House debates

Monday, 26 March 2007

Migration Amendment (Border Integrity) Bill 2006

Second Reading

8:16 pm

Photo of Brendan O'ConnorBrendan O'Connor (Gorton, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Parliamentary Secretary for Industrial Relations) Share this | Hansard source

I rise to comment on the Migration Amendment (Border Integrity) Bill 2006. I listened to the member opposite talk about the virtues of this proposed piece of legislation. There are indeed provisions that are acceptable and reasonable, however late they are and however long it has taken the government to put them before the parliament. The opposition sees some merit in these particular provisions, but we have questioned—quite rightly—not only the delay but some of the issues that go to the new technology that is being proposed. Particularly when we are talking about national security, it is very important that when we consider using technology to improve our security the technology is foolproof and watertight and will not allow any breaches to occur or any deliberate intrusions to occur by people who would like to obviate that security. The bill has been delayed and, while we understand that there have been some excuses to do with drafting, in the end, if we are going to lay the blame at the feet of somebody, it will ultimately have to be laid at the feet of the minister.

The two main provisions of the bill—namely the effort to redesign the special purpose visa regime in order to facilitate the lawful travel and entry of low-risk groups of travellers and the proposition to enhance identity verification at Australia’s immigration clearance points and to streamline processing—are matters that should be before this House and that should be debated. We want to have a secure and efficient process for entrance to and egress from this country. We should not have needless delays for visitors or people returning to this country. It is clear that there needs to be attention drawn to unnecessary delay. More importantly, we should have the best technology, complementing our specialised and experienced immigration security staff, strengthening the border. That can be done by various means.

The proposed act before us introduces biometric technology. The bill amends and introduces provisions to allow citizens and noncitizens to use an automated system in immigration clearance. Certain past legislative developments enable the operation of the current bill, which allows persons who are citizens or noncitizens to use an automated system when entering or leaving Australia. The purpose of the former act was to remove legal obstacles to the use of electronic transactions. It ensures that transactions are not invalid merely because they take place by means of an electronic form of communication. The act provides a framework to facilitate the use of electronic transactions, to promote business and community confidence in such transactions and to enable business and the community to use electronic communications in their dealings with government.

There has been some support for the introduction of this biometric technology. The use of the so-called SmartGate is dependent upon having an eligible passport—in other words, the e-passport. The bill refers to the fact that whether a passport is eligible will be determined by proposed new section 175A. The use of those automotive systems by travellers will rely on the e-passport. While we would argue that the consideration of this technology is not only sensible but ultimately necessary, there has been criticism of the SmartGate system in relation to the reliability of technology.

It is important to bring to the attention of the House that, according to certain media reports, industry experts have identified gaps in biometrics such as excessive error rates, a poor ability to find database matches and high sensitivity to varying conditions. Indeed, a senior policy analyst at the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy has estimated that the accuracy rate for facial scanning is 90 per cent, for fingerprints it is 99 per cent and for iris scanning it is 97 per cent. So clearly there is a long way to go to perfect the system that would ensure a 100 per cent guarantee that the detection by technology of the person standing before that technology is indeed the person so described on the passport.

I saw only yesterday a program where a photographer was looking not for identical twins but for two people who look almost identical but are not genetically related. He scanned the world to find two people who are so similar as to give them a fright when one was introduced to the other. They are not related, they have never met each other, but they look almost identical, certainly facially. The program that I caught a glimpse of yesterday prompts the question: how confident are we that this system will be foolproof to people who are not the person as outlined on the new e-passport?

Some questions about the reliability and the effectiveness of the SmartGate technology are expected. Dr Roger Clarke, a visiting fellow in the faculty of engineering and information technology at the ANU, commented in a recent interview:

SmartGate is destined to fail because it is built on the assumption that a person’s face will appear the same, when in reality that is rarely the case.

Indeed, he says that it is quite likely that actions like laughing and smiling may confuse the device. I know that we are usually asked not to smile when we are having our photograph taken. For some, that is definitely an improvement. Whether it is an aesthetic improvement or not, the point the academic is making in this respect is that there are ways in which even technology may be confused in terms of whether the photo matches the person. I think that, again, requires close consideration so that we can ensure that the security of our immigration process is watertight.

That is not to say that Labor opposes the proposition. We have to make sure that we use the best technology available. But I would hope that, when this bill is enacted, the government would not think it was advisable for this technology to replace the basic skills, instincts and experience of people who have been staffing our borders and immigration outlets for many years. There is no doubt that it is more than just whether you detect someone digitally on an electronic passport. Clearly, it is more than that. It is therefore something that will complement the skills required of personnel who staff our airports and entry points into this country.

There has been, as I said, a number of concerns raised with respect to the technology. There have not only been concerns expressed by people and academics who are experts in the field. Murray Harrison, the Customs chief information officer, was concerned that the matter was still unsettled—that is, that the technology was still not certain. He declared last year:

SmartGate doesn’t enhance security. It helps flow and efficiency in the limited space available in airports.

Clearly, he does not view the technology as being up to scratch and has made it clear that there are still outstanding concerns.

SmartGate is a form of biometric technology, an automated border processing system that enables travellers with the appropriate eligible passport to move through the passport control. The use of SmartGate is dependent on having an eligible passport—in other words, as I said earlier, an e-passport. The passport has a microchip embedded in the centre page which contains the digitised facial image and personal details of the passport holder. That microchip can be read electronically and will enable the implementation of facial recognition technology.

The process was trialled for a year on Qantas air crew. Again, the results were, I have to say, extremely controversial. For the most part, the only information released about the detail of the trial was contained in the statements by the minister. Roger Clarke, as I referred to earlier, was concerned about that particular process. He went on to say, beyond what I have already quoted him as saying:

The SmartGate pilot is misconceived, it has been misrepresented, and it uses technology that has not been and cannot be effective. Any large-scale implementation of such a system, based on such flawed technology, would be an utter fiasco.

So there you have a visiting professor, who is an expert in the field of engineering and information technology, suggesting that, whilst there has been a trial in place, that trial was not sufficient to guarantee the security of the system. I think we must listen to these experts, who have no vested interest in concerning themselves about this particular matter except the concern about the system failing or otherwise. It does not mean that we abandon the process. What it does mean is that we must be vigilant in ensuring that any bugs in this system are found and any deficiencies are rectified.

There is no doubt that in recent times our tendency to rely on technological solutions to apparent problems is even more pronounced when we feel vulnerable. For whatever reason—and the reasons are quite obvious to some—we in this country and in other countries feel more vulnerable today than perhaps we did a decade ago. You would agree with that, Mr Acting Deputy Speaker. People do feel less certain. There have been acts of violence and acts of atrocity against people in countries that we are close to. Indeed, there have been acts of violence and atrocity against our own citizens in places not too far from our shores.

In such an environment of anxiety—and in the hope that we have found the silver bullet—we should not place too much confidence in technology that has been subject to criticism by people of repute. They are concerned that the technology has insufficient capacity. In the opinion of at least some experts, the pilot that was used to substantiate the view that the system would operate was clearly insufficient. It is very important that the government consider reviewing this area, that it not take the system for granted and assume that it is foolproof or that technology can prevent problems from occurring. It needs to realise that the technology should be improved upon, if it is possible to do so, and that it is a tool to be used to supplement our existing system so that we can provide security for the nation and also a more efficient way of processing people who enter this country.

The bill has been a long time coming, and that has been blamed upon a number of things, including drafting. We understand the reasons for the bill and accept the two main provisions—that is, the amendment provision that goes to special purpose visas and the more substantive provision in support of biometric technology. We caution the government not to rely too heavily on the notion that the technology is infallible; it is clearly not infallible. It may well be state-of-the-art technology but it has not been tried and tested.

I had the good fortune on Friday, as part of a public inquiry, to visit the tower at Canberra airport and to view the technology used by the air traffic controllers to regulate aeroplane traffic in and out of Canberra. The technology is dated—it was built 40 years ago—but it still works, I am happy to say. The tower needs to be rebuilt, and that is being proposed. We certainly accept that objective. The point I would like to make is that, if we are going to replace technology that has been used for many years with new technology, on the face of it, it should be an improvement. There should be a net improvement to the way in which air traffic controllers regulate flight in and out of Canberra as a result of the introduction of new technology. As someone said to me when I was visiting the airport tower: it has had 40 years to find its bugs; it has had 40 years to see what the problems are with that technology. While it needs to be changed, no doubt there will be more bugs in the new system than there are in the old system, which has been there since the 1960s.

By way of comparison, I make the point that there is always an argument for going to a more technologically advanced system, but if it has not been used widely or in a comprehensive way for any length of time then we should expect—although we certainly should not hope—the possibility of some breakdown of, or some deficiencies in, the system. No pilot, like the one being used by the Qantas aircrew staff, will remove the possibility of a new system having some failings.

I warn the government to keep a very close eye on the way in which this system will operate. I say to those who are overseeing the system, the experts in the field: do not rely too heavily on the technology being infallible; rather, be sceptical of it and challenge the system because it might have failings. This will ensure that not only will faults be detected but improvements will be made and, therefore, there will be better security in this country.

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