Pat Conaghan (Cowper, National Party) Share this | Hansard source

I have said this before in this place but I believe it bears repeating: as Australians we need to appreciate that the peaceful freedoms we currently enjoy are not given; they are hard fought and hard won and have been actively and, for the most part, successfully protected in recent years via our current counterterrorism measures. However, just as in the ways our freedom can be threatened has evolved so, too, we have to evolve in the way we protect those freedoms. And I respect and applaud this government's continued dedication to this fair and reasonable evolution. It's worth noting that, over the past two years—and a previous speaker mentioned this—going through COVID, I think we've generally forgotten the dangers that present themselves in the terrorism sphere. They haven't gone away. They're still there and they're still plotting. Very sadly, we saw that in the UK, and my thoughts and prayers go out to Sir David's Amess's family. It's tragic. Quite often we might sit back and think that that's something that happens somewhere else. But it's not; it happens here in our own backyard.

This bill, the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (High Risk Terrorist Offenders) Bill 2020, provides for the adaptation of the key counterterrorism powers; namely, the creation of extended supervision orders, or ESOs, and complementary amendments to the Telecommunications Legislation Amendment (International Production Order) Bill 2020 that will continue to ensure the safety and security of all Australians.

It is an uncomfortable fact that Australia's national terrorism threat level is 'probable'—which just reinforces what I've said about 'it is in our own backyard'—and it has remained as probable since 2014, despite the fantastic work that our security agencies have done. This means that, over the past seven years, there has been credible intelligence assessed by Australia's security agencies indicating that individuals and groups have not only the intent but also the capability to conduct a terrorist act in Australia. Over those seven years, 110 individuals have been charged as a result of 51 counterterrorism related investigations and there have been seven domestic attacks and 18 major counterterrorism disruption operations in response to potential attack planning within Australia—18. That's 18 times that our agencies have prevented death or injury on our streets—in our backyard.

But it's equally uncomfortable that there are 13 convicted terrorist offenders due to be released back into the Australian community following the expiry of their custodial sentence between now and 2025—13 people who have committed offences, been convicted of those offences and put in jail to be released back into our communities. These released offenders can be highly radicalised, motivated and capable of engaging in further offending or, perhaps more worrying, inspiring and engaging others to do so.

If we couple these uncomfortable truths with the role of technology in propagating violent extremist ideologies and the COVID-19 by-product of physical isolation increasing the access and reliance on technology for communication, it's not difficult to conclude that our current counterterrorism measures must be adapted in accordance with the risk that is currently posed to our nation. Unfortunately, we've seen that the rampant spread of misinformation during lockdowns and increasing unrest as a result of the government's measures imposed to fight the pandemic have provided extremists with fertile territory to exploit public fear and radicalise other vulnerable individuals. That is the cesspit of what we call social media and the dark web.

In essence, this bill is seeking to expand the available legislative implements that the Supreme Court and the AFP currently have at their disposal. There are currently two defined options for managing terrorist offenders. The first is continuing detention orders. A court may impose that a person remain detained where they pose an unacceptable risk to the community and where that risk cannot be addressed through less restrictive means. The second option is a controlled order, which places conditions on a person in the community.

It's worth noting that on a state or territory basis that's not an unusual thing. In a former life I acted for people sentenced to terms of imprisonment and the parole system allowed for restrictions or impositions on those people. That is effectively what we're doing here. It's not something new or something radical. It takes into account the offender's state of mind and the assessment of how the objective view of that offender rates. It should be noted that these orders are not tailored for the post-sentence context, as they allow for only a very limited and defined set of conditions and are issued by different courts to continuing detention orders.

The first key additions to the current options that this bill seeks to introduce are extended supervision orders, ESOs, and interim supervision orders, ISOs, to complement the current continuing detention orders. ESOs have been specifically devised to ensure that high-risk terrorist offenders can be appropriately managed in the community at the end of their custodial sentence. In essence, ESOs are more flexible and tailored in nature than a blanket CDO, ensuring that each of the conditions imposed on the offender is reasonable, necessary, appropriate and adaptive to address the risk to the community of the offender committing a serious terrorism offence. The Supreme Court may then issue an ESO for a period of three years. That can be reviewed if necessary at that time.

The bill sets out the general conditions that could form part of an ESO and these relate to restrictions of matters, such as the movement or travel of the offender; travel documents; licences; communications, particularly the use of telecommunications or precluding them from using telecommunications; education; and rehabilitation. One would think these things are appropriate and reasonable to impose on somebody who has been convicted of a serious criminal terrorism offence. In addition to those matters I just read out, ESOs have the ability to impose a number of prohibitions in relation to alcohol, drugs and weapons—which is very reasonable—and, most importantly, obtaining foreign or Australian travel documents.

If we put into context the amendments that this bill will bring about, for the 13 convicted offenders due to be released up till 2025 they are not, in my view, harsh or heavy-handed restrictions, particularly when we look at what's at stake—the safety of our nation and the safety of our citizens. Sadly, we saw attacks in New Zealand and the UK. It's good to see that there has been a bipartisan approach on the committee, despite some of the comments from the last speaker. Earlier today Dr Aly made a very good contribution to the bill.

In the context of the offenders' initial crimes, these measures are proportionate and necessary. The fact that, through an ESO, these restrictions and prohibitions can be tailored in direct response to the level of risk should be comfort to those who have some suspicions about the imposition on the civil rights of offenders who have served their time.

The bill also amends the international production orders regime, which was introduced in 2020, allowing for improved cross-border access to communications data for law enforcement agencies, and we have seen that work so effectively in recent months. These amendments will ensure that agencies are able to obtain international production orders for the purpose of monitoring compliance with the extended supervision orders.

In conclusion, I believe—and I will always say this—our country is worth protecting. I would ask any detractors of this important bill to ask themselves if they truly share that belief. The national terrorism threat level is 'probable', and it has been there for seven years. I applaud this government's determination and commitment to ensuring the ongoing safety of all Australians.

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