House debates

Wednesday, 5 November 2025

Bills

Defence Amendment (Parliamentary Joint Committee on Defence) Bill 2025; Second Reading

11:36 am

Photo of Tim WattsTim Watts (Gellibrand, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Hansard source

The Defence Amendment (Parliamentary Joint Committee on Defence) Bill 2025 establishes the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Defence. There's never been a more important time for parliamentary accountability and oversight over defence decisions. The stakes are higher than at any time since the Second World War. As the 2024 National defence strategy stated, Australia faces the most complex and challenging strategic environment since that time. Conflict has returned to Europe. Conflict has returned to the Middle East. We've also seen conflict in our own region in South-East Asia. We face evolving threats as well—cyber threats, grey zone tactics and foreign interference, as well as continuing threats like that of nuclear conflict.

In a time of geostrategic uncertainty, it has never been more important to maintain independent oversight of our defence community. Engaging the parliament and the public in these matters is vital to the way that Australia responds to these challenges. The new Parliamentary Joint Committee on Defence will enhance transparency, accountability and oversight of defence decisions. It will provide scrutiny to all parts of the defence ecosystem at a significant moment in Australia's history.

I want to acknowledge at this point my colleague the member for Bruce, Assistant Minister Julian Hill. This bill would not be before the House but for the work of Minister Hill in chairing the Defence Subcommittee of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade in the previous parliament. He led the inquiry into international armed conflict decision-making which led to the bill before the House being with us today.

The parliament plays a crucial role in scrutinising and debating decisions of the executive government and the implementation of those decisions by departments and agencies. The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Defence will provide oversight of all areas of our defence ecosystem. The circumstances demand a coordinated, whole-of-government and whole-of-nation approach to our nation's defence. That's why this legislation is so important.

The committee is modelled on the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security and provides a mechanism for classified parliamentary intelligence briefings and oversight of defence. The PJCD fills a gap in the current oversight framework by enabling scrutiny of classified matters in a secure setting. The bill gives the committee broad information-gathering powers. The committee's information-gathering powers include the ability to request a person to give evidence or to produce specified documents. The committee is empowered to receive and consider classified information subject to appropriate safeguards. These safeguards balance the government's commitment to greater public transparency with the necessity for the protection of information. These safeguards will ensure that information which maintains Australia's security and that of our international partners is protected and the arrangements for information handling will be closely modelled on those that apply to the PJCIS today.

The PJCD will have oversight of the ADF, the Department of Defence, the Department of Veterans' Affairs and portfolio agencies, including the Australian Submarine Agency, Defence Housing Australia and the Australian War Memorial. It will also include the performance of key independent regulators, including the Inspector-General of the ADF and the Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety Regulator. The committee's functions will include oversight of administration, expenditure and personnel matters, and it will have the ability to scrutinise Australia's defence capability development, including strategy, planning and acquisitions. The committee will also be responsible for monitoring and reviewing the findings of royal commission inquiries relating to defence. The committee will be able to assess war, war-like and major non-conflict operations in the event of the executive deciding to enter into armed conflict.

The establishment of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Defence is just one part of the government's strategy with regard to our defence and security. Greater oversight and transparency is necessary at a time when we have been lifting our defence engagement with regional partners in order to build the kind of region that we want to see—a region that's peaceful, prosperous, secure and stable, governed by rules, norms and international law, a region where sovereignty is respected and countries are free to make their own choices, where no country dominates and no country is dominated.

As outlined in the 2024 National defence strategy our enhanced defence cooperation and activities with key partners 'build depth and trust in Australia's relationships, support collective deterrence and demonstrate Australia's value as a reliable partner'. In response to the more complex security environment facing the Indo-Pacific region, we have established upgraded bilateral defence arrangements with a number of partners. We've established upgraded defence agreements with partners including Papua New Guinea, Singapore, Japan, Korea, India and Indonesia. These agreements will facilitate deeper and more sophisticated practical cooperation between the ADF and our partners.

In particular, we've been lifting our engagement with the Indian Ocean region. The 2024 National defence strategy identified the north-east Indian Ocean region as an area of primary strategic interest that is critical to Australia's security. It was identified in the National defence strategy because the Indian Ocean matters to Australia. It's critical for our prosperity and security. It's home to the world's fastest growing economies. Around half of Australia's sea-bound exports set sail from Indian Ocean ports, and the shipping lanes of the Indian Ocean are vital to Australia and the broader global economy. More than a third of the world's bulk cargo traffic and two-thirds of global oil shipments travel through the Indian Ocean.

It's critical for our Defence Force posture. Half of Australia's naval fleet is based in the Indian Ocean. It's home to Fleet Base West, which is critical for Australia's capacity to deploy major fleet units for sustained operations off our west coast in the Indian Ocean. It's also home to Submarine Rotational Force - West. Submarine Rotational Force - West will help Australia build the necessary operational capabilities and skills to be sovereign ready. It will ensure Australia can safely and securely own, operate, maintain and regulate a fleet of nuclear powered submarines from the early 2030s. Submarine Rotational Force - West will accelerate our efforts to develop Australia's capability to safely and securely operate and sustain its future nuclear powered submarines. It's an investment in AUKUS and a significant contribution to the security and stability of the Indian Ocean region.

Our defence relationships in the Indian Ocean region are an important part of our regional engagement, and the gifting of the first Australian built Guardian class patrol boat to an Indian Ocean country, the Maldives, will enhance its capability to protect its sovereign waters. It will also contribute to collective maritime security in the Indian Ocean. The Indian Ocean also saw in 2025 the largest ever participation in Exercise Talisman Sabre, with over 30,000 military personnel from 19 nations partaking and an additional three nations observing. Joint exercises like Talisman Sabre reflect the strength of Australia's alliance with the United States and demonstrate our commitment to working with like-minded partners in the region. Bilateral defence cooperation between Australia and regional partners enhances collective strength, contributes to all countries' security and makes an important contribution to regional peace and security.

The context in this bill is that we're also undertaking a long overdue program of base hardening and investment in our northern and western defence bases. The Albanese government is hardening Australia's northern defence infrastructure in the Northern Territory, North Queensland and Western Australia, and we're doing this because the Defence Strategic Review identified improving the ability of the ADF to operate from Australia's northern bases as a key priority. Given our strategic circumstances, the ADF must be optimised for littoral operations in northern land and maritime spaces. The ADF must be equipped to support operations in the north through surveillance, air defence, strike and air transport.

Development of defence estates will address force posture requirements and enhance an integrated, focused force as outlined in the 2024 National defence strategy. In order to realise this, the government is upgrading defence bases, including $1 billion for upgrades to land and joint estate capabilities, $600 million in maritime estate investments, including HMAS Coonawarra, HMAS Cairns and the Harold E Holt naval communication station, and an additional $200 million towards the acceleration of additional projects. The ADF will be better equipped to defend Australia's north thanks to $14 billion to $18 billion of funding for resilient bases under the 2024 Integrated Investment Program.

In the Indian Ocean, the Cocos (Keeling) Islands is a key territory for Australia. The island is located 2,000 kilometres from Australia's north-west coastline, adjacent to vital Indian Ocean sea lanes. As argued by Professor Peter Dean and Alice Nason in a recent report by the United States Studies Centre, the Cocos (Keeling) Islands is a key Indian Ocean asset for Australia. That's why we're investing $567.6 million to upgrade the airfield there to sustain Defence operations in the Indian Ocean. This investment is expanding infrastructure in this territory and will see its operational significant to Australia only grow in the future.

Despite this clear strategic imperative, the implementation of upgrades to Australia's northern defence network has been impaired by significant delays and rising costs. Under the previous government, we lost a decade of work on these projects. The lack of oversight and focus in the development of these bases in the north and north-west led to a decade-long delay between the 2012 Force posture review and the 2023 Defence strategic review. That's why the establishment of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Defence is so significant for Australia. Our government's defence base hardening is important for Australia's security, and the delay between the 2012 Force posture review and the 2023 Defence strategic review meant that our key bases in the north and west faced vulnerabilities. It also means that they now require significant, rapid investment and hardening.

We got to work doing this as soon as we came to government, so it's important that we have committees like this to ensure that issues and investments like that maintain the focus of the parliament that they desire. More than ever, we need to ensure our defence ecosystems are transparent and accountable and have appropriate oversight. We need to ensure there is oversight of strategically key investments. We need to ensure Australia's defence ecosystem can meet the challenges of the time, and that is what the bill before the House represents. I cede time to my colleagues on the opposite side of the chamber to address this bill.

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