Kim Beazley (Brand, Australian Labor Party, Leader of the Opposition) Share this | Hansard source

This is a shameless government. Its members are here saying with pride and boasting to us: ‘We were not criminally culpable; we were merely incompetent and negligent.’ They were incompetent and negligent in the face of the worst federal scandal in living memory, in which $300 million went to the back kick of Saddam Hussein on their watch—$300 million subsequently turned by Saddam Hussein into war-making capacities and then used on Australian soldiers and others immediately after that.

They scuttle away from the accountability that they should have allowed themselves to be subject to in the terms of reference that went to Mr Cole. As was pointed out repeatedly by the commissioner in correspondence with us, there was no capacity for the commissioner to find as to the stewardship of these ministers for the responsibilities they had—critical responsibilities that impacted not only on Australian honour and Australian wheat farmers but also on the position of our allies and the soldiers of both our allies and others domestically in Iraq, who have found themselves having to confront the consequences of that money flowing through Saddam Hussein, ultimately, in all probability, to at least one part of an insurgency.

That the government should look at this finding with pride shows us how low public standards have sunk in this country, how low public accountability has fallen in this country, under this appalling government. This cynical government deceived the Australian people about why it took us to war in Iraq. This negligent government allowed 300 million Aussie dollars to go in bribes to Saddam Hussein—the very dictator it sent our troops to fight. This tricky government tricked up an inquiry to get its ministers off the hook. And now this arrogant government is going to the Australian people and saying, ‘It is not our fault.’

Not even the rorted terms of reference that this commission had can cover up the facts of the ‘wheat for weapons’ scandal. Firstly, Australia’s monopoly wheat exporters bribed the Saddam regime to buy Australian wheat. Secondly, Alexander Downer and Mark Vaile’s department approved the contracts that contained the bribes. Thirdly, the government was warned 35 times about the bribes, whether it chose to regard those warnings as well based or not. Fourthly, the ministers chose to ignore those warnings. Fifthly, having chosen to ignore those warnings of sanctions busting, Mr Howard then told us we had to go to war because sanctions on Iraq had failed. That was his reason for going to war in Iraq—the wrong war. But, when our brave troops got to Iraq, the bullets fired at them had been paid for by the Australian government. In the final disgrace, the government rorted the terms of reference of the commission supposed to investigate all of this.

I want to place this not simply in the context of the argy-bargy of Australian political debate. One thing that is not noted by many Australians, but is noted by me since largely they are deployed from my electorate and occasionally from Sydney, is that, while all this was going on—as the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister for Trade were not doing their job ensuring that the sanctions regime was being properly applied in relation to the activities of the AWB; and, whether they were being actively being misled or not, they were not doing their job—young Australian men and women were enforcing sanctions in the gulf at risk to their lives. For years and years—all through these years—young men and women were enforcing sanctions, doing their job.

Contrast the actions of Australian service personnel with the worthlessness of their political masters who sent them there and then cynically refused to put themselves anywhere near a serious inquiry during all those years of this area of sanction busting which should have set red lights flashing in the minds of every Australian minister as it set them flashing in the minds of ministers when we were in office. Take Gareth Evans. The fact that AWB may have shamelessly misled all those who made inquiries of it does not excuse this government. The best you can say from the evidence that was presented to the Cole commission is that their efforts at inquiry were ‘once over very lightly’.

But they cannot stop misleading. It comes to them so naturally. We got more of it again in the Attorney-General’s statement here today. Let me identify one part of that:

The Australian government was proactive in facilitating those two inquiries.

Proactive in facilitating the Volcker inquiry, was it? Let me quote from the opinion of Mr Volcker on how proactive the Australian government was. On 7 February 2005 the Australian Ambassador to the UN met with Mr Volcker, the head of the UN inquiry. Volcker was blunt in his assessment of Australia’s lack of cooperation with the inquiry, saying the IIC—that is, his inquiry—had encountered a problem with Australia’s cooperation. Australia, he said, had been ‘beyond reticent, even forbidding’ in responding to the committee’s requests. Volcker also told the ambassador there was strong evidence the AWB had been involved in the payment of kickbacks, and he reiterated his request for Australian documents.

And then we have the evidence of 2 June, recorded in the handwritten notes of the AWB executive. He had the Prime Minister’s office—this cooperative, collaborative government with the Volker inquiry—assisting them with the preparation of evidence. He says the PM’s office official:

… was most probative, but at the end of the meeting he was a supporter. Keep your responses narrow, technical. Do not blame US, complain about process. AWB’s strategy would be the same witting or unwitting outcome. What the government wants from the AWB says the Prime Minister’s office is to keep narrow; be a small target.

That is the Attorney-General’s view of what enthusiastic collaboration amounts to in relation to the Volker inquiry. It is no wonder that a government which had that attitude on that occasion to the Volker inquiry should have a similar attitude in making absolutely certain that the Cole commission was not clothed with the full powers to ensure that it could inquire into the negligent behaviour of ministers in administering their portfolio in that area. And, because they did not do so, whatever value there may be in this inquiry—and it will be very valuable indeed in relation to the criminal culpability of officials of AWB—as a statement of the political overview of how administration was conducted in this country, it cannot be effective because it was not properly empowered. It simply was not properly empowered, and for that the government stands condemned. In no state government in this country would those two ministers—Mr Downer and the trade minister—have survived their culpability in this regard. (Time expired)

Debate adjourned.

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