Paul Fletcher (Bradfield, Liberal Party, Shadow Minister for Government Services and the Digital Economy) Share this | Hansard source

I am pleased to rise to speak on the National Anti-Corruption Bill 2022 and the related bill. I begin by expressing my support for a national anticorruption commission. I want to discuss, firstly, why corruption is a bad thing and hence why a mechanism to detect and counter it is needed. Secondly, I want to touch on some appropriate factors that need to be balanced. Thirdly, I want to speak of ways to improve the bill through amendments.

Let me start with the proposition that corruption is a bad thing. Corruption corrodes public trust, undermines the public confidence on which our institutions depend and reduces the effectiveness of government because, if officials or politicians are interested in enriching themselves rather than delivering good public policy outcomes, then we have a government which is not doing what it should for citizens. The coalition has always been strongly concerned about the risk of corruption and having appropriate mechanisms to deal with it.

It was a coalition government which legislated Australia's first anticorruption commission—the Greiner government in New South Wales. Our previous Commonwealth government developed a detailed model for a Commonwealth integrity commission in the last parliament. We released an exposure draft, hundreds of pages long. We went through a detailed process of public consultation. As we repeatedly made clear, we stood ready to deliver this legislation the moment that Labor indicated its support.

We'd seen suggestions by the Attorney-General and by the Labor members that in some way the Labor side of politics is a watchword for purity and integrity in public conduct. That's a claim that is simply laughable to anybody with any knowledge of Australian political history. Think of the notorious criminal conduct of former New South Wales Labor members of parliament Eddie Obeid and Ian Macdonald. Think of the troubling record of criminality on the part of officials of the notorious CFMMEU, one of the Labor Party's major donors—and that record of criminality has frequently been commented on by judges. Think of the conduct of recent Labor members of parliament like Craig Thomson, the former member for Dobell.

Look at the glaring contradiction between Labor's rhetoric on this bill and its abolition of two important integrity institutions in the workplace: the Australian Building and Construction Commission and the Registered Organisations Commission. These bodies have done extraordinarily important work in providing oversight of unions, including dealing with the risk of corrupt union officials, and history teaches us that that is not a remote or distant risk at all. These bodies were hated by union officials, who did not like the scrutiny that they were subject to. Labor has wasted no time in dancing to the tune of their paymasters in abolishing those bodies. It is quite extraordinary that the CFMMEU and the ACTU have complained about the same powers in relation to the Australian Building and Construction Commission that the ACTU and the CPSU have supported in relation to the National Anti-Corruption Commission.

I turn now to the question of appropriate factors which need to be balanced up in establishing the regime under which a national anticorruption commission will operate. Many of our state anticorruption commissions have extremely wide powers. But, sadly, some of them do not have appropriate procedural safeguards so that innocent people do not become collateral damage. We need to be mindful of the great personal cost incurred by those who are falsely accused of corrupt or fraudulent conduct by such bodies. Sadly, there are too many instances of reputations and livelihoods destroyed, often leading to significant mental trauma and in some cases to suicide.

The presumption of innocence has been part of the golden thread of justice in common-law countries for many centuries for very good reason. This presumption is supported by the rules of evidence and many other procedural safeguards. These important principles should not be lightly sacrificed. We need to appropriately balance the rights of those who are called before the National Anti-Corruption Commission with the objective of effectively identifying instances of corrupt conduct. Many of these matters have been considered by the Joint Select Committee on National Anti-Corruption Commission Legislation, and they have recommended several amendments to the bill to provide extra procedural safeguards.

The coalition, and quite a number of organisations making submissions, have argued for further safeguards, and in doing so we do not seek to hamper the work of the National Anti-Corruption Commission but to make it more robust and accountable and to ensure that it is a body that is beyond reproach. As the shadow Attorney-General told this House, as he has developed the coalition's position on this bill, he has met not only former commissioners and advocates for this bill but also people whose lives and careers have been ruined by their appearances at one of the state commissions. Indeed, he's met people who have been bereaved by suicide because of the actions of one of the state or territory commissions. These are matters which need to be very carefully weighed up as this parliament considers this bill.

I turn therefore to the question of ways in which this bill may be improved. Issues with this bill have been ventilated through the parliamentary process and through committee processes. The coalition has engaged through this bill in good faith across the parliament. We have engaged with our communities and with stakeholders. Many coalition parliamentarians have engaged with constituents and stakeholders, as I know parliamentarians across all sides of this chamber have. Certainly, I have been approached by constituents, and I've had many constituents advocate strongly for a national anticorruption commission, and, as I've indicated, I support the National Anti-Corruption Commission.

But I've also had constituents share with me troubling instances of experiences at the hands of state anticorruption commissions which could only be described as manifestly unfair. The coalition has had regard to these issues and others and to all of the extensive consultation we've done in developing our careful and considered amendments. I do want to particularly acknowledge the shadow Attorney-General, the member for Berowra. I sit next to him on the front bench, my electorate adjoins his and I've worked closely with him since he came into the parliament. He is doing outstanding work on this bill and on the other elements of his extensive workload, bringing a measured and thoughtful approach to his work.

The parliamentary Joint Select Committee on National Anti-Corruption Commission Legislation has tabled an advisory report into the bill. Included within that report are a number of recommendations from coalition participants which go to the theme I've touched on: getting the balance right in this bill. Section 1.191, for example, details our concerns that it would be unfair to apply court-like transparency without court-like rules of evidence. Related to this theme, the committee expressed serious concern with the impact of public hearings on a person's mental health. There is a real risk of suicidal ideation or suicide as a result of appearing before a public hearing whereby one's integrity, identity and person may be tarnished. In section 1.235, coalition participants expressed the view that protections for those appearing before the commission should be increased by requiring the commission to give explicit consideration to a person's wellbeing and to other relevant factors.

A clear area where this bill needs improvement is the inexplicable and unjustifiable special treatment it provides for union officials exercising a power under a law of the Commonwealth. The carve-out, in sections 12 and 14 of the bill, for union officials exercising a power under a law of the Commonwealth undermines the character of the commission as an integrity commission, and the coalition is very clear that we seek to have that carve-out removed. The government has been very, very cagey about this particular carve-out. There is no explanation for it in the explanatory memorandum. It is a complete mystery. Well, it's not a complete mystery; any rational person can work out very clearly why the Labor Party's done this, but they've made no effort to justify it. When questioned, the Attorney-General's Department could not give a satisfactory answer on the reasons for the exemptions. When he was asked on Insiders about this carve-out, the Attorney-General initially denied it. He then justified it on misleading grounds.

The troubling fact is that Labor has made this provision broad enough so that the commission can call before it anyone who exercises a power under a law of the Commonwealth, except union officials. The Prime Minister was asked in question time about why this carve-out exists for union officials. His initial response was to claim that union officials don't need to be covered by the Anti-Corruption Commission, because they're covered by the Fair Work Ombudsman and Fair Work Commission, and this legislation is about plugging gaps, not duplication. The shadow minister for defence then pointed out that the Australian Defence Force is also covered by other bodies, such as the ADF military code of conduct and the inspector-general, and, taking at face value the justification the Prime Minister had offered, he then, very reasonably, asked, 'Why is the Australian Defence Force included in the National Anti-Corruption Commission but senior union leaders are not?' In view of the rationale proffered by the Prime Minister for the exclusion of senior union officials, which was that they were covered by other bodies and processes—something which is equally true of the Australian Defence Force—there was a complete failure by the government to provide an answer.

The following day in question time, the Prime Minister was asked again about union carve-outs and why union officials are specifically exempted from being subject to the operation of the National Anti-Corruption Commission. The Prime Minister then changed his line and again tried to deny that this carve-out existed. It's a simple fact. It's in sections 12 and 14 of the bill.

We have the extraordinary situation in which the conduct of Indigenous rangers is subject to the scrutiny of the National Anti-Corruption Commission. We on this side of the House certainly do not question or criticise that. But what we do question, what we do criticise—very clearly, very specifically and very pointedly—is if it's appropriate for the conduct of Indigenous rangers to be subject to the National Anti-Corruption Commission, what can be the possible justification for excluding from the scrutiny of the National Anti-Corruption Commission the actions of union officials who are exercising powers granted by a Commonwealth rule? Why is it that a union official will be able to exercise a power under the Work Health and Safety Act or the Fair Work Act to shut down a worksite for alleged safety reasons and not be subject to the scrutiny of the commission if that union official's conduct raises questions as to whether there is corrupt conduct? It is quite extraordinary, inexplicable and indefensible that an Indigenous ranger, in the course of carrying out his or her duties, is subject to the jurisdiction of the National Anti-Corruption Commission, that a worker within the National Disability Insurance Scheme is subject to the National Anti-Corruption Commission but the one category of person who is not subject to the National Anti-Corruption Commission is a union official.

What an extraordinary coincidence that the unions have collectively donated tens of millions of dollars to the Australian Labor Party over the last decade or more and that they are being provided with a shield from the scrutiny which, properly and appropriately, ought to apply to union officials exercising a power under Commonwealth legislation. There is scrutiny, which we on this side of the House agree is entirely appropriate, that will be exercised in respect of parliamentarians, in respect of public officials and in respect of a wide range of categories of others who are exercising powers under Commonwealth legislation. It's remarkable that union officials are given a carve out.

The Attorney-General is at the table right now. He's being unusually silent. It's out of character. But he has an opportunity to explain to the Australian people, to explain to the parliament why there is special treatment for union officials. He can explain to the Australian people why there is a carve out for union officials that is not available to any other category of person who is exercising a power of the Commonwealth. That is, in the coalition's view, a question, the answer to which is absolutely obvious. And if the Attorney-General and if the government wish to achieve the confidence that ought to be achieved in this very important body, then what they should be doing is amending the bill or supporting the coalition's amendment which would remove this unjustifiable exemption for union officials.

The coalition supports this bill. I support this bill. Aspects of the process have been very undesirable. We will be moving amendments to seek to improve the bill.

See this speech in context