House debates

Monday, 22 February 2010

Private Members’ Business

Proposed House Appropriations and Administrative Committee

8:22 pm

Photo of Ms Anna BurkeMs Anna Burke (Chisholm, Deputy-Speaker) Share this | Hansard source

I welcome and second the motion before the House tonight. I think it demonstrates the essence of this motion that an opposition member and a government member are putting forward something on behalf of the parliament. The general public sees question time and thinks that is what parliament is—that it is the ferociousness of two parliamentary parties going at each other. What they fail to see is the parliament: the building that we are standing in, the institution that we all hold near and dear. So much of what we actually do in this place, most particularly through the committee work, is of a bipartisan nature.

This motion before us today would continue that solid framework of distinguishing between executive government and parliament. Then there would be a great divide, and there should be, because the parliament is the institution and it will stand. Regardless of elections, regardless of parties, it will be here. But it can only be here if it is appropriately resourced. If those resources are open to greater scrutiny—and I think that the motion before us, instead of taking away scrutiny, actually gives greater scrutiny—a committee will be allowed to be there and that committee can then be reviewed by the media, by external individuals and, most appropriately, by the Auditor-General.

In a paper that the member for Wannon presented at the Presiding Officers and Clerks Conference in Perth in July 2006, he concluded:

The relationship between the Parliament and the Executive depends on the mutual respect which accompanies the principle of separation of powers within Australia’s constitutional framework. Improving the funding and accountability framework for Parliament, should contribute to enhanced standing of Parliament and its Members.

The motion before us is to improve that relationship—to say that the parliament has some destiny over its own funding model.

There has been a Senate Appropriations and Staffing Committee on the books for some time, and its website states:

Standing order 19 provides for the appointment of a Standing Committee on Appropriations and Staffing to inquire into:

a. proposals for the annual estimates and the additional estimates for the Senate;

b. proposals to vary the staff structure of the Senate, and staffing and recruitment policies; and

c. such other matters as are referred to it by the Senate.

So there is a committee of this nature that currently operates in the Senate. When this Senate committee was established, it was recommended that the House do the same thing, but sadly, as is the way of these things, we have never adopted such a committee. It would be there as a standing committee to establish the estimates for the House to use.

Those of us who have been here long enough would remember that there used to be five parliamentary departments, which then came down to three. If you want a brief history of previous attempts to amalgamate the administration of the Commonwealth, you can go back as far as 1910. That was when the desire to rationalise departments and actually have some structure about how the departments should be funded was first expressed. Then we go to the Great Depression, when the government established an inquiry under the control of an inspector of the Public Service Board. Australia is well serviced by independent statutory authorities such as the Public Service Board and the Auditor-General. These things stand separate from executive government. This committee would stand separate from executive government, saying, ‘This is how we’re establishing the finances of the parliament as an institution in its own right,’ and could not be prorogued by any government of the day.

Committees like this, as the member for Wannon indicated, are very common around the world, particularly in countries with parliaments with which we align ourselves and affiliate ourselves most closely, such as the UK. They have a very powerful House of Commons Commission. It is chaired by the Speaker and contains the Leader of the House and other senior members. It operates by consensus. It provides estimates for the House of Commons. The Treasury has no formal control over the estimates. The House of Commons has one budget for costs relating to MPs, one budget for staff and admin costs and a budget it shares with the House of Lords. The commission is established under an act of parliament, and similar independence is accorded to the House of Lords. So in the UK such a system is already in place. In Canada there is the Board of Internal Economy, consisting of the Speaker, two ministers, the Leader of the Opposition or their nominees, and other MPs, with an equal balance between government and non-government members. It is established under an act of parliament. It establishes the annual budget for the House of Commons. It has high-level, ultimate authority in administration.

That is what this motion is getting at: there are actually greater levels of administration and greater levels of accountability. This House has a long tradition of formal and informal consultation with members about matters of administration. POITAG, whether or not you like it, has a long tradition of providing for MPs’ and senators’ input on ICT matters in the parliament. We are not devoid of input into administration. The Parliamentary Education Advisory Committee, which is chaired by the Deputy Speaker and has all parties represented, looks at the great work of the Parliamentary Education Office. We have input into that; we have input into their budgetary process. The House committees obviously have a long history as sounding boards and consultation mechanisms on a wide range of matters and of advising the Presiding Officers on a range of things. Indeed, various House committees have actually recommended establishing a committee such as the one in the motion before us tonight. The Joint Standing Committee on the Parliamentary Library, as established under the standing orders, has a long and proud tradition of advising Presiding Officers on the operation of the Parliamentary Library, with input and feedback direct to the library. Again, it is a bipartisan committee. The Liaison Committee of Chairs and Deputy Chairs is again a strictly bipartisan committee. It has informal mechanisms for people to provide information back to the Presiding Officers about how committees work—how the financing of those committees works, how the staffing of those committees works.

We need greater accountability, not less. Every time we talk about the staffing and financing of the parliament, the press and individuals are out there saying, ‘Well, it’s pollies’ perks.’ This is actually about saying that we should have greater accountability, greater autonomy and greater recognition of openness in the parliament. We as parliamentarians should be able to say, ‘This is our financing budget,’ not have it imposed by the government of the day. It is about recognising the value of the parliament and the work that the parliament does. I commend the motion to the House.

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