Shayne Neumann (Blair, Australian Labor Party) | Hansard source

I'm pleased to speak on the Defence Amendment (Parliamentary Joint Committee on Defence) Bill 2024. The defence of Australia, its people and its interests is the government's most important responsibility. Australians should be assured that their parliament has an important role in debating such matters of national importance, including Australia's involvement in international conflict. This bill increases the transparency and accountability by government regarding decisions and policies relating to the defence of our country. In a Westminster style democracy such as ours, parliament plays a crucial role in providing this by scrutinising and debating the decisions by executive government and the implementation of them by departments and agencies. This scrutiny is important in ensuring best decision-making and the most efficient and effective use of taxpayer funds, along with a more informed parliament and, by extension, a better informed public.

The Senate estimates process has provided useful and necessary scrutiny of Defence, particularly major capability projects, over the years. It will continue to do so following the establishment of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Defence. But, in the challenging and complex strategic circumstances we find ourselves in, it's necessary to ensure that parliament can also examine these projects and Australia's defence strategy in greater detail and depth, and in a more classified setting with the appropriate safeguards in place. This bill addresses that gap, injecting greater parliamentary transparency, accountability and oversight of the Defence portfolio by establishing a parliamentary joint statutory committee on defence—the PJCD.

The establishment of a PJCD implements a recommendation from an inquiry by the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, which I chair, into international armed conflict decision-making, following a referral from the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence in December 2022. The inquiry, in turn, was initiated to deliver a commitment made by the Australian Labor Party to our national platform. This inquiry was very ably chaired by my colleague the member for Bruce, who spoke earlier in this debate, and in March last year the committee completed its examination of how Australia makes decisions to send service personnel into an armed conflict situation. The investigation took into account such things as the approach of similar Westminster system democracies, parliamentary processes and practices, and security implications of different decision-making models that could compromise ADF safety, operational security and intelligence or have other unintended consequences.

The power to declare war and send military personnel into conflict is arguably the most significant and serious institutional power and the gravest decision a government can make. Through our inquiry, the committee carefully and seriously considered fundamental questions regarding decision-making in relation to international armed conflict and parliamentary oversight both preceding and during the commitment of the Australian Defence Force. We found existing parliamentary oversight and accountability mechanisms for Defence and specified portfolio agencies to be inadequate in balancing accountability and transparency and national security considerations, including the risk of exposing information in the public domain that could be advantageous to potential adversaries.

To that extent, we concluded that there was a clear need to improve transparency and accountability of government decision-making in relation to armed conflict. We found Australia's system of parliamentary democracy to be likely to be kept healthy, effective and well adapted by making sensible changes that respect well-established institutions and conventions. Accompanying recommended changes to the Cabinet Handbook and new standing resolutions of both houses of parliament, we suggested the government had an historic opportunity to exercise leadership and establish what we call a joint statutory committee on defence to enhance Australia's national security while providing increased parliamentary scrutiny of defence. This new joint statutory committee would supersede and enhance defence related functions of the joint Standing Committee on Defence, Foreign Affairs and Trade. We recommended that the new committee be modelled on the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, or the PJCIS, ensuring that it can request and receive classified information and briefings to improve parliamentary scrutiny of defence strategy, policy, capability, development acquisition and sustainment, contingency planning, and major operations.

As we said in the report, it's worth remembering that in 1988 Bob Hawke, then Prime Minister, created the Parliamentary Joint Committee on the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, rejecting advice of the Hope royal commission not to enhance parliamentary oversight of the intelligence agencies. History has proven Bob Hawke to be correct on this point. We encourage the government to emulate the former prime minister's example and to act to strengthen national security and enhance accountability of Defence to parliament.

We know that the Albanese Labor government is committed to transparency and accountability in this area. That's why the legislation is before parliament today. So it's pleasing to see the government's response to the international armed conflict decision-making recommendations to agree in principle or broadly agree with the report's recommendations. The government welcomed the principal finding that decision-making regarding armed conflict was fundamentally a prerogative of the executive. The government reaffirmed its commitment to improve openness and accountability and to ensure that parliament has effecting mechanisms to examine and debate such decisions.

In recognition of this and balancing transparency with timely decision-making, the government agreed to codify practices relating to informing the parliament about these decisions. In particular, the government agreed to the establishment of a new joint statutory committee on defence, the PJCD; hence the bill before us today gives effect to this, inserting a new part, VIIIAB, in the Defence Act to create the committee, consistent with the recommendations of the joint standing committee.

It is worth noting that previous inquiries have recommended the establishment of a statutory committee on defence. For example, in 2018 the Defence Subcommittee of the joint standing committee recommended establishing a similar joint statutory committee. However, the former coalition government responded in 2019 and disagreed with the recommendation, saying there were already substantial parliamentary oversight measures in place for defence and that additional measures to enhance bipartisanship were not necessary. So, where the former government was unwilling to take this up, the Albanese Labor government is willing to act.

In terms of how the PJCD will operate, the committee will replicate the PJCIS rules that stipulate a total membership of 13 with at least two government and two non-government members per chamber, with members to be appointed by the Prime Minister in consultation with the Leader of the Opposition. That is really important. We envisage the committee membership would reflect the parliament, consistent with the PJCIS rules.

The PJCD will be responsible for reviewing, monitoring and reporting on the administration and operation of all Australian defence agencies, including the Australian Defence Force, the Department of Defence and the Department of Veterans' Affairs. The Defence Intelligence Organisation, the Australian Geospatial-Intelligence Organisation and the Australian Signals Directorate will remain subject to oversight by the PJCIS.

This bill establishes a broad range of functions that act as standing terms of reference for the PJCD which provide for greater oversight, transparency and accountability. The PJCD will also have the ability to inquire into other matters on referral by a minister or either house of parliament, as well as on its own initiative in the form of its own-motion power. In recognition of the significance of establishing a royal commission, the committee will be responsible for monitoring and reviewing on an ongoing basis the Australian government's response to the finding of any royal commission inquiry relating to defence. This will be very important with the Royal Commission into Defence and Veteran Suicide reporting. It will be critical to monitor the implementation of the recommendations coming from that, and the PJCD will play a useful role here.

Like the PJCIS, the bill will allow the committee to receive classified information and briefings in the course of performing its oversight. This will require the committee to operate in private in some circumstances, with limits to be applied to information that might be provided to the committee and disclosure of information received by the committee to protect Australia's national security and tactical advantage as appropriate. The provisions of this bill relate to the administrative operations of the committee.

Pleasingly, the government has supported this new statutory committee with funding of $17.5 million over the decade from 2024-25 and $1.8 million per year ongoing. The costs will be met from existing defence resourcing and transferred to the relevant parliamentary department.

I have much respect for the shadow minister for defence; the previous speaker, the member for Riverina; and the subsequent speaker, the member for Fisher, who has done great work as the deputy chair of that subcommittee. But the position taken by the opposition on this bill is not just disappointing but, frankly, irresponsible. Given the current strategic circumstances we face, there is a critical need for a committee such as the PJCD, which can provide effective parliamentary scrutiny. That the opposition would stand in the way of the establishment of this committee just so they can make a political point is reckless and antidemocratic.

I don't want to name too many people on the crossbench, but I will say that I don't think it is appropriate to have a situation where a political party has a spokesperson for peace and nuclear disarmament but no spokesperson for defence to be on such a committee. I'm proud of the fact that I represent the men and women from the RAAF Base Amberley in my electorate and have done so for 17 years. I am proud of the contribution they make to Australia's defence and the contribution they make to Ipswich and surrounds. I believe our country is being served by two great political traditions: the Labor social democratic tradition, to which I subscribe and have devoted my entire life, and the Liberal conservative tradition, which those opposite believe in, which I respect but don't agree with.

Government and opposition have been formed by Labor and the coalition. This is really critical: there may be a circumstance when a crossbencher, suitable and appropriate, could be on this committee, and it is fundamentally antidemocratic to preclude them by way of statutory change. The government's position has been clear from the beginning. The committee recommended it be modelled on the PJCIS, which has enjoyed long bipartisanship support—as did the report which formed the basis for this particular bill to come before the chamber. It's disappointing, in view of the previous comments made by the shadow minister, the member for Canning—which the member for Bruce has outlined on a number of occasions earlier today. The member for Canning said:

The parliamentary scrutiny of defence is broken and needs fixing.

This is an opportunity to take this up today, and in the Senate, to make sure that we have a new joint defence committee.

Indeed, I've travelled in parliamentary delegations to a number of countries over the years, and I've met with defence committees in other countries that don't have the additional responsibility that we have in the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade. Those particular committees can get access to the kinds of classified materials that the PJCIS has, and which this new statutory committee for defence should have. This is simply the right thing to do, and it provides greater accountability and transparency. There are other countries in the world that do this. It's world's best practice. We should do this, and, frankly, the opposition should support this legislation. This lack of bipartisanship is very disappointing. I do not, in any way, say that to depreciate and undermine my confidence in and my respect for the member for Fisher, nor for the shadow minister and nor for the member for Riverina, all of whom, I know, have a long commitment to bipartisanship in this space and who have a strong commitment to the defence of our country. But this legislation should be supported by the opposition.

This bill, and the establishment of this particular committee, is an important step forward in parliamentary accountability and transparency in defence. It will strengthen parliamentary scrutiny of major acquisitions, such as frigates and submarines, and it will allow members to question senior Defence officials on important strategic settings. It's welcome and timely in the current international circumstances. I'm confident it will improve the long-term relationship and collaboration between Defence and parliament.

I want to acknowledge the Deputy Prime Minister, the Minister for Defence, for supporting the committee's recommendations and bringing this critical reform forward. I want to pay tribute to the members of the Defence Subcommittee of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, particularly to the member for Bruce, who has done so much work in this space, and to the member for Fisher, who has also done a lot of work in this space. I want to pay tribute to both of them. I thank the stakeholders and those who submitted it. We should be supporting this bill, and I hope the opposition will change their perspective.

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