealing with terrorist acts. One of the things I hope the government will be able to shed some light on during the consideration in detail and in the Senate inquiry is the purposes for which they intend those powers to be used and the need for legislation to be drafted in such an extraordinarily broad manner. We look forward to pursuing those matters of detail at the appropriate time.

Ian Causley (Page, Deputy-Speaker) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Is the amendment seconded?

Martin Ferguson (Batman, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Minister for Transport, Roads and Tourism) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I second the motion. It is with some pleasure that I stand in support of the position adopted by the Labor Party on the AusCheck Bill 2006 and especially the second reading amendment moved by the shadow minister and member for Brisbane, Mr Bevis. This is a very important bill, as has been previously stated by the member for Brisbane. It is all about trying to make sure that we in Australia can sleep at night without any significant fear with respect to the battle against terrorism. It is a common-sense bill, in my opinion, that provides the regulatory framework for the conduct of a centralised background-checking service operated through the Attorney-General’s Department.

Given the international challenge of terrorism at the moment, it is very important that we have a coordinated approach to this very serious challenge that confronts, at this particular point in time, not only Australia but also, importantly, the global community in which we live. It is interesting to note that the bill is another endeavour to configure correctly our national security settings and results from recommendation 19 of the Wheeler review. As the shadow minister for transport up until the last election in 2004, I have to say that I thought the Wheeler report presented many balanced and informed recommendations. It represented a comprehensive review at that time of what should be done to strengthen the security arrangements that operate within Australia—and they are so important to Australia’s desire to have the best possible armoury in the global fight against terrorism.

The bill therefore correctly provides for the creation of a new centralised division of the Attorney-General’s Department, to be known as AusCheck. This agency will be responsible for conducting background checks on those who work in the secure areas of air and sea ports. That is obviously important to my shadow ministerial responsibilities for transport. It applies namely to the holders of the aviation security identification card, ASIC, and the maritime security identification card, MSIC. Once fully established, it is envisaged that the division will operate on a cost recovery basis. In my opinion, this bill builds on all the work done in the previous parliament with respect to the development of the aviation security identity cards and the maritime security identity cards, because they go hand in glove with comprehensive legislation going to aviation and maritime security in Australia that was properly considered in a cooperative way by both sides of parliament.

AusCheck will commence operations from 1 July 2007. But I must say that the opposition has considerable criticism of the fact that this is two years after the decision of the government in 2005 to establish the new division. I would have thought that the challenge of terrorism would have required a little bit more haste and a certain decisiveness by the government to get this framework in place sooner than the late hour at which we are now considering this important legislation. From my point of view, the delay seems a relatively lengthy period of time for what should have been a relatively simple process. But we do welcome AusCheck’s establishment, despite the government’s tardiness on this front.

AusCheck will require additional enabling legislation to conduct background checks outside the Aviation Transport Security Act 2004 and the Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Act 2003. Obviously, a maritime security identification card is required if a person needs to work unescorted or unmonitored in a maritime security zone. That is a pretty fundamental requirement as far as I am concerned. This obviously covers waterfront workers, seafarers on Australian regulated ships, Customs brokers, shipping agents and contractors as well as service providers and maintenance workers—a comprehensive list of workers who are engaged in one way or another in the Australian maritime industry. With respect to the aviation field, identification cards are required by many persons working in an airside or a landside security zone at a security controlled airport that has regular transport services.

Whilst these cards are exceptionally important, the opposition still maintains considerable concern about the failure of the government to adopt a more comprehensive approach to aviation security arrangements in regional airports around Australia such as those at Wyndham and Burnie in Tasmania. We think it is ridiculous that at some of these airports you can board a plane unchecked; yet when you arrive at, for example, Melbourne Airport, you actually have to go through security having already undertaken the trip. We have previously indicated that, in our opinion, the threat of terrorism is real. Although we have comprehensive security, regimes at major capital city airports, such as in Sydney, Brisbane and Melbourne, there seem to be gaping holes in the security arrangements at some of our key regional airports around Australia. I remind the government that we need a further examination of this challenge, because the last thing we need is for someone who wants to do Australia and Australians harm to work out these weakness in the system and exploit them for their own ends.

Holding either identification card indicates that the holder is of a suitable character to work in a secure area, having undergone background checks including a criminal history check, a security assessment by ASIO where required, and an authority to work in Australia check by the Department of Immigration and Citizenship to ensure that the person is a citizen or permanent resident. The bill also provides authority for the department to maintain a database of applicants and cardholders; to collect, use and disclose information; and to recover costs for conducting background checks. Obviously it is important that we guarantee the security of this information, because it goes to considerable information about individuals in the Australian community. I remind the authorities to have a wary eye with respect to maintaining the security of this personal information.

The database is about minimising duplication of effort where individuals have a need to undertake background checks for different purposes, and should improve the Australian government’s response to a security alert by providing a centralised repository of information on persons who are required to enter a secure area. Hopefully, over time, this will streamline security procedures with respect to people who work in these highly sensitive industries.

Background checks have increasingly become a critical aspect of the workforce, with Australian Background reporting that 21 per cent of the 1,000 applicants it surveyed lied about their skills, experience or qualifications—which is of considerable concern to all of us. Interestingly, some five per cent had criminal convictions and, of these, 21 per cent or one in 100 applicants had prior convictions for theft or embezzlement. So, in many ways, this is no longer just about security; it is also about the major challenges of theft and fraud in some of the industries that operate in Australia. So it is important that we have a proper eye with respect to these challenges too.

In 2002, fraud cost the Australian economy $5.8 billion, which represents over 18 per cent of the total cost of crime. However, rates of reporting fraud are low, with about 25 per cent in small business and around 60 per cent in large companies. This means that, due to the nature of the crime, perpetrators can re-offend in another company or agency that does not conduct thorough background checks. I think it is important that these issues be brought to the attention of the House, because they are of fundamental importance to the operation of business in Australia from not only a security point of view but also the point of view of guaranteeing that honest practices prevail in the operation of Australian business.

In the context of my portfolio responsibilities as shadow minister for tourism in addition to transport, I well understand that security at our air and sea ports is vital to Australia’s tourism industry, because this industry employs over half a million Australians. Many of those people are young people starting out in their working lives, and there are also increasing opportunities for more mature-age people to work on a part-time basis. We need to try to overcome some of the major challenges that exist with respect to attracting labour to and retaining labour in the very important export-earning tourism and hospitality industry, which Australia has been so good at for so long.

I also remind the House that, with my former responsibilities as shadow minister for resources, I have on a number of occasions raised the importance of ensuring that maritime security is upheld at all times to the highest possible standard, going to background checks and identity cards for anyone in the gas industry who works on board or offshore. Obviously, the importance of that is understandable. In addition, there are also the important issues raised by the member for Brisbane, which went to foreign-flagged vessels, foreign crews and sensitive cargo, such as ammonium nitrate.

The opposition, especially through the speeches of the former Leader of the Opposition, Kim Beazley, has pursued these issues on numerous occasions. But, unfortunately, the government has continued to turn a blind eye to the importance of maintaining an efficient domestic maritime industry more regularly staffed by Australian crew rather than having our waters principally devoted to foreign ships with foreign crews without adequate security checks. We will continue to remind the House of these issues, especially when you consider some of the cargo, such as ammonium nitrate, that is being carried from port to port around Australia. It is imperative that the security regime that exists in Australia is second to none in the world. The opposition takes the issue of maritime and aviation security very seriously and takes the view that there is no room for complacency on this front—a view we believe is also shared by the Australian public.

The workers dutifully perform their tasks on the wharves and in the airports, and I believe that they and their families have a lot to gain from a secure maritime and air travel environment. If anything goes wrong, they are the first affected. As is the case with any employment arrangement, we have to make sure that all Australian workers have the capacity to work in the safest possible environment. In any survey of Australian workers and their families, the issue that always comes out first is not the wages and conditions of employment but the desire to ensure that, when a worker goes to work each day, he or she is not killed or maimed at work and is able to come home. I regard this security regime as being important, in the same way as normal occupational health and safety standards are important to Australian workers and their families.

It is also important to recognise that these workers are not the barrier to making sure that we have the best security regime in the world. They are the eyes and ears that will alert us to any threat. In our modern-day world defined by a climate of fear, we can sometimes mistakenly see the fear as inordinate in relation to the actual threat and, in doing so, place unnecessary intrusions on the private lives of ordinary citizens. I raise this because of my regular contact with the aviation and tourism industries. Whilst it is important that we have the toughest regulatory regime possible, we have to maintain a balance with what is required given a particular level of threat. That requires not only ongoing consultation and proper assessment of the security arrangements required in Australia and for the purposes of international travel but also having proper regard for the potential impact on the operation of Australian industry.

With respect to the travelling public, it also requires us to have proper regard to how we manage and put in place the ever-increasing number of changes that are being pursued in the security regime in Australia. For example, as has happened overseas, we will soon, in an international aviation context, go with more thorough and restrictive requirements regarding taking fluids on board international carriers. This issue will have to be worked through very carefully. There will also be greater checks on what we carry onto those international carriers. I ask the government to ensure that they properly consult industry when putting these changes in place and allow sufficient time, and minimise the inconvenience to the travelling public, with respect to the introduction of these major changes.

The second reading amendment is vital because it proposes two important alterations. They involve deleting two unguarded clauses for criteria in future regulations—clauses 5(d) and 8(c). In proposing and supporting the second reading amendment, the opposition calls for a complete definition of what a background check is—so that people understand more fully what is involved—and for the scope of the AusCheck scheme to be embedded in the bill. We believe that this would provide for an additional safeguard against the misuse or potential misuse of AusCheck.

While this might appear an overly cautious amendment, it does address a number of concerns surrounding so-called Big Brother legislation—and I note comments from the government party room this week on Big Brother legislation and personal identity cards for the purpose of the operation of the social security system in Australia. It is perhaps easy to blur our sense of perspective in this world of 24-hour, seven-days-a-week live and instant media that can seemingly elevate everything to crisis level. In this climate, it is easy to assume that our present situation confronts us with threats like no other and that our world is the most dangerous, the most hazardous and the one most plagued by terror. Every era has had its threats and its own focus on the origin of those threats, and I contend that the 21st century is no different to any other.

This is not to say that the threat of terrorism today is not greater than it was before that tragic day 5½ years ago on September 11 in the United States. It is greater, and our democracy is more fragile than we think as a result. It has been claimed by the Attorney-General’s Department that a terrorist act aimed at Australia’s interests has been carried out, aborted or disrupted every year since 2001, which is something that we have to have in mind in considering this type of legislation. Our fear of the threat may, from time to time, be out of proportion, but it is real and legitimate. That is why I stand here today in support of this bill and encourage the swift and efficient establishment of the new division, AusCheck. It is also why I support the second reading amendment, which provides an additional safeguard against the misuse of a centralised background-checking service. Our national security is, as we would all agree, of the utmost importance—but it cannot come at any cost. I commend the second reading amendment to the House and indicate the opposition’s overall support for the bill.

Duncan Kerr (Denison, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I endorse, without exception, the remarks of the member for Batman in this debate on the AusCheck Bill 2006. It is important to realise that when it comes to the security of airport and marine installations it is fundamentally the safety of those who work in those environments that is also at issue and that we have to temper our fear with a realistic appreciation of the harms that can befall us as a society if we give way to too great a degree of reliance on authoritarian responses, particularly if they are imposed without regard to the interests of those who are working in those environments.

This bill seems a practical measure to bring together the vetting arrangements for those who will work in environments where some degree of pre-clearance is required. It also avoids the need for those pre-clearance arrangements to be undertaken by employers—so that the employers would become aware of personal circumstances in ways which might otherwise be seen as breaches of privacy—and confers on an agency of the Commonwealth the management of this process. In that regard, it appears to be sensible. It has the support of the unions that represent workers in the employment areas that are most immediately relevant, and it seems to offer a practical and convenient way of addressing what we all reluctantly accept as a necessity for the modern age.

I will just make a couple of short points. The area that I wish to raise is one which the shadow minister has said requires examination in the Senate. I am a little concerned about the growing practice in legislation proposed to this House that provides for the making of regulations to determine matters which should be set out in the principal legislation. Two particular parts are a good example in relation to this legislation. Proposed section 5 defines what a background check can be. It says that it is ‘an assessment of information relating to one or more of the following’ and then sets it out:

(a)

the individual’s criminal history;

(b)

matters relevant to a security assessment of the individual;

(c)

the individual’s citizenship status, residency status or the individual’s entitlement to work in Australia, including but not limited to, whether the person is an Australia citizen, a permanent resident or an unlawful non-citizen …

Those matters, I think, the House and the Senate will find uncontentious. But, then, the provision goes on to say:

(d)

such other matters as are prescribed by the regulations.

Given that this is establishing a legislative arrangement for a security regime which will currently apply principally to our ports and airports but is capable of extension across a wider range of circumstances, I think it is reasonable to say that the parliament itself should determine whether or not some other matters are going to be made the subject of inclusion within the background-checking process.

I do not think there are suitable guarantees in saying that it is always open for either house to move a motion of disallowance if the regulations extend those processes into areas where there would be concerns. I do not think it is satisfactory for two reasons. Firstly, with the increasing volume of regulations, the capacity of this parliament to critically examine the raft of regulations is increasingly being tested. Secondly, the executive has, in a practical sense, control of a majority in both the Senate and the House. It might be said in response to that point that any legislation that could be proposed is likely to pass, equally. But I think there is, in a practical sense, no doubt that greater scrutiny occurs when legislation is put forward in this House and subject to forensic examination, the sunshine of public exposure and debate and the requirement for its rationale to be explained to the parliament as a whole. I do not think there is any doubt that that is a much more rigorous process of examination than permitting the executive to make a regulation that will stand until a proposal to disallow occurs, with that only occurring in circumstances where it is likely that those who have proposed the disallowance know that the executive has control of both houses and probably will defeat it.

I think that the mandatory requirement to subject any extension of the background-checking regime to legislative amendment is a proper one. If we were to have that examined in the Senate and, if that were the conclusion of the Senate, it would be one I would certainly be very comfortable with. I see no reason why the government would reject that proposal. It is quite capable of bringing forward a bill and, if there is a sufficient rationale for a significant change, advancing those arguments in the parliament and having those arguments examined.

There is a concern in the community about the growing authoritarianism and intrusion of identity and security checking. It has been manifested in the coalition party room—I think somewhat intemperately, if I read the headlines correctly—in relation to allegations that certain new proposals amount to a national identity card. But, whether intemperate or otherwise, I think it is one of those crucial areas of public policy where this House and the Senate need to insist that, if we are going to widen the range of matters that a citizen can be subject to by security check before they can get employment in particular areas, this parliament should have oversight of it and not delegate a possible net-widening capacity to the executive in a way which is effectively less well checked or unchecked.

The second area where the regulations have a similar potential effect is in relation to extending the areas in which the AusCheck scheme can operate. At the moment, the scheme will operate in the aviation areas under the Aviation Transport Security Act or the Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Act, and then there is the omnibus regulation-making power for such other purposes as are prescribed by the regulations. We are not given to anticipate where this might be but, if we are going to extend the requirement for security checking pre-employment and exclude from employment Australians, because of those security requirements, who do not meet the checking, it is equally proper to say this parliament should decide which industries and what circumstances those intrusions on citizens’ rights are going to be extended to.

I do not like the current trend, which is in a sense to put up framework legislation and then effectively allow the executive, through regulations, to extend the reach of the legislation, the circumstances where it will apply, the areas in which it will apply and what can be done under the legislation. Traditionally, regulations passed under an act made by this parliament have been to facilitate the implementation of substantive provisions already existing in the legislation. Routinely, we would pass an act that sets out the bounds of what is possible under the legislation and then gives the executive power to make regulations so that the detail can be filled in. The kinds of regulations that are being proposed here do not do that. They do not fill in the detail; in fact they widen the ambit of the legislation and give the capacity to widen the kinds of matters that would be subject to security checking.

In a sense this parliament surrenders its sovereign power to define the reach and ambit of legislation to the executive. It is not quite what used to be called the Henry VIII clause, which allowed the executive to overturn or suspend a provision of legislation, but it is awfully close to it in its practical application. The legislation sets out certain things which, on the face of it, are unobjectionable but then leaves to the executive the capacity to extend them into other areas of employment where this parliament may or may not wish the legislation to extend. It also extends the range of matters that are subject to security checks beyond the ordinary—criminal checks, national security and the like, citizenship—into subject matters which are not defined and which the government has not illuminated us on in relation to its intention. But they potentially could have very grave ramifications were they to extend into areas such as, for example, the private personal lives of people, their conduct in various regards, their political allegiances and the like.

I do not know of anything that gives rise to particular concerns but, if there are no reasons to fear the parliament’s scrutiny, it would be far preferable to make any extension the subject of further amendment in this House. This would be subject to proper examination rather than proceeding in this rather unfortunate way, where the primary legislation simply becomes a vehicle for potential extension rather than for defining the law, using regulation simply to fill in the gap. It is wrong in principle. It is not a satisfactory way to use this parliament. It ought to be condemned. This parliament ought not to further facilitate what is an increasingly common practice which degrades the oversight that this parliament routinely and traditionally has exercised in relation to substantive legislation.

With those short remarks, I commend the bill to the House and to its scrutiny by the Senate, and I would hope, picking up on those points that I have made, that there is some opportunity for further reconsideration of the structure of the legislation, particularly the very wide and sweeping capacity to make regulations which might transform what is quite an acceptable and very appropriate piece of legislation into something that we did not anticipate during its passage through this parliament.

Sharon Grierson (Newcastle, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The AusCheck Bill 2006 provides a framework for a centralised background-checking service by the Attorney-General’s Department and to coordinate criminal and security assessment for aviation security identification card and maritime security identification card applicants. It also provides the authority for the department to maintain a database of applicants and cardholders, to collect, use and disclose information and to recover costs for conducting background checks.

Labor supports having a central vetting agency, believing that it has the capacity to improve efficiency, particularly the response time should they be needed in any security alerts or upgrades. We hope—and we would insist—that it would actually improve privacy for those people submitting themselves to background checks.

We do have some concerns, however, about some clauses in this legislation. That is why, with my Labor colleagues, I support the amendment to refer the bill to a Senate inquiry. In particular, we would like to see changed the section which leaves the definition of a background check open to amendment by regulation. We would perhaps suggest that there would have to be very good reasons to change that. Similarly, the section which allows the scope of the AusCheck scheme to be expanded beyond ASICs and MSICs by regulation should, we think, be changed.

As with many of the security related matters which are increasingly coming before us in this place, the challenge is to get this rather delicate balance right between security, making sure that our travelling public are safe, and making sure that people’s individual rights and civil liberties are maintained as much as is possible. We would be concerned that moving all of these powers into the Attorney-General’s Department could lead, if there is wriggle room in legislation, to a Big Brother attitude. With all that information centralised in one place, in a security culture which certainly becomes quite emotional and, at times, highly politicised, we would have to make sure that the right checks and balances existed—and they should be in this legislation.

The establishment of AusCheck follows a recommendation of the Wheeler airport security and policing review that the background checking for ASICs be tightened, centralised in the Attorney-General’s Department and harmonised with maritime cards as well. As Deputy Chair of the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit, which completed its own thorough review of airport security last year, I am pleased to see some action from the government, which we think has been dragging its heels on aviation and port security for too long. In fact, the committee reported back in June 2004 on problems with airport security in Australia but resolved to revisit the subject after mounting community concern over travelling safety became very apparent. Some people will recall that that concern came to a head with the notorious camel suit incident at Sydney airport, where a baggage handler rode around on a cargo trolley wearing a dress-up suit he had pulled out of someone’s luggage. Committee members and the public were rightly concerned about aspects of the Schapelle Corby case and the allegations of organised drug-smuggling among some staff at Sydney airport. So there are many reasons to make sure that aviation security is well controlled, well maintained and informed by events and by the industry as well. The committee recommended that Sydney airport in particular be the subject of regular unannounced security audits. I look forward to the government’s response on this.

During the committee’s second review of airport security, I kept a file of publicly reported incidents of security breaches at our airports. Sadly, that file now—and I keep it current—has almost 100 incidents listed. There would be many more, I imagine, that are never reported publicly. So I think it is important that we say that the security of the travelling public must be paramount.

The latest incident recorded was at Sydney airport. An unidentified object was found in a bag. It was believed to be a weapon, and it caused a security scare and evacuation. These are major disruptions. In October last year a Pakistani national was arrested for holding fake passports and was believed to work as a security guard at Melbourne Airport. There is no doubt that you have to know who works at airports and around our ports. You have to know that they have been thoroughly background-checked and that their employment is appropriate for maintaining safety and security.

I think we have all seen over the years that the staff involved are making more of an effort to use ASICs, especially in regional airports. I can remember seeing staff jump off planes and not bother to put their ASIC on because they were in a regional airport. I never see that now, fortunately. ASICs are required if a person needs to work in a secure area, on the tarmac area in particular, either on the air side or land side of a security controlled airport that has regular public transport services. That is a lot of airports in Australia.

Under the current system, issuing bodies are individually responsible for background checking, issuing the ASICs and reclaiming expired ASICs. A hundred and eighty-eight registered airports and airlines currently issue ASICs. That is a lot of issuing bodies. The committee found, in submissions from the industry and from people who had received ASICs, that there were varying outcomes from and processes within the issuing bodies themselves. It was alleged in submissions that it was easier to get an ASIC with some issuers than it was with others, and that assessments did not always match security risk. It was alleged that if you went to the right issuer you could get an ASIC. We were concerned about that. While I am pleased that this legislation is tidying up the background-checking process, there are still a number of recommendations by the JCPAA committee that relate to ASICs which I would have liked to have seen in this legislation.

Our committee heard in November 2005 that there had been 384 lost or stolen cards. That was a major concern. We were of the view that some centralising of the management of ASICs could help reduce the number of lost or stolen cards. It was an unacceptably high number and certainly unacceptable as a benchmark for any government department. We recommended, therefore, that AusCheck should issue the cards, take responsibility for their return and also be required to provide an annual report to parliament on the number of non-returned ASICs. Labor, though, is concerned that centralising the issuing as well as the background checks in the Attorney-General’s Department could become a breach of people’s privacy and an opportunity for data matching and data sharing that is not necessary or warranted and which could infringe on people’s privacy. It was very strongly stated in the committee’s aviation security report that these sorts of decisions should be taken in consultation with industry and with advocacy groups for the travelling public.

The committee also recommended that decisions relating to background checks made by AusCheck be subject to appeal. We are talking about people’s livelihoods, and it would be unacceptable if they were barred from gaining an ASIC or an MSIC unfairly. We do think there should be an appeal process. Our recommendation was that it should be through the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. It is unclear whether this will apply to any expansion of AusCheck’s role made under regulations, but I think it should. That is one reason why I think that aspect should actually be referred to and reviewed by a Senate inquiry.

We also recommended that AusCheck should be required to monitor, and report annually to the Attorney-General on, the adequacy of the completion of background checks for aviation security identification card applications by ASIO, the Australian Federal Police and the Department of Immigration and Citizenship. We want expediency. We want to know that all those agencies are doing their job properly. We do not want to think that any of those departments or those very important security, police and immigration agencies use information incorrectly or misuse that opportunity to do the correct background checks. We do think that should be reported on annually in terms of the adequacy of those checks. If they are dragging the chain and not doing their job, we do think the government should know about it.

We have also been concerned about the expiration and termination of cards for cardholders working in aviation. We recommended that an annual report to the parliament should be made on the number of non-returned identification cards. Our concern was that there were already so many cards out there unaccounted for that the parliament deserves to know every year whether we are achieving better outcomes. So we were very firm in our belief that this is an important area that has to be monitored, and I hope this legislation under review by the Senate inquiry will make sure that we do achieve some of those best-case outcomes.

Newcastle is my electorate and I am particularly aware and conscious of what any aviation security legislation means to my area. The screening of baggage at regional airports was quite an issue in our report. We also asked DOTARS to report in three months time—that is, at the start of March—on whether further regional airports need mandatory baggage screening. This is one of the most controversial areas in aviation security. Air travel through Newcastle Airport has grown by 400 per cent in just the last few years. So there is certainly no time to delay in improving airport security. Interestingly, industry is moving ahead, but so is research. I note that Newcastle university researchers are developing drug and explosives screening techniques using chemical sensors. A leading international toxicologist is employed there and funded with Australian Research Council grants. I am pleased to see that happening.

MSICs were required from 1 January this year. Talk about the security of ports has been continuing for some time. I congratulate the Port of Newcastle on the very expedient and successful implementation of its port security plan. I know that has been used in the industry to guide the other port security plan developments. We are a very busy port and we are very conscious that we do need to know who is in our port. Sometimes we think that there needs to be greater understanding of the movement of people from ships in ports as well as people who work in those environments.

This week I spoke to a maritime union official from the International Transport Workers Federation regarding an incident on board a Greek owned ship in Newcastle. ITF was denied entry onto that ship. That is very unusual; as a matter of fact I do not know of it happening in our port before. I think it is important that the unions, who are working in those environments every day, being some of the people who get the first tip-off about any security risks, are given good access to our ports. I am told that, after publicity, the ITF official was allowed entry. I also note that the MUA has raised concerns about ports, like ours having ammonium nitrate passing through it and having flag of convenience ships crewed by foreign workers who have not had to have MSIC screening.

I also think it is very important that we do not go too far. I know that in Townsville recently there were people locked up on their ships who could not get out because there was no-one to security-clear them to leave their ship, leave the port and go into town. So, yes, it is very important that we tighten up on MSICs, identity checks and the return and management of cards—we have to make sure that our ports operate safely. But we also have to be sensible and think about the welfare of crews and port users.

I think the Howard government can do a lot more on aviation and port security. I am mindful of the fact that the Wheeler report was done some time ago, and it still has many outstanding provisions. One recommendation that the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audits did not make—not for the lack of me suggesting it—was that a department of homeland security be established. I still think that this is such a complex area that a dedicated government department is absolutely needed. This government has had long enough to deal with all aspects of transport security. This bill does move in the right direction, but it seems to me that the wheels are turning too slowly.

Daryl Melham (Banks, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise to support the AusCheck Bill 2006 and the second reading amendment moved by the honourable member for Brisbane. In his second reading speech the Attorney pointed out the policy objective of this bill. He said:

... the government agreed to establish a centralised background checking service in the Attorney-General’s Department as part of a wider initiative to strengthen the ASIC and the MSIC systems.

ASIC relates to aviation security identification cards and MSIC relates to maritime security identification cards. The Attorney-General continued:

The new division has been established, now known as AusCheck, and it will help the aviation and maritime industries to identify high-risk individuals who should not be granted an ASIC or an MSIC.

…         …         …

The decision to establish AusCheck followed a recommendation of Sir John Wheeler’s Airport Security and Policing Review and is an important part of the government’s ongoing commitment to improve aviation and maritime security.

That recommendation was recommendation No. 19, which states:

A new national card-authorising body within the Attorney-General’s Department is required to bring together the national security and criminality streams and immigration checks on a timely ‘live’ basis and to apply judgements as to who is a fit and proper person for the purposes of access to sensitive airport areas and aircraft. Appeals against decisions of this body should be to a special section of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal as is currently available with respect to ASIO decisions. Employers also have a responsibility to screen prospective staff carefully before seeking an ASIC and to monitor any relevant behaviour after issue. This improved aviation system has a clear analogue in the maritime sector.

So what the government is attempting to do with this legislation is laudable. I think it is something that deserves the support of all of us in parliament. I think there is a history where, at times, there has been a bit of slackness—which I do not necessarily need to go into. In the heightened security environment the public would expect that areas like this are streamlined, are more efficient and are seen to be more effective.

The problem we have, I suppose, as a federation, is that we have eight states and territories and a Commonwealth, and at times, quite frankly, things fall through the cracks because of jurisdictional borders. The same is true in relation to different agencies. Things can fall through the cracks from different agencies not talking to one another. So what we are seeing here is a capacity for different agencies to talk to one another and to be able to have this new national card-authorising body operating in a timely and efficient manner with a single database.

As the honourable member for Denison pointed out, there are some question marks over whether some aspects of this scheme should be in the legislation or should be in regulations. He pointed out two sections of the bill. Clause 5 is really the guts of the bill—‘Definition of background check’. It states:

A background check, in relation to an individual, is an assessment of information relating to one or more of the following:

(a)

the individual’s criminal history ...

No problems with that. Clause 5(b) states:

(b)

matters relevant to a security assessment of the individual ...

No problems with that. Clause 5(c) states:

(c)

the individual’s citizenship status, residency status or the individual’s entitlement to work in Australia, including but not limited to, whether the person is an Australian citizen, a permanent resident or an unlawful non-citizen ...

No problems with that. Clause 5(d) states:

(d)

such other matters as are prescribed by the regulations.

That is a very broad section of the act, and it is open to manipulation by governments and bureaucrats in relation to what those ‘other matters’ are that are going to be prescribed by the regulations. I can understand the need for regulations as against legislation in a number of instances—indeed, the benefit of a regulation is that it allows rapid action to be taken in times of emergency. But a disadvantage is that accountability and control are lost.

Another section that is a cause for concern is clause 8—‘Establishment of AusCheck scheme’. Clause 8(1) states:

The regulations may provide for the establishment of a background checking scheme (the AusCheck scheme) relating to the conduct and coordination of background checks of individuals:

(a)

for the purposes of the Aviation Transport Security Act 2004 or regulations under that Act; and

(b)

for the purposes of the Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Act 2003 or regulations under that Act; and—

here is the problem subclause—

(c)

for such other purposes as are prescribed by the regulations.

What we would say—or what I certainly say on this side—is that that is a very broad subclause, together with clause 5(d), in terms of just saying ‘for such other purposes as are prescribed by the regulations’. That is a really wide power to be handing over to the minister without proper guidelines. Under clause 5, you can tell that we are worried about specific things: criminal history, ASIO checks and citizenship status. What can come under clause 5(d)? Someone’s political affiliations? Will the old Communist Party membership disqualify you?

Peter Dutton (Dickson, Liberal Party, Minister for Revenue and Assistant Treasurer) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Are you still a member?

Daryl Melham (Banks, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I am not a member and have never been a member, unlike some on your side who have been members and supporters of fascist parties and engaged in dodgy activities.

Ian Causley (Page, Deputy-Speaker) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Order! I remind the member for Banks that it is appropriate to reply to interjections by addressing his remarks through the chair.

Daryl Melham (Banks, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Mr Deputy Speaker, I am entitled to answer what is an interjection and what needs to be dealt with.

Ian Causley (Page, Deputy-Speaker) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The member for Banks is arguing with the chair. If the member for Banks wishes to—

Daryl Melham (Banks, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Mr Deputy Speaker, it is relevant to this bill.

Ian Causley (Page, Deputy-Speaker) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Order! If the member for Banks wishes to respond to an interjection, which is unparliamentary, he will at least have the courtesy of addressing his remarks through the chair and not directly engage in conversations with the member opposite.

Daryl Melham (Banks, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

It is actually relevant to this legislation, because the truth is that, if this legislation had been enacted in the fifties, the Menzies government would have been able to disqualify people on the basis of Communist Party membership. We went through that charade in the fifties, where the High Court knocked over the government’s legislation and the people also rejected the government having those powers. So the interjection that the minister made is pertinent because it shows his prejudices. It also highlights how he as a minister would have a power that, in my opinion, is open to abuse by him because of his own prejudices should he say, ‘If you’re a member of the Communist Party’—or whatever—‘that will disqualify you in relation to this legislation.’

So even though it is out of order his interjection is relevant, which is why I took it up. And I thank him for it, because it does not take much to scratch this particular minister and get out his bile and his prejudices. He is now a minister of the Crown. Those sorts of interjections are unbecoming of a minister of the Crown. He is not an ordinary backbencher. He should act how his office requires him to act: responsibly, without prejudice. That is exactly the point that I make about those two particular subclauses that cause me to have some concern.

The government is to be applauded in the main for this legislation. It is based on protecting and securing our nation, and the government or the opposition should not be the repository of that. It is our responsibility as members of parliament and as ministers of the Crown. And, when ministers of the Crown make regulations, they should be doing so in terms of certain principles, not certain prejudices. All I am saying to the minister at the table and the government, and to anyone listening, is that I have no problems as long as the basic principles are enunciated. The parliament should be entitled to adopt those principles so that ministers or governments, irrespective of their political persuasion, cannot go off on frolics.

Unfortunately, we are living in an environment where there is a new McCarthyism. There is a fear out there in the community. Governments of all political persuasions are responding and coming up with quite oppressive laws. In relation to this legislation I say to the relevant minister that he is right in having this legislation as it pertains to the criminal history and security of an individual, and the assessment of that, and citizenship status. If there are other matters that the minister feels should come into the background check then I believe it does not necessarily need to be done, as a parliament, by regulation. Earlier I quoted the advantages of some regulations, because they do allow for urgent situations. We should not be naive enough to think that there will not be urgent situations in this area and that, as a result of conduct that is worrying, some instances or recommendations might require some urgent action but might not come to the attention of government and the bureaucracy.

I am not standing up and saying that in all instances, even in relation to this legislation, governments should be totally constrained, but there have to be some principles and the principles have to go to security. They have to go to the vulnerability of the systems that are currently in place and go to improving the systems and giving confidence to members of the public. What worries me is whether it will be a situation where unionism will be outlawed in relation to individuals.

I have a view about the security of our airports that we are a lot more vulnerable with the outsourcing that is taking place and the contractors who have a role there than with having an extension of the Australian Protective Service or public servants who are properly trained and with whom you would not necessarily have the turnover that you might have with an outsourced organisation. You could bring in public servants, properly remunerate them, give them pride in their job and properly train them to, in effect, do the baggage and security checks and profiling at airports et cetera. In my humble view, if you have a trained Public Service, you will have a more secure system than if you have an outsourced system that, with it, might bring people who are not necessarily criminal or a security problem, or whatever, but who, as a result of necessary cost cutting and other things, are not necessarily the best individuals to be in jobs that we regard as important.

With those short remarks, I commend the bill to the House and commend the government on bringing it forward. There are certainly advantages to this bill that are not currently there in the current system. I thank the minister for his disorderly interjection because it enabled me to point out how the system can be abused. I am sure that, in relation to the matters that I raise, the Senate committee and the minister will, hopefully, at least have a look at them. If there is merit in what I say then there is merit in the government looking at it. If it is not meritorious then it is a matter for the government.

Michael Hatton (Blaxland, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I agree with the comments the member for Banks just made about outsourcing. We should have trained public servants in our airports and our ports rather than outsourcing for contracted workers. But he was too kind about past and current problems. As is my wont, I will go much further than the member for Banks and say there are people who are still conducting criminal activity at Kingsford Smith airport. They have been doing it for decades. They have been doing it in such a way, across a series of areas, that they have been undetected. They will not be broken up unless we have an activist Australian government willing to go into Sydney Airport and the other major airports and break the cabals that have been operating without proper scrutiny for years now. There has been so much movement of illegal drugs Australia-wide, undiscovered through major airports. Certain people have not been pinged because we do not have a dedicated police force.

The general approach has been that the state police force and state detectives should not be involved in our major airports. I think they should be, because the Australian Protective Service, no matter how good a job it does, is not made up of professional policemen trained in this area to pick up criminal activity and chase it down. Police should be involved, as long as we have got the normal regulation and control to ensure that there is not a corruption of those officers working in this area. The money is so great because of the amount and value of the drugs and other contraband that are moved through there that we need a dedicated force that will go in practically and crack the back of this. This is because there is also another fundamental connection here in our ports and our airports that the state police, the Federal Police and our security agencies are concerned about. What this bill is striving to do by getting a better picture of it and a better hang on it with the AusCheck proposal—which I am fully in favour of—is to underline the fact that we need to look at the deadly combination of criminality and terrorism.

We have already seen that there have been people with active terrorist contacts working in Sydney Airport. One of the first people taken out of the place was a baggage handler at Sydney Airport. In terms of the potential for terrorist activity in Australia, you could not get a much more vulnerable situation than having people inside, working in the baggage area. We know from the terror plots that have been discovered so far that there has been a concentration on aviation. The undiscovered areas are maritime and rail, as we had with Madrid. But we also know that what has been done so far to try to crack the problems, particularly at KSA, is not enough. And we are trying to drive the government harder and faster to address these problems, because there is not that much time. You cannot step back and do it in a fashion where you just expect that things will go your way. You cannot just take partial measures here.

I know the normal response is to look at something and say: ‘Well, there might be a few problems here. You know, it’ll be blown up in the media; it’ll be blown up whether it’s in print, radio, TV or whatever else.’ But the member for Lowe—who sits next to me in this House and has an adjacent electorate—has, by working day in and day out asking questions to ministers, pinned down exactly what the situation was with security cameras in Kingsford Smith airport. One security camera was out of focus, and another was turned against the wall. They just happened to be in those areas that were most vulnerable.

You need an active Customs Service and an active Australian Protective Service, and I think we need to engage in this area with the state police. We need a state police presence, with people who are experienced in detective work, to really go in and clean out these areas so they will not be as vulnerable as they are.

I will say here again, as I have said previously on questions of security at Kingsford Smith airport—and I know that the Attorney takes these matters very seriously—that there are significant problems that have not yet been got at. And the reason they have not is the nature of the whole process. The member for Banks alluded to this when he spoke about the outsourcing. I know outsourcing is the flavour of the decade: walking away from government responsibilities and deciding that we will not have government staff do the work and that we will not have all of the on-cost involved in that. That has happened at federal, state and council levels. People have made all sorts of savings—big savings—and efficiencies.

But I can only say that in the most capitalist country on the planet, the United States of America, you will not find them outsourcing their security service, their baggage-handling service, their customs service or their protective services. There is a whole range of fundamental security mechanisms that are in place in the baggage and cargo checking and handling. You will not find local, private security companies involved. You will not find Wackenhut involved in this.

Prior to September 11, 2001, that might have been a bit of the flavour of the US. It may have made some inroads. I do not really think so, though, because the culture in the United States is that—whilst they are entirely capitalist and in some cases have untrammelled capitalism at its greatest, as we saw in the 1860s and the 1890s—they have a strong sense of government responsibility and a strong sense that the government is there to protect the people of the United States of America. That is its chief task, and it will not be assured that if it gives the job to other people it is really going to be done.

I have been through the United States. I have been through the upgraded checking at their airports. Years before, I went through Los Angeles or Kennedy airport in the United States and I discovered that before there was any evident or extant problem with terrorism there was a really significant process for getting into the country. US citizens were in one line and whole queues of aliens were in another. That was the first time I found out that I was an alien but they still tend to treat people in that way—rather brusquely.

Philip Ruddock (Berowra, Liberal Party, Attorney-General) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

You are not an alien here, I hope?

Michael Hatton (Blaxland, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I hope not, Philip. I may be considered an alien by some but I hope not. Sometimes I think I might be.

The checking was so intense that the person who got through quickest was a nun who was about 40 or so. She got through in 15 minutes. I do not have a problem with that, and I do not have a problem with officials dealing with it in the way that we have Australian Customs officials dealing with it. I actually think it is really important.

Here I would put to the Attorney-General that we should have a complete change of culture at our airports and ports. I am speaking about the changes with security cards, including the maritime security identification card and, as I have spoken of before, the aviation security identification card. The Attorney will have been apprised of the fact that our amendments go to the manner in which they were rolled out, although that did not occur during his time as Attorney. I will trust that the demerits in that roll-out will be fixed by Mr Ruddock as Attorney-General, because this is fundamentally important. Slow, careful, detailed work in this area is critical. Why?—because we have had plenty of examples, at Kingsford Smith airport in particular, where the process for the security identification cards has not been right. It has not been adequate or complete, and that has left us very vulnerable.

It is difficult to understand this at the contracting-out level because people generally think of contracts in terms of cleaning contracts, where companies like Spotless, Totalcare or someone else take the head contract. They have employees and they have control of those employees, and you would pretty much be able to determine, if something went wrong, what was happening. It is in the nature of the security industry in Sydney in particular—I know this is Australia-wide but my experience is in Sydney—at Kingsford Smith airport and elsewhere, that you are not dealing just with a head contractor. The head contractor subcontracts, that subcontractor subcontracts and that subcontractor subcontracts. In a country where we have contractors for just about everything—there are no employees left in this area—you have people contracting right down at the bottom. The control over those people—a casualised workforce with people moving in and out—is not what it should be.

It has not been envisaged by the Attorney-General or by the government—it has been envisaged by me previously, by the member for Banks now and more generally by Labor—that the whole lot should be cleared out. I would get rid of Wackenhut, SNP and all the rest of them. Clear them all out. Let us, in this instance, follow the lead of the United States government and put Australian government employees—as we have in Customs and APS—into the key roles where we check baggage and cargo, because it is vitally important.

Our amendments are significant in terms of the security identification cards in the aviation and maritime areas because unless this system works adequately we will not have the kind of protections we have had. In his second reading speech on this bill the minister indicated that the government has moved in a series of areas where we have pressed hard—such as the hardening of cockpit doors—and circumstances have also pressed hard so that we have passenger screening for all regular passenger jet flights, upgraded closed circuit television and monitoring capability. As the member for Lowe has pointed out time and again, you have to make sure that it works. Although there is monitoring, it may be turned off, allowing terrible things to happen, and our security may be trammelled because processes are not undertaken properly because we have not got to the core of the problem.

The government have taken a series of other measures that I have spoken on recently with regard to maritime security. This area really needs to be got to the bottom of. This system has to work, and it has to work well. That is why I support what is being fundamentally done in AusCheck—because bringing together the disparate elements of this into one approach under AusCheck, under the Attorney-General, is the right way to do it. Other members have indicated that there are some areas where it may be rolled out and extended later. The shadow minister and the member for Banks have underlined those areas. I will leave my comments with regard to that at that.

There are areas that need to be answered in that regard, but in terms of the broader area—we have spoken about this in other circumstances, but it is fundamental—permitting foreign flag-of-convenience ships to carry dangerous goods on coastal shipping routes without appropriate security checks is a recipe for absolute disaster. And, where the crew and cargo details of ships are not available 48 hours before arrival, this is a significant area of danger for Australia—particularly with major ships carrying ammonium nitrate from one end of the planet to the other—unless you pin this down very finely.

There is a danger to our ports and to a place like Sydney. When you have a load of ammonium nitrate in a boat you could blow the whole of the CBD up. That is fundamental and critical but the government have not taken those steps; we recommend they give serious consideration to it. We are committed to doing it because we think it is important. Likewise, we urge the government—and also give them a whack over the back of the hand—because they have failed to X-ray or inspect 90 per cent of containers. They promised to provide security in this area but they have been lax in this regard, and we do not think that they should be—it is too important.

Something that the government will not do is provide for an Australian coastguard—to establish it and properly fund it. They have relied upon the Navy exclusively. Let us use the example of the United States and its coastguard. It has not destroyed that country to have an independent coastguard as an adjunct to its naval capacity and activities. I have been on the Fremantle class boats and I have also inspected the Armidale class boats as the deputy chair of the defence committee. These boats are being used to do splendid intervention work in Northern Australia and off the coasts of Western Australia and Queensland. They are doing fantastic work, and we need to support them as much as we can. Their job is so immense that we need to support them with an interleaved capacity. This can be achieved by having an adjunct whereby a group is dedicated to the work but other people assist them in doing it.

The United States is not afraid of such a facility. It too is continental. It too has the kinds of challenges we have. We argue that that kind of facility should be brought to bear here and that we should establish a department of homeland security to better coordinate security in Australia. This is not something that the government wishes to take on but something that we have underlined. Attorney, we propose the establishment of a department of homeland security to better coordinate security in Australia—but, interestingly, what is AusCheck doing? It is better coordinating security checking in Australia under one aegis. That is the operative in this bill. It is the core of what it is about: to bring all the disparate elements together so that we can have a better view and better control of them. We think that is a smart thing and an intelligent thing to do.

Where is a department of homeland security—I think I have heard of that before—operating? It operates in the United States. They understand the gravity of the situation. They understand that there is a particular utility in focusing on one area. Generally, the Australian government has been against that idea, because it is our idea and it is natural for governments not to appreciate the ideas of oppositions—

Philip Ruddock (Berowra, Liberal Party, Attorney-General) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Mr Ruddock interjecting

Michael Hatton (Blaxland, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

It is our idea to pick up ideas from elsewhere. Arch Bevis, the member for Brisbane, has strongly pushed this case time and time again. In the Australian context, it is our idea to utilise the coastguard model that has worked so successfully in the United States. There is another model, Attorney, which you might be more inclined to look at—but the outsourcing must go. This is not popular in the Australian context, but there is a benefit in having public servants dedicated to ensuring the safety and security of their fellow citizens. This is demonstrated at every port, airport and railway in the United States. To use the Public Service in this way, I think, provides us with exactly the kind of protection we need to ensure that criminality and, in particular, terrorism do not put us in a situation where, despite the checks done through AusCheck—however deep we can go, whoever we pin on this and whatever safety we provide here—we do not reach its ongoing core. We still have not fixed that area. That is why I support this bill.

We are not at the point where I can be assured and where I can assure all of the constituents in my current electorate as well as my new electorate, the redistributed electorate—and that is the same for every member in New South Wales—that their safety while travelling is as secure as it can be. The model is for our own people to work for the federal government. They would be in charge of the security in cargo handling, in X-raying and in security checks. They would be directly responsible to their superiors in the Australian Public Service, to the secretary of the department and, ultimately, to the minister. I know it is unfashionable to have government involvement, but this is a critical area.

Attorney, you have previously given clear thought, in a whole range of areas in which you have been involved, as to what the fundamental or core areas of need are. I urge you to look at this closely. A major attack at either our ports or our airports could be prevented if we take this major step and change the way that we are organising this. England and, more particularly, the United States are our best examples. A department of homeland security to better coordinate security in Australia mirrors the smaller step in this legislation of an AusCheck. It will look at security identification in a more coordinated, centralised and smarter way so that you get all of the elements, and not much is left out.

With so many containers arriving at our major sea ports and containers going through our airports, security is vital. We have already seen—and we have been lucky to pick up—a series of different materials that could have caused great danger to our population. We need to go the whole way to ensure that there is proper screening at the major regional airports and that we have better security at places like Bankstown Airport. It is so close to KSA, and there could be an impingement. I support the bill. I urge the Attorney to give close consideration to what I have argued in relation to the bill. It has merit in its importance for securing the future for every travelling Australian.

Philip Ruddock (Berowra, Liberal Party, Attorney-General) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I thank all members who have participated in this debate on the AusCheck Bill 2006, starting with the member for Brisbane, the member for Banks, the member for Batman, the member for Denison and, latterly, the member for Blaxland, whose contributions I always enjoy and find thoughtful. I might deal with the part of his contribution that I think was least relevant to this debate, and that is the question, the canard, as to whether or not we should have a department of homeland security.

I have not had an opportunity to talk about this recently, but I am interested that the idea is still being pushed. The assumption that we might not look at what happens abroad and see what could be learnt would be a flawed assumption. We always look at what is happening abroad. The question is whether it is appropriate for our jurisdiction. We came to the view that, essentially, having to revisit all of the administrative arrangements that need to be examined when you go through a major reorganisation of that type would effect a lessening of our efforts in relation to security while you had people focusing on looking at what their tasks might be and re-establishing appropriate linkages and relearning their relationships. You only have to look at what happened in the United States in the tragedy of Cyclone Katrina. It was quite clear that the Department of Homeland Security failed, and that had a great deal to do with the problems of linkages.

There was another argument that I noticed was advanced. It was that I do not have enough time to devote myself to the security tasks because I happen to also have some responsibilities as Attorney-General. I thought that was a particularly interesting argument that I had to grapple with: that I have to handle a number of my colleagues on the other side of the chamber—the member for Brisbane, our colleague from Melbourne and, I suppose, if I am dealing with native title issues, probably somebody else—and I do not have enough time to give myself full focus. I thought this was an argument that the member for Brisbane would have been convinced of.

Then I looked at the new responsibilities that were given to the members opposite. I asked for a copy of the shadow ministry list, and I note that the member for Brisbane is now the shadow minister for homeland security and territories. I do not know what linkage there is between national security and territories, but what I do notice is that his single focus on national security is no more; he has these responsibilities for territories in addition. But excuse my making a little fun of what has happened. I would like to deal with the substance of the AusCheck Bill, and I am glad you did not bring me into order, Mr Deputy Speaker, for speaking beyond the bill.

I welcome the supporting principle for the measure, because the bill is necessary to provide legislative authority to enable a new organisation, AusCheck, to provide a centralised background-checking and coordination service for the Commonwealth. It does not set up any new background-checking regimes, but it provides a framework that will be conducted by AusCheck. The detail of what may or may not be required to meet the requirements of existing or new background-checking schemes is set out in the current legislation or will be provided under the new legislation and supported by regulations made under the act.

AusCheck has the potential to deliver significant efficiencies to avoid delays and duplication for both business and individuals in sensitive sectors where community expectations require screening of employees. The commencement of AusCheck is expected to significantly reduce processing time and prevent the card-issuing delays that have been experienced in the past. In the case of the aviation security identification card and the maritime security identification card programs, the detail of background-checking elements is already in place and provided for in the relevant legislation.

I note that the member for Brisbane and the member for Denison raised concerns that regulations may be made under this bill. The substance of any additional background-checking schemes that AusCheck coordinates will be set out in an act or regulation that deals with the relevant policy issues. For example, the aviation and maritime security background-checking requirements are contained in legislation administered within the transport portfolio. Another example is the new screening requirements for people employed in aged-care facilities, which are contained in legislation administered within the portfolio of the Minister for Ageing.

AusCheck is not presently involved in coordination of those new checks but may in future offer attractive efficiencies to the administering department through the use of automated systems and special expertise. Whenever AusCheck provides checking or coordination services, its activities will need to be supported by regulations made under this bill. It is only through the regulation-making power that AusCheck will be able to take new checking coordination roles and, through this, enhance Australia’s security.

This bill is designed to provide a flexible framework for a government agency to develop expertise in automated background checking against criteria set out in diverse pieces of legislation in response to a variety of concerns. It will permit AusCheck to offer its services to a wide range of government departments charged with the responsibility of responding to those concerns. With its automated system and focus on privacy protection, it will be a fast, fair and efficient way for individuals to have assessments relevant to their employment made. As a result, when background checks are made necessary by law, individuals and industry can be assured of a speedy and consistent outcome.

AusCheck will not be responsible for issuing any cards. It will provide advice about whether a background check on a person indicates that they have met the specified requirements. Of course, these requirements are set out in the relevant scheme, not in the AusCheck Bill. Once operational, AusCheck will be able to manage background checking in other schemes and minimise duplication of effort. It will maintain a database of all aviation and maritime security identification card applicants and cardholders, and the bill provides that the database can only be used for a limited purpose. Its purpose will be responding to a national security incident. I note that the member for Newcastle placed emphasis on privacy, and I observe that the protection of privacy is a vital aspect of the process. AusCheck will operate in accordance with the provisions of the Privacy Act and ensure that information on its database is properly protected.

Since the tragic events of September 11, there has been heightened awareness of the potential threat to public safety in the aviation sector, and the government has already adopted substantial measures to strengthen aviation security, including hardening cockpit doors, requiring passenger screening through all regular passenger jets, upgraded closed circuit television and monitoring capability, and enhanced cargo security clearances and checked-baggage screening. The creation of AusCheck as a centralised background-checking service for the Commonwealth will help the aviation and maritime industries to identify high-risk individuals. This bill is obviously an important step forward in the government’s commitment to improving both aviation and maritime security.

There were some further issues raised. The member for Brisbane drew upon instances of lost ASICs in his comments on the AusCheck Bill. In fact, the commencement of AusCheck and its centralisation of background checking should improve the ability to monitor cards. I make this observation: it is of concern when cards are unaccounted for, but the number of non-returned cards compares favourably with the non-return rate for other identity documents, such as drivers licences and Australian passports. For example, of the 1.2 million Australian passports issued each year, some 25,000 are reported lost or stolen, representing 2.1 per cent of all Australian passports issued each year. That compares with 1.5 per cent of ASICs that are reported lost or stolen.

We are working with industry to implement best practice measures to manage issues relating to lost, stolen or expired cards, and industry members have advised the government that they have established practices to do so. They include confirming the identity of the holder with the photograph at manned access points, disabling any electronic access rights that may have been included on an ASIC as soon as it has been reported lost or stolen, reporting the loss of a card to police, routinely auditing irregular card use at points not authorised for the holder and routinely reviewing ASICs with unusual characteristics, such as those that have not been used for some time or those with an unusual expiry date.

The member for Brisbane and the member for Denison expressed concern about the range of purposes for which background checking may be prescribed. Let me make it clear that AusCheck could be limited to national security matters, as initially it will coordinate background checks for the aviation and maritime industries. But the authority for AusCheck to maintain a database is restricted to keep it for limited purposes that have a national security focus. However, the creation of AusCheck to coordinate background checking does allow the government to build expertise in background checking for other systems and processes. That expertise has the potential to be applied in other sectors where there is a strong community interest in such checking. Examples are matters involving children and the elderly, where the subject matters are unrelated to national security but it is important that they are dealt with adequately. There is no current consideration of AusCheck being involved in either of these examples, but there is no reason that the expertise should be limited solely to background checking schemes that are related to national security. To cater for the range of possibilities, the scope and purpose for which the AusCheck background checking scheme may be established has been described by reference to Commonwealth fields of operation set out in the Constitution.

I mention those matters in particular, and I note that the matter has now been referred for further examination. Obviously, if issues arise in relation to the legislation through that examination, we would be more than happy to deal with them. I note that there are matters that are going to be considered in detail here, but I might observe that we did offer the opposition the opportunity to be fully briefed on these matters before this debate commenced, particularly given that there was no indication that the proposed bill would be opposed in principle.

I note that there is a second reading amendment, and I will deal with that briefly. In relation to aviation, the government is making significant progress in improving aviation security. The ASIC background checking criteria have been strengthened in three ways: first, by removing the grandfathering provisions that allowed certain criminal offences not to be taken into account in the assessment of ASIC applications; second, by adding a pattern of criminality test for ASIC applicants; and, third, by providing more frequent background checking if an ASIC applicant has a history of lower level criminal activities. ASIC holders who have failed new adverse criminal record criteria have had their cards cancelled. The government has enjoyed tremendous cooperation and assistance from the industry in this review. The advice from industry members is that background checking processes have been significantly improved.

In relation to maritime security identification cards, the rollout of that scheme began on 1 January 2007 and commenced smoothly. From the end of December 2006, the first round of temporary cards were issued to those people who applied for them before 27 October 2006. These temporary cards expired on 31 January 2007. The government has been actively working with industry to urge those who had not applied to take action and do so at their earliest convenience. The government and the issuing bodies are continuing to process applications as promptly as possible; however, some delays may occur depending upon individual circumstances—particularly, for instance, if an applicant has a criminal history. Obviously, processing can take longer in those circumstances.

In relation to foreign ship security, pre-entry reporting every ship seeking entry to Australia is subject to a comprehensive security assessment regardless of the flag it flies. This includes every ship carrying ammonium nitrate to an Australian port. The security risk assessment takes into account all relevant information about the ship, including the nature of the ship’s cargo and operations. This information is collected from mandatory ship and crew reports, which are required within certain time frames, depending upon the length of the voyage. Any ship failing to comply with pre-entry reporting requirements or identified as posing an unacceptable risk can be refused entry to Australia. Any ship so identified as posing a security risk, whether because of crew, cargo or other factors, would not be allowed entry.

I make those points in relation to the second reading amendment. I commend the bill to the chamber, and I hope that the Senate examination will not unduly delay the passage of this bill through all stages in both houses.

Ian Causley (Page, Deputy-Speaker) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The original question was that this bill be now read a second time. To this the honourable member for Brisbane has moved as an amendment that all words after ‘That’ be omitted with a view to substituting other words. The question now is that the words proposed to be omitted stand part of the question.

Question negatived to.

Original question agreed to.

Bill read a second time.