Kevin Rudd (Griffith, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade and International Security) Share this | Hansard source

This Prime Minister argues in his core defence that he is not poll driven. This nation has never had such a poll driven Prime Minister. Every element of domestic policy, every element of foreign policy, every element of national security policy—all driven through the prism of one man. It is not the Minister for Foreign Affairs or the Minister for Defence; that one man is Mark Textor. There is nothing that I see done in this parliament that is not shaped fundamentally by this Prime Minister’s recourse to market research.

This Prime Minister’s response to things like ‘children overboard’ was also shaped by market research. You cannot point to a single national security policy scandal where market research and polls have not fundamentally shaped the way in which this Prime Minister operates. The reason for it is this: first and foremost, this Prime Minister is a clever politician and, last and least, he is the leader of this nation. This Prime Minister, as he cuts and runs from the chamber of the House of Representatives, is a clever politician. He is not a leader in the tradition that this country has seen in the past and not a leader prepared to take decisions in the nation’s long-term interest—not a leader in Curtin’s tradition, not a leader in Chifley’s tradition and not even a leader in Menzies’ tradition. This leader is in a league apart, whereby political research and the short-term political interest of his own career come first, but this nation’s interest comes a long last.

His second argument concerned the Leader of the Opposition’s position on the war. I just say this: when it came to a vote in this parliament, when we actually sat down and looked at that resolution on the war, we voted against it. We voted against the war, every one of us united. Each one of you voted for the war. Let us cut the nonsense from this debate. There could not have been a sharper divide in this nation and this parliament when we looked at the arguments that this mob put for taking this country to a war—in defiance of the UN charter; in defiance of the United Nations Security Council resolution. We had the integrity to vote against this war; they had the expediency to vote for this war. The argument that you have advanced concerning the Leader of the Opposition collapses in one heap because this party was as one.

This Prime Minister advances as his third defence that, if there were a withdrawal of troops from Iraq, it would lead to a massive compounding of the existing jihadist threat in South-East Asia. The CIA, the Central Intelligence Agency, is a funny old thing. Sometimes it puts out things which do not exactly fit this government’s interests. A bloke named Porter Goss—a decent fellow—was recently the head of the CIA; he was in the congress before that. Back in 2005, in testimony to the United States congress about what was then going on in Iraq—at that time and under the circumstances, there was no talk of leaving Iraq—he said:

Islamic extremists are exploiting the Iraqi conflict to recruit new anti-U.S. jihadists.

He went on to say:

These jihadists—

that is, those there now—

who survive will leave Iraq experienced and focused on acts of urban terrorism. They represent a potential pool of contacts to build transnational terrorist cells, groups, and networks in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and other countries.

Could those other countries include South-East Asia? You had the head of the CIA saying way back then that, as a product of the United States’ policies in Iraq—like right now—that you had a bubbling-out of freshly trained jihadists from Iraq into the rest of the world. So do not come to us with the argument that your policy is somehow reducing the spread of jihadism to the rest of the world. You are compounding it.

The fundamental historical and strategic error they made was this: to take a Western invasion force into the middle of the sacred sites of Islam and somehow believe that the Islamic world was going to sit around and say, ‘It’s okay—not a problem.’ Well, it was a problem. It remains a problem. It remains a huge fuelling agent for jihadists worldwide; a unifying agent for previously split traditions of militant Islam into one united force of Islam and militant Islamism. This is the singular, national security policy legacy of this mob opposite, who have the audacity to call themselves the responsible government of Australia.

There are many things we have known in this debate over the last two or three years. It has been known for years now that this government lied about pre-war intelligence on Iraq. It has been known for years now that this government lied about the impact of Iraq on Australia as a terrorist target. And we have known for almost a year that this government lied about the warnings it got about $300 million going to Saddam Hussein’s back pocket. We have the foreign minister—Saddam Hussein’s bagman of choice; his preferred bagman—as the person responsible for authorising, through the agency of the Customs regulations, $300 million worth of cold, hard readies for the back pocket of the Iraqi dictator. The Howard government is of course the best friend Saddam Hussein has ever had. We have known these things for some years.

The importance of the censure motions this week, the questions in the House of Representatives and some of the answers given is this: the debate has now entered an entirely new important phase in the history of the Iraq debate in this country, because it is now a debate about their strategy for the future of Iraq. It is about the plans that they have for Iraq’s future. It is about how they propose to stabilise Iraq’s security. It is a debate now about how they will in fact bring about political arrangements in Iraq which give the Iraqi people, long suffering people that they are, some hope for their future.

So far in this debate, which has now raged for some years, we have not had a strategy from this government but a slogan. The slogan is ‘cut and run’ or ‘stay till the job is done’. But you know what? The business of government is a serious business. It is about what really works. What will actually deliver a half-decent outcome for the poor people of Iraq? What actually works on the ground? This Prime Minister says he is not poll driven. You should actually look at the substance of his policy. If this man were a leader of the nation he would put forward in a formal statement to the parliament his outline for how Iraq will be stabilised over the one, two and three years ahead. That is missing. It has not been there at all. Instead, he has a focus group, with Mark Textor at work on the key line and theme. If you want evidence to counter the argument put by the Prime Minister at this dispatch box only 15 minutes ago, it is that: no strategy, only a slogan. Of course, the market researchers say, ‘Don’t argue a strategy, you might be held accountable to it. Give them a slogan and that’s all they’ll remember.’ That is why this government stands so condemned in terms of the effectiveness of its policy on Iraq. The member for Bennelong is not a leader. The member for Bennelong is a clever politician. The primary prism through which he looks at national security policy and foreign policy is in fact what the market researchers tell him.

When you look at the arguments which the government has put forward for the future of its strategy in Iraq it is important to focus on the new developments in the last day or two. They concern these things: the transfer of responsibility to the Iraqi security forces for security in their own country—plank No.1 of the government’s new emerging policy on Iraq. Plank No. 2 is whether Iraq should be a unified state or a separated state. Plank No. 3 is whether or not we are really serious about having an Iraqi democracy anymore. Let us have a look at those.

The first one, I think, is terrific. When harassed today on ABC national radio about whether he had any sort of strategy for the future of Iraq, the Prime Minister was forced to say: ‘A signpost for determining Australia’s troop withdrawal will be the handover of security responsibility to the Iraqi forces.’ Iraq has 18 provinces. This morning the Prime Minister was asked how many provinces that handover has occurred in. His answer was two. Foreign Minister, you are following me in this debate: how many provinces do we need where security responsibility has been handed over to the Iraqis for you to believe that there is a reasonable basis of security that would justify the withdrawal of foreign troops?

See this speech in context