Bruce Scott (Maranoa, National Party) Share this | Hansard source

On behalf of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, I present the committee’s report on the inquiry into Australia’s Defence Force regional air superiority, together with evidence received by the committee.

Ordered that the report be made a parliamentary paper.

by leave—Mr Deputy Speaker, I am pleased to present this report, Inquiry into Australian Defence Force regional air superiority, on behalf of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade.

The issue of Australia’s regional air superiority has been the subject of considerable discussion and commentary since 2000. The strategic guidance outlined in Defence 2000: our future Defence Force, commonly known as the defence white paper, and the acquisition and phasing out of equipment proposed in the Defence Capability Plan 2004-2014 have provided the basis for much of the debate amongst key stakeholders.

The Defence Subcommittee of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade first examined the issue of Australia’s air combat capability in its Review of the Defence annual report 2002-03. Further to this inquiry, in June 2005 the Senate resolved that the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade inquire and report into:

(a)

the ability of the Australian Defence Force to maintain air superiority in our region to 2020, given current planning; and

(b)

any measures required to ensure air superiority in our region to 2020.

Although the committee has made no recommendations, the report examines the various issues and diverse views presented during the two public hearings and in the 41 submissions received during the term of this inquiry.

Strategic considerations, both global and regional, underpin Australia’s future regional air superiority. Concepts such as a balanced force structure, asymmetric threats and an assessment of regional military capabilities are key drivers in developing a balanced Australian Defence Force. Importantly, the committee notes that Australia must continue to monitor developments in the region when considering new and improved air combat capabilities.

The Australian Defence Force’s current capability planning is guided by the defence white paper and subsequent defence policy updates released in 2003 and 2005. In examining the existing guidance and the planning for a future air combat capability, the committee notes that the introduction of a new platform is underpinned by strategic policy, cost-effective delivery of capability and the constraints of providing a well-balanced Australian Defence Force.

A key decision in transitioning to a new air combat capability is the withdrawal from service of the F111 in 2010. Many commentators believe this retirement date is premature, and the report discusses the technical and maintenance issues in extending the aircraft’s in-service life past 2010. The report concludes that industry could support the F111 until 2020 but there are risks, including the ability to sustain critical skills amongst the current workforce. Further, the committee notes the increasing severity of the risk profile in extending the F111 beyond 2010.

The Australian Defence Force’s future capability planning is examined in the report, with particular attention being given to the acquisition of the Joint Strike Fighter. The unique nature of the Joint Strike Fighter project and Australia’s decision to join the international program provide opportunities for Australian industry that would not be available if a more traditional capital acquisition strategy had been undertaken.

However, any delay in the Joint Strike Fighter project would be unacceptable, and the committee notes the government’s decision to purchase the Super Hornet aircraft to address any potential capability gap which may arise during the transition to the Joint Strike Fighter.

The committee concludes its report with a comparative analysis of the Joint Strike Fighter and the FA22 Raptor, covering issues such as capability, availability and cost. Irrespective of whether the FA22 Raptor is available for export sale to Australia, the committee notes the purchase of the Joint Strike Fighter is considered by Defence to provide the most effective and efficient air combat capability whilst maintaining a balanced Australian Defence Force.

In conclusion, I would like to thank all those who contributed to this inquiry through the submissions and the discussion with the committee. I thank the committee members and I thank my deputy chairman. I would also like to take this opportunity to thank the secretariat. I notice some of them are in the House at the moment. I thank them very sincerely for the hard work that they put into this report and their efforts throughout the inquiry process. I commend the report to the House.

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