Simon Crean (Hotham, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Minister for Regional Development) Share this | Hansard source

You will have your opportunity to talk. I refer you to the fact that in 2002 you wrote a letter to the then Minister for Veterans’ Affairs, saying:

I write in support of operational service such as mine clearing and nuclear veterans’ services being declared Hazardous Service under the Veterans’ Entitlement Act 1986. Nuclear veterans’ service should be declared as hazardous service by the review of veterans’ entitlements—the Clarke review.

That is the very thing that the member for Shortland has been arguing and has been castigated for by way of interjection from the minister. Do not talk about sanctimony or hypocrisy unless you are prepared to apply the standards to yourself. We on this side of the House, whilst we support what is being done, do not believe it goes far enough. It should go further in accordance with what has been recommended by the very extensive review—the Clarke review—into entitlements. It was something that the government hung onto for months. They certainly delayed the release of the report in the lead-up to the last election.

My concern on this issue goes back to the period when I first became actively involved in the issue of people suffering from the fallout of nuclear tests and the consequences of nuclear tests, particularly the tests conducted by the British with Australian government sanction and support. My period of experience goes back to 1991 when, as Minister for Primary Industries and Energy, I, together with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Gareth Evans, had carriage of the task of seeking from the British government a contribution towards compensation for the victims of British nuclear tests. At the time we successfully got the British government to make a contribution of some ₤20 million—an outcome that was designed to, in its own words, support future claims for compensation for participants.

In that agreement, which took us two years, I might say—between 1991 and 1993—it was recognised that there could be future claims. At the time a fair bit of that money was to be used for the clean-up at Maralinga. We had many discussions with the Tjarutja people, who lived on the Maralinga lands and whose lands had been used during the tests. These people had suffered consequences as result of the tests and there was also a need for a major clean-up of the lands in question. At a subsequent stage I was involved with the hand-back of the Montebello Islands to the Western Australian government. In recognition of the tasks those islands had fulfilled in the national interest by allowing the British tests, the lands were returned to the state to which they originally belonged, as part of the Commonwealth territory.

I come to this debate from the point of view of understanding that this is a longstanding issue that needs to be addressed. The Labor Party has not only had a recent commitment to do something about it but also it has had a longstanding commitment to do something in support of justice for the victims of the nuclear tests that were conducted by the British government using Australians and with the full support of the Australians.

It is interesting to go into the history of this to understand what we are dealing with. There were some 12 direct tests, major tests, undertaken between 1952 and 1957. There were atomic detonations at Montebello Islands, Emu Field and Maralinga. These tests were conducted by the British in the development of nuclear bombs and they were done, as I say, with the cooperation of the Australian government. The Australian government had given full authority for this to happen. It has to accept clear responsibility for the consequences, just as we believe the British government had to make a contribution to the solution. The British government have made that contribution, but the Australian government has been dragging its feet in terms of its solution.

It is not just the 12 tests in question that I refer to, because they were the major ones, but there were some 600 minor trials, some causing extensive site contamination, according to the reports in question. The exposure issue—the victim exposure consequences—also includes people on contaminated sites after the tests. In total, 17,000 Australians participated, compared with approximately 20,000 British. So a significant number of Australians participated in this.

It is interesting to look at the way different governments treated this exercise. There have been several inquiries and case studies into the implications of these tests. When the coalition government was in office in 1980, the Australian Ionising Radiation Advisory Council was asked by the then science and environment minister Senator Webster to investigate the claims. Essentially, the report concluded that the tests were conducted within the limits existing at the time and that no persons were exposed to any excessive radiation. Subsequent to that—after Labor came to office, in 1983—we saw the Donovan report, the Kerr committee report in May 1984 and then the McClelland royal commission, which was established in 1984 and which presented its report in 1985. On the basis of the McClelland report, approaches were initiated to seek compensation from the British government

So there was denial up till 1980—essentially it was said that there was no connection—and then a realisation during the 1980s that there was a serious connection. It is important to make the point that the medical evidence shows that there is no proven causal link between the nuclear tests and the increased incidence of cancer suffered by people who were present at the tests. But as the member for Shortland has indicated, there is a wealth of information showing a strong correlation between a rate of cancer higher than the rest of the population and having been exposed to the tests. That is something no responsible government can ignore. There is no point waiting for the medical evidence to prove watertight and conclusive. These people are suffering. They need attention. Their loved ones need to know they are going to be properly cared for. This bill goes part of that way, but only part. I would urge the minister to reconsider his position and to adopt the position he was advocating only a few years ago.

The compensation from the British government was a recognition of their involvement in this. It was all done at their instigation, with our approval. The British government were very reluctant to do it. They knew that any commitment to compensation was an admission, not only of their involvement, but also of their obligation to make restitution. Whilst 17,000 Australians were affected by this, 20,000 British were also involved. So any recognition by the British government of an obligation to award compensation or offer assistance to the victims in Australia, by consequence, had to have implications for the British. That is the reason they commissioned a number of reports themselves, which postdated the McClelland royal commission and which have been relied upon by those of us who take an interest in this matter on this side of the House. I have no doubt that there is interest in this matter by those on the other side of the House as well; I am not trying to pretend we are the only ones; I am merely trying to demonstrate that we have been prepared to make a commitment to sensible restitution. That is why we are arguing that this government needs to carry on the good work. They will not have any truck with us in dealing with this matter. This is a matter that can get bipartisan support. We can demonstrate in our concern for the victims and their loved ones that there is a circumstance in which the parliament as a whole has a view that not only do they need to be looked after but also they need to be looked after in accordance with recommendations that came from a very extensive view.

The fact is that this bill provides an ability to treat these people but it does not go to the question of compensation—and that is the glaring deficiency in terms of this legislation. Compensation, as we all know, has been very difficult for these victims to obtain. The digest that the Parliamentary Library put together—I do not have time to go through it, but anyone who is interested should look at it—demonstrates how difficult it is for victims to obtain proper compensation. It is very costly. There are delays with the court system, particularly at a time when they are stressed and very ill and this adds to that stress. And there is worry for their family. Why should we put them through this? And, if we are prepared to recognise that we need to treat them because we have an obligation, why shouldn’t we go the next step and deal with the compensation? That is the question I pose to the minister. The Clarke review looked at that question and recommended that we urge the government to embrace that issue. We urge the minister to look again and to go back in his files to the position that he advocated on behalf of victims in his constituency. Just as the member for Shortland has victims in her electorate, we all have them. As there are 17,000 people at various stages, these concerns would be raised with all of us as members of parliament.

This is a question of justice. Part of that justice is being served by recognising that the government should pick up the tab for the treatment of these people for their cancers. However, we say: go the next step and adopt the recommendation of the Clarke review. In the meantime we are prepared to support this legislation, but I seriously urge the minister to reconsider and to join with us in a bipartisan way in recognising that we have an obligation to these people who served their country as they were asked to do. They did not know of the risks inherent in that service—none of us did. I think it is very interesting that in the current context, when we are all outraged about what is happening in North Korea with its detonation of further tests, we know now much more about the consequences that these things can wreak on nations, on stability—and on individuals. We have to be honest with ourselves in recognising the impact on these victims and in understanding that they performed this service not because they chose to but because they were required to. The government authorised them to perform this service and, having done that and their having suffered the consequences, we should be prepared to look after them better than this legislation does.

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