Sussan Ley (Farrer, Liberal Party, Shadow Minister for Justice and Customs) Share this | Hansard source

I thank the Parliamentary Secretary for Regional Development and Northern Australia for giving me the opportunity to speak on the Transport Security Amendment (2008 Measures No. 1) Bill 2008. The purpose of the bill is to amend the Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Act 2003 and the Aviation Transport Security Act 2004 to streamline some legal terms and conditions that will enhance the effectiveness of security outcomes. The bill does not merge the security arrangements of the aviation, maritime and security sectors. Rather, the bill seeks to ensure that a similar regulatory framework is in place for each industry to enhance the overall efficiency of transport security.

Following the events of 11 September 2001, the international community recognised a need to implement systems to protect the maritime and aviation transport sectors against the threat of terrorism. As a result the International Maritime Organisation developed the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code in December 2002. Under this code, all security regulated ports, port facilities, offshore facilities, port and offshore service providers and ships are required to implement security plans and undergo security risk assessments.

In Australia, the Maritime Transport Security Act was introduced by the coalition government in 2003. It sought to implement international guidelines developed by the International Maritime Organisation. After subsequent amendments, the act was amended and renamed the Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Act 2003. The Aviation Transport Act 2004 establishes a regulatory framework which requires that certain aviation industry participants have approved transport security plans and implements Australia’s obligations under the Convention on International Civil Aviation, known as the Chicago convention. In 2007, a task force was established within the Office of Transport Security, a division of the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government. The review was designed to examine ways in which the Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Act 2003 could be improved to increase flexibility and clarity in maritime security planning. The outcome of the review led to a series of policy and legislative proposals. The legislative proposals are sought to be implemented in this bill.

The coalition supports the bill as drafted. The bill amends both the Aviation Transport Act and the Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Act to clarify that the department secretary may permit both aviation and maritime industry participants to hold multiple security programs or plans at once and that, prior to the commencement date of the amendments, the operation of the ATSA and the MTOFSA did not prevent industry participants from holding multiple security programs and plans. Additionally, in relation to the Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Act, this bill is intended to insert a definition of ‘Australia’ into the act so that the act’s operation is extended to include our external territories, such as Norfolk Island, and to allow the department secretary to approve a maritime or offshore security plan for up to five years but no less than 12 months. The bill enables regulations to be made to stipulate mapping standards for maritime security zones and security regulated port boundaries and standards for the presentation of information detailing offshore security zones required to be produced by industry participants. The bill ensures the consistent use of definitions and terms throughout the act.

The coalition government created a single organisation body, the Border Protection Command, to coordinate the planning, surveillance, intelligence and deployments of Coastwatch and the Australian Defence Force, which adds teeth to border protection, with around 450 personnel and tougher rules of engagement. I congratulate the officers in the Border Protection Command for the work that they do and query, as I have in the past, the number of flying hours that our Customs Dash 8s are now reduced to as a result of the current government’s cuts. The coalition increased funding for Customs from $357 million in 1995-96 to $1 billion in 2007, which is an increase of 98 per cent in real terms. The coalition increased funding for the Australia Federal Police from $205 million to $976 million—an increase of 238 per cent in real terms—to tackle smuggling and substantially boost our quarantine controls, as well as the other good work that the AFP does. The coalition took practical measures to boost our intelligences agencies and law enforcement bodies that work towards improving maritime and aviation security. ASIO’s staff was boosted from 580 at the end of 2000-01 to around 1,860 by 2010-11. The coalition gave our law enforcement agencies teeth by strengthening the legislative framework for terrorist related offences. The coalition increased regional and global cooperation in law enforcement activities and legal assistance in order to boost the fight against maritime and aviation security threats, such as terrorism, piracy and transnational crime.

The criteria for issuing people a security clearance to work on Australia’s wharves must be upgraded immediately to make our ports more secure. Workers who obtain a maritime security identification card, MSIC, can have a criminal record as long as they have not been convicted of a maritime security relevant offence and have not been sentenced to imprisonment. This is not good enough. The arrangements that are currently in place are inadequate and will continue to pose a threat to Australia’s customs regime and security unless they are changed. This view has been expressed by our law enforcement agencies and other bodies who know, if I may put it like this, the character and the quality of some of those who work on our wharves today. Recent figures quoted show that approximately 10 per cent of those who are approved for MSICs have a criminal history. This is allowed because their conviction has not been for a maritime security relevant offence. Sea containers house the largest volumes of illicit drugs that come into Australia and criminals and organised crime groups rely on workers in the maritime environment to move illicit drugs from one country to another.

The Parliamentary Joint Committee on the Australian Crime Commission heard last month that about five per cent of sea cargo that arrives in Australia is X-rayed and, of that five per cent, only one-tenth is physically inspected. I reiterate my remarks about the resources that Customs has to carry out the checks that I believe it needs to do. Background checks need to be rigorous and it is critical that the issuing body can enforce stricter criteria for denying approval of an MSIC.

I hold an aviation security identification card myself as a commercial pilot and I am familiar with the strict regulations and rules that need to be adhered to in order to obtain and keep the so-called ASIC. I would commend those who manage the process and there is nothing wrong with that process. We do all have to jump through a certain amount of hoops and so we should. With ASICs and MSICs we need to set the criteria and the bar higher so that those who have been involved in criminal activities in the past can be excluded. I am not saying every single criminal activity needs to be excluded—some, with the benefit of distance and hindsight, were perhaps not particularly relevant or serious offences in the first place.

There has to be some sense brought to the decision, but we do not have the balance where it needs to be in terms of excluding those with criminal records from holding the maritime safety identification card in particular, given the access that they have to containers and freight coming into Australia, onto our wharves, and the high level of contract labour that is employed. Customs is not able to fulfil all these activities itself. It needs to employ the services of contractors, and of course there is contract transport available. I mean to cast no aspersions on those who do their jobs very well in these contract organisations, but I think it is an area where security is lax.

In conclusion, as I have mentioned previously, our position on this bill is that we do support it. It is integral to continue to improve national maritime and aviation security and make the necessary amendments to do so. The coalition recognises that threats to our security are increasingly complex and unpredictable and that we must get on the front foot with a coordinated and uncompromising approach to protecting our maritime borders and our aviation spaces. Ultimately, it is of vital importance to Australia that our maritime and aviation security measures are amended to ensure that we are best able to respond to changes in our overall security environment. I commend the bill.

Question agreed to.

Bill read a second time.

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