House debates

Wednesday, 13 May 2015

Bills

Migration Amendment (Strengthening Biometrics Integrity) Bill 2015; Second Reading

12:27 pm

Photo of Don RandallDon Randall (Canning, Liberal Party) Share this | Hansard source

I am pleased to be presented with the opportunity to speak in the parliament today on an important bill such as this one. The Migration Amendment (Strengthening Biometrics Integrity) Bill 2015 seeks to consolidate and to streamline this government's efforts to ensure that Australia's security and safety are not compromised whilst also maintaining our current levels of both temporary and permanent migration.

This bill further supports the changes introduced last year in the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Act 2014. It also reinforces the Prime Minister's statement on national security when he announced that legislation that would support the fight against terrorism as well as ensure the security of Australian citizens was a priority. Recent events have demonstrated the need to increase our ability to protect our borders, and obtaining biometric data, also known as personal identifiers, will be critical in doing this.

Since the advent of the biometric program, there have been more than 9,000 instances of fingerprint matches under either Australian Law Enforcement agencies or Five Country Conference partner countries. Those countries are Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States. There is no arguing that the threat level to Australia domestically has risen and that the technology used by those seeking to do harm to our citizens is improving. This bill seeks to counter their efforts.

Strengthening our ability to collect biometric information will assist on two fronts: the ongoing fight against terrorism and terrorist activities, and the government's efforts to disrupt human-trafficking activities in Australia. Since 2006, current legislation has been amended several times, leading to overlapping and occasionally inconsistent results. This new legislation seeks to streamline and build on our existing ability to protect our borders.

We know that those on this side of the House are very keen on protecting our borders. In addressing the migration bill that was before the House earlier today, I spoke about what had happened over the six years of the previous government: 800 boats and 50,000 people; we do not know exactly who many of them are, because they came in such a flood. Many of them are still sitting in the Australian community now, unprocessed, waiting for their status to be determined.

As I said, this legislation protects our borders. It does not do this by introducing universal biometric collections or by undermining any human rights of those who may be subject to checks. In fact, the implications of these changes have been heavily measured against Australia's obligations. These changes have been sparked by a series of events where photographic identification has not proven to be accurate enough. The amendments in this legislation further consolidate the coalition's efforts to reduce red tape and increase efficiency. The amendments are not expected to incur any additional costs that cannot be drawn from existing resources. Faster checks equal more checks, which increases the strength of our border protection practices.

The Department of Immigration and Border Protection's biometrics program has been almost 10 years in the making, and a step-by-step approach to its implementation has been taken. As a result, there are a large number of noncitizens still in the community that have managed to evade checks that would have been subject to stronger scrutiny, whether that be due to the time or the way that they arrived in Australia. Current legislation still requires citizens and noncitizens to identify themselves and provide biometric identifiers. However, limits are placed on the types of identifiers that may be used and the manner in which they are collected. The provisions for the collection of these identifiers have been made in several different sections through various amendments; this has resulted in loopholes, overlapping provisions and inconsistencies in legislation.

As it currently stands, all citizens and noncitizens are required to provide identification when entering and leaving Australia. As we all know, when we go through the airport or on a cruise, you have to identify yourself when you come and go. That usually takes the form of an Australian passport. Noncitizens have a far more expansive requirement to submit biometric information, as they should. This information is required when a visa is to be granted, when determining whether a valid visa is held and in any decisions surrounding the detention of noncitizens. In instances where checks are being done on travellers under the age of 18, parental consent is required in the context of visa applications. However, consent is not required when arriving or departing at border control. It is inconsistencies such as these that often create unnecessary conflict between border protection officers and the travellers they are serving.

Some of the more common personal identifiers under the current legislation include fingerprints, hand prints, measurements of height and weight, image of an individual's head and shoulders, an iris scan and a signature. However, in 2013-14 less than two per cent of noncitizens who were allowed to come into Australia were required to submit biometric information. Since 2007, only a small number of those travelling into Australia were required to submit to biometric identifiers. Despite this, there have been significant successes in exposing fraudulent and illegal activities. There are also a number of safeguards that need to be applied when carrying out an identification test which afford a great deal of privacy to the individual. However, modern technology has allowed many of these safeguards to be rendered unnecessary. While current legislation has provided an excellent framework for establishing the collection and management of biometric identifiers, new technology is allowing improved checks without any additional compromises in privacy. It would be irresponsible for a government to not ensure legislation keeps pace with modern technology.

The proposed amendments build on an existing framework for biometric data collection. They also provide a way for this government to close the loopholes within the system and address any inconsistencies created by the multiple amendments to current legislation over the past number of years. They seek to strengthen the ability for border protection officers to collect biometric information under a single power, removing restrictions and providing greater flexibility in the opportunities to collect data. This will also allow officers to request information either in writing or verbally.

The amendments do not provide a carte blanche approach to the collection of data. They will allow for the collection of information from individuals who have not previously submitted data and who have been identified as a concern after their arrival in Australia, whether through intelligence agencies, law enforcement or immigration officials. They also allow for the collection of data for any reason where a link to the Migration Act or Migration Regulations can be appropriately demonstrated. The removal of current safeguards is not an indifference to the privacy of visitors but a reflection of new technology. Fingerprint scans can now occur on mobile devices then and there, without the removal of any articles of clothing or the need to obtain facial images.

Current processing procedures can take between 30 and 60 minutes; mobile fingerprint scanners take a matter of seconds. Removing the necessity for this to occur in private will ensure faster processing and an optimisation of staffing resources. Scans will be used to conduct checks against the existing data in order to verify a person's identity and detect individuals who may be a cause for concern in relation to security, law enforcement and/or immigration, as it applies under the Immigration Act. After scans have been completed, data will not be retained.

Another provision within this bill removes the necessity to seek a parent's or guardian's consent when obtaining personal identifiers from those under the age of 18 or those considered incapable. This is simply a child protection measure to assist in the prevention of human trafficking or child smuggling. The circumstance where data is collected from a child or incapable person is specifically limited to when the identity of a child or incapable person needs to be verified to a higher level of integrity. At no point are there any provisions for the forcible collection of data or to compel individuals to provide it. So you would ask, 'What happens?' I will tell you what happens. Refusing to comply with a request may result in having a visa refused, detention, delayed departure from Australia or refused entry into Australia, which would result in having to return to their original departure location on the next available flight.    That is not an unreasonable condition or request to make of someone who wishes to enjoy the security and safety of a country like ours, Australia.

Ensuring the correct identity of noncitizens has significant consequences beyond just entry into Australia. Many of those seeking to live here permanently eventually wish to access government services at local, state and federal levels. It is beyond essential that we are able to correctly identify those who seek to cross our borders and live in our communities, for the safety and security of all those who reside here now. There have been several instances where persons of interest or concern may have been prevented from travelling by the use of increased biometric information. In Western Australia, to take a local example, Mr Junaid Thorne, often called a radical Islamist and a hate preacher, has been charged with purchasing an airfare under a false name and using the ticket to travel. This individual has openly expressed support for ISIL, and has defended the actions of the perpetrator of the Charlie Hebdo massacre. Deputy Speaker, I refer you to an article by Grant Taylor in The West Australian newspaper on 16 January of this year where you can read more about Junaid Thorne's activities.

It is not unreasonable for us to keep up with the technology of things like eye scans and other biometric identifiers. On a personal level, having gone through the US recently myself—no-one in any way even thinks twice about it, and it is every time you go through. It is not just your thumbprint; it is your whole handprint—and it is if you are just transiting, not even trying to enter the country. That is just taken as a matter of fact. Hollywood makes it much of, for example, fingers being cut off and used; all this sort of stuff. But when you cross-reference a number of identifiers, it is very difficult to defraud—when you have, for example, iris scans. I was fortunate enough to go on a parliamentary program to Afghanistan, and most of the people entering the base had to identify themselves with an iris scan. It is not a problem. The only people that have a problem with that sort of further identification are those who have something to hide, or those who have an issue. I was quite happy to have an iris scan; I am quite happy to be fingerprinted many times. It is for our wellbeing—and, unfortunately, it is due to the increased activity around the world in terms of fundamentalists and those who are involved in terrorist activities or those who would seek to defraud or harm others.

Another case in point well known to all of us here is the case of Khaled Sharrouf. He gained notoriety for being the father of the seven-year-old boy who was pictured holding a decapitated head, somewhere in the Middle East; around Iraq, I suspect. I have the ABC article here: ' Khaled Sharrouf: the Australian radical fighting for Islamic State in Iraq and Syria'. It says: 'With a single photo of his seven-year-old son holding a severed head, Khaled Sharrouf has shot to global infamy.' This is the guy that went through Sydney Airport using his brother's passport. The biometric identifiers did not kick in then, did they? He got through this country by just swapping passports with his brother. What we know about Khaled Sharrouf is that, aside from having a history of being mentally unstable, he is also the person who had his passport—quite rightly—cancelled. But that is when he decided to use his brother's passport. The most recent reports indicate that his 14-year-old daughter has married his cohort and purported best friend, Mohamed Elomar—that is his 14-year-old daughter; he somehow got her overseas, too. This is why we are talking about these under-18s: the greatest tragedy is that these children could have been prevented from having their lives ruined by their misguided and mentally unstable parents. So Deputy Speaker, you can see it is in the interests of the mums and dads of Australia that we are collecting this information. But it is to identify those who pose a greater security threat by supporting terrorist activities, such as Khaled Sharrouf.

As I mentioned before, admittance is not the only concern when considering immigration fraud and the way that biometrics can assist. Having the gift of permanent residency, and subsequently citizenship, bestowed often means having access to world-class health and welfare systems, and simpler travel requirements. In October 2013, a Ghanian national was convicted in a court of law for falsifying documents in order to apply for citizenship, obtaining an Australian passport, and opening and operating an Australian bank account. On 10 October 2013, Senator Cash outlined this case in the other place.

That is why this bill to toughen our stance on biometrics is to be supported.

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