Andrew Nikolic (Bass, Liberal Party) Share this | Hansard source

Listening to that speech, you would think that the Labor Party was the only party represented at the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security. What we have heard from the member for Isaacs is: 'Labor did this. Labor did that.' My recollection, because I am a member of that committee, is that what we produced was a bipartisan report, a report that reflected a valued contribution from all members on that committee. There were certainly some tough discussions and, I would have to say, goodwill in most hearts. So it is disappointing to me to hear the criticisms and the partisan comments from the member for Isaacs because many of the things that he mentioned were, from my recollection, cooperatively concluded recommendations rather than in the way that they were portrayed.

The member for Isaacs also says that counterespionage and counter-terrorism make up only a very small amount of the requests for metadata. But I remind the honourable member that this is not a quantitative but a qualitative issue. One person can have a strategic affect and, as we have seen in recent times, all too often, resurgent terrorism has thrown up far too many recent examples of that essential truth.

The other essential truth is that the first duty of government—and this is where I agree with the member for Isaacs—is to keep its people safe. As a member of the committee that the member for Isaacs also belongs to, I am pleased to contribute to that very important outcome. In light of the resurgent threat of transnational terrorism, in light of the adaptive nature of those who engage in terrorism, in serious crime and in the appalling sexual abuse of our children, the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 2014 is important to Australia and to all Australians.

Terrorism concerns each and every rational government in the world today. It also concerns multilateral organisations like the United Nations, which has called for greater action in this area. The recently adopted UN Security Council resolution 2178, for example, requires states to criminalise the travel or attempted travel of foreign fighters.

As I wrote in an opinion piece in The Australian newspaper just a few weeks ago on 16 February, the United Kingdom is considering the introduction of a power to suspend citizenship for those found guilty of terrorism offences. Canada is being even tougher following the terrorist attacks at Ottawa's national war memorial and parliamentary precinct. After the atrocity in Paris in early January, France, like Canada, is revoking the citizenship rights of dual nationals. I think this British, French and Canadian determination signals a pragmatic way ahead for others, including Australia, to confront resurgent terrorism.

I spoke in that opinion piece in The Australianabout my own encounter with captured terrorists while serving as team leader of a United Nations mobile team called Team Zulu in south Lebanon in September 1991. The terrorists we captured never achieved their mission after their small boat was seized by my United Nations colleagues. It was a boat crammed with AK47s, hand grenades, knives, explosives and rocket propelled grenades. Their intent was to land on the Israeli side of the border near a beautiful coastal town called Nahariya where my wife and then two very young daughters lived. Their mission was to kill as many Jews as possible before they themselves were killed. When I asked that three-man terrorist team through the French-Arabic interpreter how they would distinguish between Jews and overseas visitors, the terrorist leader confidently put that question in the hands of his god. I can recall thinking at the time how lucky we were in Australia not to have such insane, indiscriminate killers in our country. But, as we now realise, those days are long gone.

That is why this bill is so vital. It gives our police and security agencies the additional powers they need to keep us safe. We may not like it, but this is now the practical reality which will continue to increasingly inform and affects the lives of every one of us and those we represent. This climate is likely to continue to persist for at least the foreseeable mid-term future and perhaps even well beyond that. Indeed, informed pundits such as former Chief of the Army Lieutenant General Peter Leahy are predicting a century of commitment to confront and contain let alone defeat resurgent and spreading religious and social extremism, intolerance and barbarism. This bill is a common-sense approach to that serious threat.

I will turn now to the practical application of this bill. In essence, it requires telecommunications providers to keep a limited and defined subset of metadata for two years. It means that we can shore up consistent standards across industry for storing limited data so that it remains available for criminal and security investigations. This is absolutely vital because the case studies that we heard on our committee demonstrated that metadata is the basic building block in nearly every successful counterterrorism, counterespionage, organised crime and paedophilia investigation. That is why Hetty Johnston from Bravehearts has called this legislation a 'no-brainer'.

Remember that metadata is information about a communication—the who, when and where—not the content, substance or 'what' of a communication, for which a warrant is still required to access. For phone calls, metadata is information such as the phone numbers of people talking to each other and how long they have talked to each other, not what they have said. For internet based services, metadata is information such as an email address and when it was sent, but not the subject line or body of an email. Metadata allows our police and security agencies to understand the links between people and networks. We are talking here about pattern-of-life analysis, understanding how people or networks of concern might link with each other to determine the need for more intrusive means to look perhaps at the content of what they are saying to each other.

In comprehensive briefings to our committee, we learned that metadata was used in 100 per cent of cybercrime investigations, nine out of ten counterterrorism and child protection investigations, and eight out of ten serious organised crime investigations. In a recent European paedophile investigation, the UK was able to prosecute 121 offenders. In contrast, the Germans, who have no data retention regime, could not convict a single perpetrator.

This legislation is particularly urgent because of fast-changing technology and the adaptive nature of our adversary. Telecommunications companies are retaining less data for shorter periods. We do not want our police and security agencies to become increasingly blind in pursuing terrorists and those involved in serious crimes. In 2013 a major internet service provider reduced its retention period for IP address allocation from many years down to three months. Remember that this data enables agencies to match suspect communications with actual people. In June 2014 the Australian Federal Police were unable to identify a suspect who stated online that they intended to sexually assault a baby because the carrier only retained data for a maximum of seven days. No responsible government can sit by while those who protect our community lose access to such vital information. The Australian Federal Police and organisations like ASIO are adamant that the decreasing availability of this data is hampering investigations and preventing perpetrators being brought to justice.

Contrary to the scare campaigns by the Greens party and their activist mates, this legislation gives no extra powers to our agencies, which have been accessing metadata for decades. In fact, we are strengthening privacy in this bill because we are cutting the agencies which can access metadata from around 80 to around 20 who have a clear and demonstrable need. Currently, even local councils and the RSPCA can access metadata. Under our new law, we will substantially reduce access to around 20 core criminal law enforcement and security agencies. This reflects public concern around the number of agencies permitted to access telecommunications data.

As a member of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, I can also provide assurances on the privacy protections in this bill. The Commonwealth Ombudsman will be given powers to inspect access to and the use of telecommunications data by Commonwealth, state and territory enforcement agencies. The Privacy Commissioner will continue to assess industry's compliance with the Australian Privacy Principles and monitor its nondisclosure obligations under the Telecommunications Act. The Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security will inspect and report on ASIO's access to data. The government has significantly increased the inspector-general's resources to enable it to effectively oversight the activities of intelligence agencies, and the Attorney-General will report on the scheme annually. It is important to make the point that the data retention proposal does not affect the immunities given to whistleblowers who qualify for protection under laws like the Commonwealth Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013.

It is clear that this legislation is urgent, but no-one can accuse us of rushing it through the parliament, given that we introduced the bill almost four months ago, on 30 October 2014. In relation to costs—an item raised by the member for Isaacs, again, in a critical way—the government has provided the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security with a confidential briefing on the costs of the scheme. This briefing to our committee enables us to include in our report details of the range of estimated costs of the scheme and to ensure that these details are made public prior to debate of the bill. The government has said from the outset—not under pressure from the member for Isaacs or anyone else—that we are prepared to meet a reasonable share of the up-front capital costs to implement this legislation. We are confident that industry understands the importance of data retention and takes seriously its corporate responsibility to do the right thing by helping our police and security agencies to protect Australians. But even at the highest estimate, the cost is less than one per cent of the $40 billion plus sector, so the costs involved will be comparatively modest.

Importantly, this bill is fair to all law-abiding and decent Australians. It targets only those among us who would seek to do the very great majority harm and supports their detection at the very earliest opportunity. To do otherwise is neither sensible nor prudent. Perhaps, in the end, the best way to assess the validity of this bill is for all of us and, indeed, all those we represent to ask a simple question: who has most to gain or benefit by delaying these measures? The answer to this question is pretty clear: it is not any of us in this chamber nor the majority of Australian citizenry beyond, rather it is those who intend to harm their fellow Australians. While the subject of data retention is, itself, less dramatic than the use of aircraft armed with both kinetic and smart weapons against Daesh, it is nevertheless an important complementary measure, which may very well prevent others from joining their murderous ranks.

I heard the member for Isaacs talking about journalists, and the journalist issue has been topical in recent times. My view is that we must not exempt categories of people from the law. Let's face it, journalists are just as likely as to commit crimes as others—lawyers, priests and doctors—who also engage in privileged private communications. Despite what the member for Isaacs has said about there being no compelling evidence why a warrant regime for journalists should not be implemented, there was no evidence presented of abuse of the metadata scheme over the last 30 years that it has been used. There is no evidence whatsoever about abuse in relation to journalists or their sources. So the question I ask is: what problem are we solving? There are safeguards within the PJCIS recommendations to provide additional protections. Law enforcement agencies must notify the Ombudsman or in the case of ASIO the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security each time an authorisation for metadata relates to a journalist's source. The committee I am a member of—the PJCIS—must also be informed and can consider the operational imperatives relating to that authorisation.

Let me conclude by reinforcing the important effect of this bill in helping secure our current way of life in an otherwise difficult and testing security environment. This bill establishes a vital statutory obligation to retain metadata. It is vital because it is at the heart of keeping our community safe. It is the agencies that conduct those activities that are telling us exactly how vital it is. This government will not rest until our community is as safe as it possibly can be, and a vital part of that is getting this bill through the parliament. I commend the bipartisan nature of the committee's consideration of this bill. I congratulate our chair, the member for Wannon, Dan Tehan, and the deputy chair, the member for Holt, Anthony Byrne. I commend this bill to the House.

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