House debates

Monday, 14 August 2006

Committees

Intelligence and Security Committee; Report

1:23 pm

Photo of Duncan KerrDuncan Kerr (Denison, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Hansard source

I rise in the absence of the Deputy Chair of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, the member for Holt, who is unavoidably away from the parliament due to illness. Previous reports of this committee have drawn attention to the concern the committee had that, if an agency expanded too fast, that could have significant long-term negative consequences, both by reason of the recruitment of the wrong kind of staff and the distraction from the operational priorities of the organisation. However, I think we on the committee are broadly satisfied that intelligent responses have been undertaken, notwithstanding the very large expansion that has been undertaken. But, as the chair has indicated, this is not without its problems, in particular in language recruitment. Our report details a wide range of strategies that are being employed to try and minimise the difficulties that are associated with a large expansion of recruitment and the need to expand training programs.

One of the difficulties that we identified goes to the length of time after a person puts themselves forward for potential employment within the agencies, as there needs to be a very careful and appropriate interview mechanism and then security screening. We would all expect that those intelligence agencies employ rigorous means to make certain that they are not compromised through this period of large expansion. Of course, each of those agencies has a very large interest in making certain that those recruits will be able to play an ongoing role into the future in a way which is consistent with community expectations and that we are not recruiting the wrong kind of people into those agencies simply because of the exigencies of current demand.

I think it is fair to say that we are satisfied across the committee that those concerns that were expressed earlier by this committee and also by the Flood inquiry are being managed as carefully as could be, although there are some considerable losses, we are told, between the time that people are initially selected for potential recruitment and the time that they are offered employment, due to these extended examinations that occur with respect to security clearance and appropriate interview. That issue has involved a blow-out in the time for security clearances. The committee spent some time looking at the long trail time that was involved in some of these instances. We are satisfied that efforts are being made to minimise that.

There is one issue that I should reflect on that the committee reported on at paragraphs 2.46 and 2.47 and then addressed in recommendation 2. We ask the agencies to report every year on the backlog and the methods being used to address security clearance backlogs, and we also report on the fact that there is, at least within some of the agencies, an arrangement that has been entered into and formalised between agencies to accept those who have been security cleared—positively vetted—so that they can transfer from agency to agency within the Australian intelligence community. For example, at 2.47 we note that recently an MOU has been formalised amongst some of the agencies to accept positively vetted security clearances issued by other agencies, and we note that the defence department agencies recognise other agencies’ positive vets and that ASIS now accepts other agencies’ positive vets.

I think it reflects the view of our committee that the group within the Australian intelligence community that specifically meets to deal with security standards should continue to pursue the issue of reciprocity of clearances by all agencies within the community, because it is a complete waste of time and resources if we have a standardised template for security clearance that is recognised by most but not all of the agencies. It also impedes career development and cross-agency transfer and probably impedes the most effective utilisation of our intelligence resources. So we would urge that upon the intelligence community. (Time expired)

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