In accordance with the resolution agreed to on 27 October 2026, the House will now consider the bill in detail as a whole.

I present a supplementary explanatory memorandum to the bill.

The question now is that the government amendments as circulated be agreed to.

Government's circulated amendments—

(1) Schedule 1, item 5, page 5 (line 7), omit "and being", substitute "or".

(2) Schedule 1, item 5, page 5 (line 14), omit "and", substitute "or".

(3) Schedule 1, item 90, page 28 (lines 5 to 10), omit subsection 140(5), substitute:

Effect of industry codes

(5) The validity of an industry code registered under this Division before the commencement of this subsection is not affected, and is taken never to have been affected, by a failure of the body or association concerned to:

(a) publish a draft of the code or invite submissions about the draft as mentioned in paragraph (1)(e) or (f); or

(b) specify a period of at least 30 days for making submissions about a draft of the code in accordance with subsection (3).

(4) Schedule 1, item 91, page 28 (lines 13 to 18), omit subsection 145(4), substitute:

Effect of industry standards

(4) The validity of an industry standard registered under this Division before the commencement of this subsection is not affected, and is taken never to have been affected, by a failure to comply with section 148 (public consultation on industry standards).

(5) Schedule 2, item 8, page 39 (lines 21 and 22), omit subsection 25D(2), substitute:

(2) Seriously harmful material or conduct does not include:

(a) excluded material; or

(b) class 2 material.

(6) Schedule 2, item 8, page 40 (lines 10 to 22), omit paragraph 25F(1)(c), substitute:

(c) material as follows that is produced for the sole or dominant purpose of entertaining individuals:

(i) audiovisual content made available by an on-demand program service;

(ii) material contained in a film or computer game that has been classified under the Classification (Publications, Films and Computer Games) Act 1995 other than class 1 material or class 2 material;

(7) Schedule 2, item 8, page 40 (after line 34), at the end of subsection 25F(1), add:

Note: Certain films classified under other Acts are taken to be classified under the Classification (Publications, Films and Computer Games) Act 1995: see section 6HA of that Act.

(8) Schedule 2, item 8, page 41 (lines 6 to 15), omit the definitions of broadcasting video on demand service, commercial radio broadcasting service, commercial television broadcasting service, national radio broadcasting service and national television broadcasting service in subsection 25F(3).

(9) Schedule 2, item 8, page 45 (line 4), omit "paragraph (e)", substitute "paragraph (1)(e)".

(10) Schedule 2, item 8, page 47 (line 11), after "Commissioner", insert "under subsection (4)".

(11) Schedule 2, item 8, page 47 (line 21), after "Commissioner", insert "under subsection (4)".

(12) Schedule 2, item 8, page 48 (line 4), omit "the tool", substitute "user empowerment tools".

(13) Schedule 2, item 8, page 48 (line 28), after "conduct", insert ", make available and retain".

(14) Schedule 2, item 8, page 51 (line 27), after "Commissioner", insert "under subsection (3)".

(15) Schedule 2, item 38, page 68 (line 5), omit "specified".

I thank all those in this chamber who have contributed to the debate on the Online Safety Amendment (Digital Duty of Care) Bill 2026. The government is introducing minor technical amendments to the bill, including redefining the definition of exempt content subject to the classification scheme; solidifying the effect of the existing industry codes and standards until the new legislation commences so eSafety can continue their existing investigations; clarifying the definition of a nudify app; and minor language changes, to improve consistency throughout the bill.

Debate about a digital duty of care comes down to a simple question: do you really think that big tech is on the side of worried Australian parents and vulnerable Australian children, or are they on the side of their shareholders? And we, as elected members of this place—whose side are we on? Australia's digital duty of care will set basic safety standards for the digital services we use every day, just like we have for food, cars and kids' toys. The duty will change the foundation of Australia's online safety laws and put the onus on digital platforms to put systems in place to prevent online harm before it occurs. Calling a bill 'unsalvageable' is not a policy position; it's simply throwing in the towel and refusing to do the work. Voting against the digital duty of care is a vote for endorsing the status quo.

The question before the House is that government amendments (1) to (15) as circulated be agreed to.

The question now is that the amendments circulated by the member for Mackellar be agreed to.

Member for Mackellar's circulated amendments—

(1) Schedule 2, item 8, page 51 (after line 27), after subsection 27G(1), insert:

(1A) The Online Services Ombudsman Scheme established under subsection 27GA(1) is not a complaint and dispute process for the purposes of subsection (1) of this section.

Note: This means that a person responsible for a prescribed online service cannot satisfy the requirement in subsection (1) of this section by being a member of the Online Services Ombudsman Scheme.

(2) Schedule 2, item 8, page 52 (after line 12), after section 27G, insert:

27GA Online Services Ombudsman Scheme

(1) The Minister must, by legislative instrument (the scheme instrument), and in accordance with this section:

(a) establish a scheme to be known as the Online Services Ombudsman Scheme; and

(b) provide for the operation of the scheme.

(2) The scheme instrument must specify a start date for the scheme.

Online Services Ombudsman

(3) The Online Services Ombudsman is:

(a) unless paragraph (b) applies—the Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman (within the meaning of the Telecommunications (Consumer Protection and Service Standards Act) 1999); or

(b) the person (if any) prescribed by the scheme instrument to be the Online Services Ombudsman.

Function of scheme

(4) The function of the scheme must be for the Online Services Ombudsman to:

(a) investigate; and

(b) make determinations relating to; and

(c) give directions relating to;

complaints about:

(d) prescribed online services; and

(e) other matters (if any) specified in the scheme instrument.

Note: For prescribed online service, see subsection 27G(2).

(5) The scheme instrument may specify:

(a) requirements for the scheme; and

(b) without limiting paragraph (a), requirements to be complied with by any of the following in relation to the scheme:

(i) the Online Services Ombudsman;

(ii) a member of the scheme;

(iii) a person or entity specified in the scheme instrument.

(6) The scheme instrument may confer powers or functions on the Online Services Ombudsman, or on another person or body, in relation to the scheme.

Members of the scheme

(7) Each person responsible for a prescribed online service is to be a member of the scheme.

Funding for the scheme

(8) The scheme instrument must:

(a) require the members of the scheme to fund the operation of the scheme; and

(b) specify arrangements for funding the operation of the scheme.

No charges for end-users

(9) An end-user of a prescribed online service is not liable to pay any fee or charge (however described) to a person responsible for a prescribed online service in respect of a complaint made under the scheme by the end-user of the prescribed online service.

Relevant matters and consultation

(10) When making or amending the scheme instrument, the Minister must have regard to the following matters:

(a) accessibility;

(b) independence;

(c) fairness;

(d) accountability;

(e) efficiency;

(f) effectiveness;

(g) such other matters (if any) as the Minister considers relevant.

(11) Before making or amending the scheme instrument, the Minister must consult with:

(a) the Commissioner; and

(b) the Online Services Ombudsman.

27GB Complying with the Online Services Ombudsman Scheme etc.

A person responsible for a prescribed online service must comply with:

(a) any requirements in an instrument made by the Minister under subsection 27GA(1); and

(b) without limiting paragraph (a) of this section, any directions given by the Online Services Ombudsman, as mentioned in paragraph 27GA(4)(c), in connection with the Online Services Ombudsman Scheme.

(3) Schedule 2, item 8, page 52 (line 13), at the end of the heading to section 27H, add "and the Online Services Ombudsman Scheme".

(4) Schedule 2, item 8, page 52 (line 16), after "subsection 27G(1)", insert "or section 27GB".

(5) Schedule 2, item 8, page 52 (line 21), after "subsection 27G(1)", insert "or section 27GB".

I welcome the Online Safety Amendment (Digital Duty of Care) Bill 2026 and its objective of placing a legal obligation on tech companies to protect Australians from foreseeable harm when using their platforms. For too long, powerful multinational corporations have operated without adequate accountability while Australians have been left to deal with the often devastating consequences. This bill is an important step towards changing that. A key part of this bill is the provision of stronger internal complaints and dispute resolution processes for users, which I welcome. I also acknowledge the vital role of the eSafety Commissioner as a publicly funded regulator in investigating breaches and holding platforms accountable through enforcement action and financial penalties. But these mechanisms will simply not be enough. An independent ombudsman responsible for digital platforms is critical to ensuring Australians have a failproof way of enforcing their rights against large multinational corporations. This is the purpose of my amendments. My amendments prescribe that online service providers must be a part of an independent external dispute resolution scheme through an online services ombudsman.

We can all relate to the problem of dealing with big tech platforms when something goes wrong. There are no phone numbers or direct contacts who take care of complaints. You email an unknown entity and often never get a response. When accounts are hacked, small businesses and community organisations can be locked out of the platforms they rely on to operate, communicate, reach their customers and support people. Losing access to an account can mean losing income, customers and years of work. Often, complaints about harmful content go unanswered, and the content is never taken down. Challenging a decision made by a multinational tech company can be practically impossible. And, when platforms fail to act, there is nowhere independent to turn.

My amendments provide a practical solution to all of this. They would require the minister to establish an online services ombudsman scheme through a legislative instrument. The Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman, TIO, would perform this role. The TIO already provides an established model of independent dispute resolution for telecommunications consumers. These amendments would build on that model and extend independent protections to users of prescribed online services. Importantly, the scheme would be empowered to investigate complaints, make determinations and issue directions, and digital platforms covered by the scheme would be required to become members and comply with those directions. Crucially, the scheme would be funded by the platforms themselves, not by everyday Australians. This industry funded approach is already familiar in telecommunications, financial services and energy. It also creates an incentive for companies to resolve complaints before they escalate. The amendments would require the scheme to be designed with accessibility, independence, fairness, accountability, efficiency and effectiveness in mind. Importantly, it would operate alongside, not replace, platforms' existing internal complaints obligations.

This is not a new or radical proposal. There is strong support for independent external dispute resolution from the Australian public, consumer advocates, legal and community organisations, and academics. The ACCC has previously recommended stronger internal and external dispute resolution arrangements for digital platforms. These calls reflect a simple principle: Australians should not have fewer rights online than they do when dealing with their bank, telecommunications provider or energy company. This bill is about establishing a duty of care, but that duty must be meaningful for the people it is intended to protect. Strong laws need effective enforcement, and effective enforcement must be matched by accessible remedies for individuals. An independent online services ombudsman would give Australians somewhere independent to turn and provide a practical pathway to resolution. I commend the amendments standing in my name to the House.

I thank the member for Mackellar for her amendments relating to external dispute resolution processes and exemptions for small business. The government recognises that the current process for dispute resolution is not working for a lot of digital platform users, including small businesses. In response to the recommendations of the independent statutory review of the Online Safety Act, the government is prioritising the creation of enforceable internal dispute resolution processes through legislative instrument. Section 27G of the bill empowers the eSafety Commissioner to do this in consultation with the Privacy Commissioner. Failure to comply with the eSafety Commissioner's enforceable internal dispute resolution process will result in penalties of up to $10.2 million.

I rise in support of the amendments moved by the member for Mackellar, and I want to raise in particular the impact this has on small businesses. I get these requests every single week from small businesses that have been significantly affected because they have been dumped for some online platform and can't get a resolution of these issues. I appreciate that the government is seeking to address this, but this is an issue that is ongoing and needs urgent attention. The eSafety Commissioner is not the place for this. It is about having a time line and a commitment about when we're going to get this resolved for small businesses, because this has been an issue.

The ACCC's digital platform inquiry recommended an ombudsman for disputes for digital platforms seven years ago and suggested that the TIO should take on that role. That's seven years old. The government has been in power for over 4½ years. It is well beyond time that the government takes action here and supports small business in trying to resolve these issues that materially impact them and make sure they have a pathway that is practical and timely and that they don't have to pay more for in order to get a resolution of these issues, because it fundamentally affects their business. We don't accept this from the banks. We don't accept it from the telcos. There are ways that we manage all those, and this is absolutely needed for small businesses as well.

The question is that amendments (1) to (5) on the sheet circulated by the member for Mackellar be agreed to.

The question now is that the amendments circulated by the member for Curtin be agreed to.

Member for Curtin's circulated amendments—

(1) Schedule 2, item 8, page 39 (after line 31), after paragraph 25E(1)(d), insert:

(da) material or conduct that simulates emotional intimacy and encourages or fosters a child's dependence on it in place of human relationships;

(2) Schedule 2, item 8, page 47 (line 33), omit "User", substitute "Providing user".

(3) Schedule 2, item 8, page 49 (after line 7), after section 27B, insert:

27BA User empowerment tools must be prominent and accessible

(1) A user empowerment tool must be designed, offered and managed so that:

(a) the tool is:

(i) accessible; and

(ii) easy to use; and

(iii) prominently available on the service; and

(iv) functional; and

(v) available on an ongoing basis; and

(b) use of the tool does not:

(i) affect the general functionality of the service; or

(ii) reduce or impair user experience.

Civil penalty

(2) A person responsible for an online service must ensure that user empowerment tools provided by the service for users of the service meet the requirements set out in subsection (1).

Civil penalty: 6,000 penalty units.

Formal warnings

(3) The Commissioner may issue a formal warning if the Commissioner reasonably believes that a person responsible for an online service has failed, or is failing, to ensure that user empowerment tools provided by the service for users of the service in Australia meet the requirements set out in subsection (1).

(4) Schedule 2, item 8, page 49 (lines 10 to 22), omit subsections 27C(1) and (2), substitute:

Scope

(1) This section applies if the Commissioner reasonably believes that a person responsible for an online service has failed, or is failing, to comply with one of the following requirements:

(a) a requirement in section 27 (risk assessments);

(b) a requirement in an instrument made under subsection 27A(1) (providing user empowerment tools);

(c) subsection 27BA(2) (user empowerment tools must be prominent and accessible).

Remedial directions

(2) The Commissioner may give the person a written direction requiring the person to take specified action directed towards ensuring that the person does not fail, or is unlikely to fail, to comply with the requirement mentioned in subsection (1) in the future.

Note: For variation or revocation, see subsection 33(3) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901.

(5) Schedule 2, item 15, page 55 (after line 17), after paragraph 163(1)(aa), insert:

(aaa) section 27BA;

(6) Schedule 2, item 19, page 57 (after line 4), after paragraph 163AA(2)(b), insert:

(ba) section 27BA (user empowerment tools must be prominent and accessible);

(7) Schedule 2, item 20, page 57 (after line 24), after paragraph 164(1)(ab), insert:

(aba) section 27BA;

(8) Schedule 2, item 22, page 58 (after line 5), after paragraph 165(1)(ab), insert:

(aba) section 27BA;

Today I propose two substantive changes to the digital duty of care bill. I commend the minister and the government for engaging in good faith on this important legislation and for being open to reasonable improvements to it, like the ones I'm proposing today.

The first change is reflected in amendment (1). It adds a new category of harm to children that platforms have to consider—attachment hacking. This is where a service simulates emotional intimacy and encourages or fosters a child's dependence on it in place of human relationships. It will apply to all online services. Most importantly, it will apply to AI companions, like Nomi and Chai, and to general chatbots, like ChatGPT and Claude, if they continue to simulate emotional intimacy and foster dependence. eSafety found AI companions offer humanlike, sycophantic and often sexually explicit conversations. About 200,000 Australian children aged 10 to 17 have used one. We've seen just how badly this can go wrong. Sewell Setzer, aged 14, Juliana Peralta, aged 13, and Adam Raine, aged 16, died by suicide after extended conversations with chatbots. Reporting on their chat logs suggests the bots discouraged them from turning to other people.

This amendment would also capture the slower, less obvious harms of AI chatbots and companions that pretend to be your friend. Psychologists are telling us that children are increasingly turning to AI instead of friends, parents and teachers. This is a significant risk to children's long-term psychological development. Human relationships are how children learn to form bonds, regulate emotions and form a sense of self. Relationships with strangely friendly or sycophantic AI chatbots are not. Because this harm is long term, the evidence is still emerging, but, from the social media experience, we've learnt that waiting for exhaustive evidence of damage leaves a generation of children impacted. Importantly, this doesn't restrict AI chatbots or companions being used by children, but it tells these AI companies that simulated emotional intimacy, sycophancy or pretending to be a friend or romantic partner is unacceptable.

The second change is reflected in amendments (2) to (8). This ensures that user empowerment tools such as the opt-in or opt-out setting that the government says it will require under this bill must be prominent, accessible, easy to use, functional, available on an ongoing basis and not affecting the functionality of the service or impairing the user experience. Why is this important? We know that tech companies will do what they can to exploit loopholes and keep users on their algorithm. After the EU required Meta to give users an option to switch off the algorithm, the company hid the setting, removed significant functions from the non-algorithmic feed and automatically switched users back to their algorithmic feed every time they closed and reopened the app. This malicious compliance is unacceptable. To ensure Australians have genuine control to switch their algorithm on and off, the setting must be prominent, accessible and easy to use and not affect the functioning of the app. Putting these standards in the primary legislation and not just in a ministerial determination strengthens these obligations and gives notice to social media companies that this is something they must comply with in good faith.

I also note that I had intended to move amendments to increase penalties for noncompliance with the digital duty of care. These amendments will now be moved by the member for Bradfield. The current penalties that apply to companies that do not comply with the digital duty of care are roughly $100 million. This would be about one-twentieth of one per cent of Meta's revenue last year—too small to change the behaviour of some of the wealthiest companies in the world. The EU, UK, Canada and New Zealand have either implemented or proposed fines that range from three to 10 per cent of global revenue. We should do the same. A big stick like this is essential to get these companies to change their behaviour. I would also like to see a private right of action added so that Australian users, not just the regulator, could enforce this new duty.

I would like to thank thousands of Curtin constituents who informed my work on this bill by responding to my community survey, the UWA students who attended my workshop on this issue and the many organisations across the technology ecosystem who engaged with me and my office. I commend the government for its work on this bill, and I thank the minister, who has indicated that the government will support these amendments. I commend these amendments to the House.

I rise in support of the amendments moved by the member for Curtin and agree wholeheartedly on the importance of ensuring these attachment bots be included in relation to online harms. But I also have a question for the minister because, whilst there's a strong focus on protecting under 18s from harms online, there are other foreseeable harms that we're seeing occur and are not being addressed in this digital duty of care. My question for the minister in this consideration in detail process is: why has the government failed to explicitly include harmful AI generated deepfakes in its duty of care legislation? If the purpose of this legislation is to prevent foreseeable online harm, why are we failing to address one of the fastest-growing threats?

We've got an opportunity to get ahead of an emerging threat, yet the government is leaving a significant gap in online safety protections. Artificial intelligence can now make someone appear to say something they never said, do something they never did and participate in an event that never happened. We've already seen how this technology is being misused in Australia. Deepfake video circulating, for example, of Senator Jacqui Lambie was falsely depicting her criticising another party's voters. That results in threats from those voters back to her. At a time when we're talking about a heightened security environment for members of parliaments and the public at large, we're allowing this to continue to be legal.

The amendment I had wished to propose to this effect sought to address deepfakes depicting identifiable people without their consent where the content is capable of misleading viewers and likely to cause serious harm. We know the government has looked at this from the nudify apps perspective, but the harm goes beyond that. Harm to a person, whether they are under 18 or over 18, where their image, likeness and voice are used by AI technology to generate deepfake content that is then pushed through social media platforms and digital platforms and where there is no consent from that person that is readily identifiable should also be treated as a harm that these platforms should have to prevent and be aware of. So I ask the government to look at protecting all Australians, not just under-18s, from this use without their consent of their image, likeness and voice in relation to the creation of AI deepfakes. It is not just in the political space that this matters. This could ruin someone's business reputation. If someone is in the public eye in sport—we've seen Sportsbet do it with some actors as well. It is really important that the government address this gap.

I would also like to note my deep frustration with the process. This was an amendment that I had sought to get drafted, but, through lack of resources through the system, it has not been possible for the parliamentary drafting services to provide the draft of that amendment despite being asked to do this over a week ago. I find it deeply unacceptable for the parliament to not be able to provide adequate services to members.

Let me first respond to the member for Warringah's questions. I can confirm that AI generated images that cause serious harm would be defined as adult cyberabuse. They can be taken down by the eSafety Commissioner. That would include deepfake nude images. The duty would also require platforms to have systems in place to prevent the harm from occurring.

The member is correct in that material and content that does not cause serious harm is not the subject of this bill. We feel that the Joint Select Committee on Artificial Intelligence that is currently on foot is meant to be looking into these particular issues, and we intend to incorporate those informed findings into the forthcoming Australian AI standards, which we believe is the more appropriate place for them. Other feedback is noted. I also thank the member for Curtin for her amendments, which the government will support.

On user empowerment tools, the government recognises the importance of making sure that the primary bill mandates that the user empowerment tools are accessible, easy to use, prominently available on the service, and functional and available on an ongoing basis. We support that. On attachment hacking, we also recognise that the use of AI chatbots and companions are creating risks to children's long-term development and it's horrifying. As sociologist Sherry Turkle observed: 'Social media came for our attention. Chatbots are coming for our attachment.' I've spoken in this chamber before about the boy who was found to have 50 different tabs open seeking companionship, and whilst some of those chat—

The time for debate has expired.

The question is the amendments circulated by the honourable member for Curtin be agreed to.

The question now is that the amendments circulated by the honourable member for Bradfield be agreed to.

Member for Bradfield's circulated amendments—

(1) Schedule 2, item 6, page 33 (before line 22), before the definition of data access rules, insert:

annual global turnover, of a body corporate for an income year, has the meaning prescribed by the rules for the purposes of this definition.

(2) Schedule 2, item 6, page 34 (after line 8), after the definition of harmful to children, insert:

income year has the same meaning as in the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997.

(3) Schedule 2, item 8, page 45 (lines 14 to 17), omit section 26C, substitute:

26C Compliance with the digital duty of care

(1) A person must not fail to comply with the person's digital duty of care.

Civil penalty:

(a) if the person is not a body corporate—60,000 penalty units; or

(b) if the person is a body corporate—the greater of:

(i) 300,000 penalty units; and

(ii) 5% of the person's annual global turnover for the income year in which the contravention of this subsection occurs.

(2) Despite paragraph 82(5)(a) of the Regulatory Powers Act, the pecuniary penalty payable by a body corporate for a contravention of subsection (1) of this section must not be more than the pecuniary penalty specified in paragraph (1)(b) of this section.

(4) Schedule 2, item 8, page 48 (line 31), omit the penalty, substitute:

Civil penalty:

(a) if the person is not a body corporate—60,000 penalty units; or

(b) if the person is a body corporate—the greater of:

(i) 300,000 penalty units; and

(ii) 5% of the person's annual global turnover for the income year in which the contravention of this subsection occurs.

(5) Schedule 2, item 8, page 48 (after line 31), after subsection 27B(1), insert:

(1A) Despite paragraph 82(5)(a) of the Regulatory Powers Act, the pecuniary penalty payable by a body corporate for a contravention of subsection (1) of this section must not be more than the pecuniary penalty specified in paragraph (1)(b) of this section.

I rise to speak to the amendment that I've moved. A duty of care is only as strong as the consequences for breaching it, and, under this bill, the maximum penalty for a company that breaches its duty of care is around $109 million. For almost any Australian business, this would be ruinous, but we're not talking about almost any business. Last year, Meta took in more than US$200 billion in revenue. That means it brings in $109 million in about three hours. If a company can earn back their fine before lunch, it doesn't deter any behaviour; it's just a small additional cost to doing business. This amendment lifts the maximum penalty for a company that breaches the duty of care or fails to meet its risk assessment and user empowerment obligations to the greater of around $109 million or five per cent of annual global turnover. This isn't radical; it's catching up. In the EU, fines can reach six per cent of global turnover; in the UK, it's 10 per cent of worldwide revenue. Canada is proposing up to three per cent and five per cent for criminal fines. New Zealand is proposing up to 10 per cent of worldwide revenue. Australia has led the world on online safety. We shouldn't now be too soft on these companies when they breach their obligations.

I've heard three objections to this amendment. Firstly, it's the reputational risk, not the dollar figure, that drives compliance. Well, I can say that social media companies are among the least trusted industries in the world. They have gone through scandal after scandal, and their behaviour hasn't changed. Reputation clearly isn't doing the work. Secondly, there is no precedent for penalties based on global turnover. Well, courts in the UK and Europe are already working through exactly these cases. The point of these penalties is not to raise revenue; the point is to encourage and drive compliance. The bigger the stick, the less likely we are to ever need to use it. And thirdly, this could strain our relationship with the United States. This is a maximum of up to five per cent. The courts keep full discretion to impose lower penalties. It applies to every company equally, wherever it's headquartered, and it's entirely reasonable for Australia to set Australian laws to protect Australian children. So, paired with a private right to action, which I urge the government and the Senate to take up, enforcement would rest with Australians themselves, not just the government.

I would like to commend the member for Curtin for leading the charge on the crossbench's advocacy on this issue. She was initially going to introduce this amendment alongside the range of other amendments that she's proposing but was generous enough to suggest that I introduce it instead. Parents in my electorate tell me they feel powerless against these platforms. This bill tells those parents that the platforms now owe their children a duty of care. This amendment makes sure that the platforms take that duty seriously. I commend the government's work on this critical legislation, and I urge the government to adopt and implement my amendment.

I thank the member for Bradfield for her amendment to increase maximum penalties. The bill proposes $109.2 million, which is consistent with other consumer protection fines in Australia. While that may seem like a negligible amount for $1 billion company who did just unblushingly pay $25.6 billion in fines to New Mexico a few weeks ago, it's important to remember we're not doing this alone. This is supposed to be a global coalition. It's having a cumulative effect. There is a global reckoning coming. This is part of it. We're leading the way. We do want to see behavioural change from these companies. That is our shared end goal. Thank you.

There being no further speakers, I'll put the question. The question is that the amendments moved by the member for Bradfield be agreed to.

Question negatived.

The question now is that the amendments circulated by the member for Fowler be agreed to.

Member for Fowler's circulated amendments—

(1) Schedule 2, item 6, page 34 (after line 20), after the definition of seriously harmful material or conduct, insert:

small business entity: a person is a small business entity at a time if the person is a small business entity (within the meaning of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997) for the income year (within the meaning of that Act) in which the time occurs.

(2) Schedule 2, item 8, page 36 (after line 13), at the end of Division 1, add:

25AA Small business entities

Exemption

(1) This Part does not apply in relation to a person who is responsible for an online service if the person is a small business entity.

When the exemption does not apply

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply in relation to an online service if the online service:

(a) allows end-users to post, share or send material to other end-users, or to communicate in other ways with other end-users; or

(b) provides, or links to, pornography; or

(c) generates, enables end-users to generate, provides, or links to, AI-generated nudity; or

(d) is targeted at children.

(3) If the Commissioner is satisfied that an online service poses a material risk of serious harm to users of the service in Australia, the Commissioner may declare, in writing, that subsection (1) does not apply in relation to the online service. The declaration has effect according to its terms.

(4) The Commissioner must ensure that a declaration made under subsection (3) is published on the Commissioner's website as soon as is practicable after the declaration is made.

(5) A declaration made by the Commissioner under subsection (3) is not a legislative instrument.

Interpretation

(6) In this section:

AI-generated nudity means an image or video that:

(a) is generated or altered, wholly or partly, using artificial intelligence; and

(b) depicts, or appears to depict, a person in a state of nudity, whether:

(i) the person is real or fictional; or

(ii) the depiction is realistic or non-realistic.

(3) Schedule 2, item 8, page 45 (lines 8 to 9) omit subsection 26A(3), substitute:

(3) For the purposes of subsection (1), the cost of the action or measures:

(a) must not be taken into account if the person responsible for the online service is not a small business entity; and

(b) must be taken into account if the person responsible for the online service is a small business entity.

(4) Schedule 2, Part 3, page 83 (after line 22), at the end of the Part, add:

58 Delayed application to small business entities

Small business cost assessment

(1) The Minister who administers the Online Safety Act 2021 must cause an independent assessment to be conducted of the likely costs for small business entities of complying with Part 2 of the Online Safety Act 2021 (as amended by Part 1 of this Schedule).

(2) The person conducting the assessment must give the Minister a written report of the assessment.

(3) The Minister must cause a copy of the report of the assessment to be tabled in each House of the Parliament within 15 sitting days of that House after the Minister receives the report.

Delayed application of amendments

(4) If a responsible entity for an online service is a small business entity, Part 2 of the Online Safety Act 2021 (as amended by Part 1 of this Schedule) applies in relation to the responsible entity after the end of the period of 6 months beginning on the first day on which a copy of the report of the assessment has been tabled in both Houses of the Parliament as mentioned in subitem (3).

Note: Section 25AA of the Online Safety Act 2021 (as amended by Part 1 of this Schedule) provides for an exemption from Part 2 of that Act for small business entities in certain circumstances. Nothing in this subitem affects that exemption. The effect of this subitem is that, for small business entities that are not covered by that exemption, Part 2 of that Act will apply to those entities only after the end of the 6-month period mentioned in this subitem.

Interpretation

(5) A term that is used in this item that is defined in the Online Safety Act 2021 (as amended by Part 1 of this Schedule) has the same meaning in this item as it has in that Act.

These amendments are about proportionality. They recognise that an ordinary small business's website is different from a platform that allows users to share harmful material, and they seek to give small businesses clarity about their obligations under this legislation. Think about the businesses in Fowler—a builder in Edensor Park displaying photographs of completed renovations, a bakery in Cabramatta showcasing its baked goods variety, a cafe in Liverpool accepting bookings, a restaurant displaying its menu, a mechanic in Bonnyrigg advertising Services. These businesses use the internet to reach customers and earn a living. A website used for those purposes should not be treated in the same way as a service that allows users to distribute pornography or generate new images using artificial intelligence. The law should recognise that distinction clearly.

My amendments make three changes. First, they establish a small business exemption using the small business entity definition in the income tax legislation. That exemption is not unconditional. It does not apply to services that allow users to post, share or send material to other users or otherwise communicate with one another. It does not apply to services that provide or link to pornography. It does not apply to services that generate or enable users to generate, provide or link to AI generated nudity, and it does not apply to services targeted at children. The amendments also allow the commissioner after inquiry to remove the exemption for a particular service when satisfied that it poses a material risk of serious harm to users in Australia. Business sites alone should not provide an ongoing exemption for a service with those features or risks, but an ordinary small business website should have a clear exemption where none of those exceptions apply.

Second, the amendments require compliance costs to be taken into account where a small business remains covered. That does not make it cost effective. It does not create an automatic defence. It ensures that the cost of an action or measure is considered when determining what is appropriate for a small business. A family business does not have the same resources as a multinational technology company. Recognising that difference is not an argument against online safety. It is an argument for obligations that are practical and proportionate.

Third, the amendments require an independent assessment of the likely cost to small businesses of complying with this part. The report must be tabled in both houses of parliament for small businesses that remain covered, the part would apply only after a further six months. To be clear, the deferral also applies to small businesses operating services excluded from the ongoing exemption, including services targeted at children and those involving pornography or AI generated nudity. It also applies where the commissioner removes the exemption. That is the transition proposed by these amendments. It should be considered separately from the question of which services qualify for an ongoing exemption. The assessment would give parliament and small businesses a clearer account of the likely compliance costs. The additional six months would provide time for affected businesses to prepare. I ask the government: How many small businesses does it expect to be covered? What does it estimate compliance will cost businesses operating ordinary, low-risk websites? Why should those costs not be taken into account when determining what measures are appropriate?

These are practical questions about how the legislation will operate beyond the major technology platforms. Small businesses deserve clear answers. We should distinguish between services according to their features and risks, we should consider the resources of the businesses expected to comply, and we should understand the likely cause of the obligations parliament imposes on small businesses. For anyone who has a small business in this House, they should understand how much costs have increased to operate a business since this government came to power. These amendments seek to put those principles into legislation. I ask the House to support them. I commend the amendments to the House.

I thank the member for Fowler for her amendments. As I said in response to the amendments by the member for Mackellar, the government will work with industry to address their concerns. To that effect, I can update the House that we've set up a meeting between the eSafety Commissioner and COSBOA.

The question is that the amendment circulated by the member for Fowler be agreed to.

The question now is that this bill, as amended, be agreed to.