Anne Aly (Cowan, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Hansard source

It gives me great pleasure to stand here today, serving as the deputy chair of the Human Rights Sub-Committee of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, presenting this interim report titled Legal foundations of religious freedom in Australia. The terms of reference of the report were much broader than specifically looking at the legal foundations for freedom of religion in Australia. It looked at the status of freedom of religion or belief as recognised in article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights around the world, including in Australia.

I must pay heed to the wonderful work done by the committee secretariat and the committee in producing what, I believe, is quite a comprehensive report, particularly at a very critical time when these issues are starting to be debated in our parliament, with the impending delivery of the marriage equality bill—hopefully by the end of this week. We do hope that this report will offer a basis for the impending inquiry that is to be undertaken by Philip Ruddock.

The report, as I mentioned, is quite comprehensive. I don't have enough time to go through everything, but there were some things that I did want to speak about here today. The first of those is the examination in the report of the difference between holding and manifesting belief. This is a really important issue and one that I think will come up in the very nuanced debate that we're about to have around the protection of religious freedoms in the context of marriage equality and that we'll be voting on.

In particular, the report makes mention of several submissions which emphasised the distinction between having or holding a religious belief and the manifestation of that belief or the freedom to manifest that belief. In Australia, we accept that, under our Constitution, particularly section 116, there is a separation of the state and religion, and that Australia welcomes religious plurality and the freedom to practice a belief, within certain confines, and those confines being that, if the manifestation of your particular religious belief calls for you to do something which is against the law or which is unlawful, there are limitations on that manifestation. This is evident in examples such as someone arguing that female genital mutilation is a religious practice. I personally believe it is not a religious practice. But where someone argues that female genital mutilation is a religious practice then of course the law comes in and says, 'That is unlawful,' and prohibits the manifestation of that professed belief. The coming weeks will, I hope, allow us to debate with more intellectual rigour the crux of this argument about holding a belief and the manifestation of that belief.

Another part of that argument is the practice of a belief as an individual or in a community with others. The question here is whether or not we extend the protections for freedom of religion that we have for religious organisations to religious individuals. This is where some people may argue, for example, that a baker or a marriage celebrant who holds particular religious beliefs might be able to then discriminate against a same-sex couple by refusing them their services should they want to marry. We have some exemptions in place at both state and federal level for religious organisations to allow, for example, Catholic schools to hire only Catholics or other religious organisations to employ only people of that faith as part of the duties of their employment. Do we then extend those to individuals, as opposed to just organisations? I think that's something that is really going to come up in the discussion as we proceed—whether or not we extend those exemptions for religious organisations to individuals who profess a religious belief so that they are able to then, effectively, discriminate against same-sex couples in the provision of their services.

The question I would ask is: in doing that, would we also then be extending the idea that individuals can also manifest their religious beliefs in ways that have an impact on others, and, in many regards, a negative impact on others? These are legitimate concerns that I think will be brought up by both sides of the argument—by those who seek more protections for religious freedoms, and those who will argue that religious freedoms are fairly comprehensive.

It's very fortuitous to have this interim report on hand as a basis for informing those arguments, particularly because it is so comprehensive and looks at issues like legitimate limitations on freedom of religion and belief—where we accept that certain religious practices, or certain practices that people profess are religious, are indeed unlawful or illegal in Australia. We currently have a range of instruments to deal with that. But we also currently have a range of instruments that make it unlawful to discriminate in Australia. So should we permit limitations if they are the result of balancing the claims to fundamental human rights? Should we permit limitations on the freedom of religion and belief if, in permitting those limitations, we are in fact balancing one human right against another and protecting people from discrimination? Again, that is something that I believe will come up in the final report and in the ensuing debate. The report also looks at the important issues of existing protections for freedom of religion, both at the national level and at the state level, and very comprehensively canvasses the balance between the right to freedom of religion and other rights.

I said in my first speech to parliament that I do not believe that the rights of some people trump or override the rights of others. I believe that all human rights are worth pursuing with vigour. So, for me, getting this balance right and ensuring that all people feel protected, including those who want the freedom to practise and to express their religious beliefs as well as those who support marriage equality, is fundamental. I don't think that this is something that is unachievable for Australia. I think that we can get to this point of adequately balancing rights without having to wind back our antidiscrimination laws.

I will make one more point here before closing. That is that the report notes that Commonwealth protections for freedom of religion or belief are limited. The report also notes that there is a cause to strengthen protections for religious freedoms, including a religious discrimination act. I might say that, when I suggested that, the member for Goldstein, who is sitting opposite, claimed that I was asking for blasphemy laws. I do hope that the member for Goldstein will change his mind when people on his own backbench call for the same thing.

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