Anthony Byrne (Holt, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Hansard source

I rise today to address Appropriation Bill (No. 3) 2005-2006 and Appropriation Bill (No. 4) 2005-2006. In relation to Appropriation Bill (No. 3), I note, for the edification of Mr Deputy Speaker Causley, who is not here at present, the $54.6 million that is spent on the Australian Federal Police, particularly in the area of policing airports. In reflecting on this and the role of the Australian Federal Police, and in undertaking a little research with respect to that fine body, its responsibilities, its tasks and its level of resourcing, I have come to the conclusion that this federal government has miserably failed that particular organisation in providing the appropriate level of financial resourcing to ensure that the Australian Federal Police has the person power that is required to perform the tasks that have been stipulated.

I would like to start my reflection on this particular matter by quoting the Prime Minister. The quote is from a speech by the Prime Minister at the official opening of the AFP training village in Canberra on 23 June 2005. He said:

Events of the last five years have totally transformed both the demands and the expectations of the Australian community on the Australian Federal Police. In that five year period we’ve seen the threatening arrival of international terrorism, and we’ve seen the emergence of an ongoing need on the part of this country in cooperation with our friends in the Pacific Region to involve ourselves in the restoration of conditions of law and order and cooperation with the police services and governments of those countries.

In that short time, the Federal Police has had demands placed on it which go as far beyond the demands that have been placed on an organisation in terms of change as any I have seen at a federal level. I want to put on record a counter-response to the Prime Minister’s statement by the Chief Executive Officer of the Australian Federal Police Association, Jim Torr, on 28 June 2005. It is about the reality of what sworn police officers—sworn AFP officers in particular—face in executing their duties. Jim Torr said:

The Australian Federal Police is today fighting with one arm tied behind its back. Huge increases in the taskings since September 11 have not been matched with comprehensive, consultative strategic planning.

Significant increases in the government funding have not been translated into sustained permanent staffing outcomes. The men and women of the AFP continue to perform to a world class standard but the AFP provides no staffing or surge capacity certainty. The future operating environment has not been adequately considered, analysed and modelled. The AFP lurches through sporadic recruiting bursts and reactionary operational responses.

Its time for strategic planning over a 10 year time frame with a goal to achieving sustained operational capability and flexibility with budget certainty. The people of Australia and our other stake holders deserve no less.

In a particularly instructive paper by Organisational Architects—a key issues paper titled ‘A planned future for the Australian Federal Police’—the issue of the AFP and its staffing shortfalls was extensively addressed. I want to quote selected sections of the paper to highlight and amplify the problem that sworn police officers have in executing their duties on behalf of the Australian Federal Police. They will illustrate the problems that we face, with very severe consequences to policing of certain areas in the Australian community. The executive summary states:

While the Australian Federal Police (AFP) has a greater role in the National Security of Australia than ever before its staffing level is approximately the same as it was 20 years ago. Moreover, during the past 20 years there have been dramatic variations in staffing that have not been linked to the changing mission of the AFP.

Unlike Australia’s Defence establishment, the AFP has been predominantly managed on an inherently budget driven and short-term basis without public discussion in relation to its future funding and capability requirements. Evidence of this can be seen in the ongoing tasking of AFP resources to international operations without action being taken to ensure that “traditional” responsibilities are being adequately back filled.

The AFP is today so important to the National Interest that it should be subject to a process similar to the Defence White Paper and thereby be able to project resourcing, environmental modelling and capability development up to ten years into the future.

Best practise environmental and strategic modelling requires that the planning for the AFP be conducted in an open, consultative and strategic fashion, and that this planning involve: consultation with the public and other stakeholders, a rational identification and assessment of the various risks to Australia’s interests, commitment to forward budget expenditure, and a coherent resourcing model for future linkages to existing and planned Defence and other National capabilities.

Members in this place may recall that the AFP was formed in 1979 following the Hilton bombing in Sydney. Since that time, the AFP has assumed the role of Australia’s leading investigative agency in relation to illicit narcotics, criminal attack on Commonwealth revenue, political corruption, e-crime, people-smuggling and a number of other crimes. The AFP evolved through the eighties as an organisation principally focused on illicit narcotics trafficking and major fraud against the Commonwealth. A comprehensive network of international liaison officers was established and ties with foreign police established and strengthened.

In 1988 the AFP was made up of 2,771 sworn members and 547 unsworn members, a total of 3,368 employees. However, a reduction in the size of the AFP commenced at this point and continued until 1999, when the AFP employed 1,887 sworn members and 690 staff members, a total of 2,577 employees. From 1999 to 2003 the organisation again began to increase in size to a maximum staffing of 3,496. In 2004, numbers had reduced again slightly to 3,473. Between 30 June 2004 and 30 June 2005 the AFP’s unsworn number rose by 144 but the sworn police number decreased by 16, leaving a staff total of 3,601. Basically they are indicating that there is a substantial drop in the number of sworn police officers. To illustrate the point: 20 years ago in 1985, when the world environment was much different and the AFP’s task was less, the AFP had 2,838 sworn police while, as at July 2005, it had 2, 310 sworn police. That is a loss of 500 sworn police officers.

A review was conducted into the second half of the nineties—the Ayers review—when the AFP achieved a high public profile largely through their work in the areas of people-smuggling investigations, East Timor deployments and an increased role in cooperation with Pacific rim neighbours, particularly in the provision of training. In 1998, due to critical staff shortages and lobbying by the AFPA, Prime Minister Howard announced the Ayers review. As a consequence of that review, we saw large budget increases for the AFP, which were reflected in the previously mentioned increase in numbers from 1999. However, since 2001 the AFP has been without a long-term strategic plan, which I find quite amazing given the task that this organisation is required to perform—again, with no effective public accountability.

Then we had September 11 2001, after which the role of the AFP changed in a very profound way. No arm of government had been more affected by September 11 than the AFP. It is now understood that terrorists have no return address and that conventional military responses are very often inappropriate. As a result, police, including the AFP, are now absorbing more and more of what we have previously identified as military roles. Since September 11, if you think of those declining numbers of sworn police officers, over 600 AFP employees have been diverted from what they were doing on 10 September 2001 to new counter-terrorism functions. This retasking of AFP resources, though fully warranted by the circumstances and the environment following September 11, has led to a real shortfall in resourcing in traditional areas of AFP responsibility. The AFPA is not aware of any strategic planning that has been conducted to accommodate future AFP responses to the changed global environment. To all intents and purposes, the AFP is still planning with a pre-September 11 mind-set.

Since September 11, the AFP has been thrust more into the public consciousness. The AFP seems to be everywhere at once. Its new focus on counter-terrorism cannot exist in a discrete counter-terrorism only framework. A vacuum is formed in investigations of other crime types which produce counter-terrorism intelligence as an important by-product—for example, narcotics, identity fraud and money trafficking. It is worth noting that the Madrid atrocities involved active drug offenders.

Concerning planning requirements at the current time, what I can do for the edification of the chamber is detail AFP functions and sworn police numbers over 20 years and contrast the functions they were required to perform in 1985 with the functions they were required to perform in 2004.

One of the AFP’s key functions is ACT policing, as the member for Fraser will know. The AFP conducted that policing in 1985 and they still did so in 2004. The second is Australia’s remote territories policing. They did that in 1985 and they also did that in 2004. Narcotics was one of their responsibilities in 1985 and still was in 2004. Commonwealth revenue fraud was one of their duties in 1985 and they still performed that duty in 2004. Political corruption investigations they performed in 1985 and were still required to perform in 2004. Diplomatic and VIP security they performed in 1985 and were still required to perform in 2004. Witness protection they were required to perform in 1985 and were still required to perform in 2004.

Special event security planning they were not required to provide in 1985, but they were required to provide this in 2004. People-smuggling they were not required to investigate in 1985, but that was part of their parameters of duties in 2004. E-crime involving internet and child pornography they were not required to explore in 1985 but they were required to explore in 2004. E-crime which constitutes attacks on business continuity they were not required to investigate in 1985 but they were required to investigate in 2004. Sexual servitude they were not required to investigate in 1985 but it was one of the parameters of their responsibilities in 2004. Child sex tourism they were not required to investigate in 1985, but they were required to perform that duty in 2004. Sky marshals, air security officers, they were not required to provide in 1985 but were required to provide in 2004.

International deployment for the United Nations they obviously were required to provide in 1985 and they continue to provide that facility to this day. International deployment for Australian response to events they were not required to provide in 1985 but they were required to provide this in 2004. International disaster response was not one of the parameters listed in 1985 but they were required to respond to these events in 2004. International police training—we have seen that occur in the Solomon Islands in particular—they were not required to provide in 1985 but were required to provide in 2004. Interpol liaison was not a duty that was required in 1985 but it was required in 2004.

One of the key changes where they have lost an area of responsibility, which I think they should have retained, is policing at federal airports, which they were required to provide and supervise in 1985. For some bizarre reason, they no longer have control of that, which I think leads to serious issues with respect to airport security.

In essence, what is happening to the AFP—and I understand it—is that the AFP is now suffering a shortfall of resources in its traditional areas of responsibility, such as community policing and general criminal investigations. It is trying to take on its new expanded role with a total staffing level, as I have said in this place on two occasions, which is the same as it was 20 years ago, with the number of sworn officers reduced by 528 or almost 20 per cent. As I have said, over 600 AFP members are directly involved in counter-terrorism functions both in Australia and offshore, including the 400-strong International Deployment Group. At times, since 11 September 2001, the AFP has had nearly 10 per cent of its people serving overseas—compare this with a much lower percentage of the Australian Defence Force on duty offshore—with serious implications for performing their domestic functions. Their ability to do so is much reduced.

Faced with these constraints, the AFP has effectively found it impossible to backfill the vital positions it needs to keep up its traditional area of responsibilities. And it is believed within the AFPA and by the sworn officers that if the public were fully aware of the significance of these gaps, including skyrocketing stress factors on individual officers doing their best with inadequate resources, there would be an immediate and loud outcry.

In the words of those connected with the AFPA, the inescapable by-product of these personnel gaps has been a worrying vacuum in the investigation of crimes which are the backbone of AFP operations. Yet it is, as I said before, these very tasks—narcotics, identity fraud and money-trafficking crimes, for example—which are inextricably linked to terrorism. If the government is seriously concerned about adequately arming and resourcing its police forces, particularly the AFP, in continuing their functions then it would address this as a serious issue.

There is another serious issue—that is, that the AFP is not accountable to any one particular parliamentary committee. You have the Australian Crime Commission, for example, which has to answer to the Australian Crime Commission committee. You have DSD, ASIO, ASIS and DIGO and a range of other intelligence organisations, which have to answer to the joint intelligence committee, and yet this very important body is not accountable to any parliamentary committee for its oversight, which I find quite stunning. I know the government specialises in lack of accountability, but we are asking the sworn officers who put their lives on the line for the benefit of our community to not have protection, to not have some of their grievances discussed by the duly elected representatives that are elected here to represent them and to not have the oversight protection of a parliamentary committee.

Make no mistake about it: they are very serious concerns that I have detailed to this place about operational shortfalls. These will obviously impact on domestic resourcing and the capacity to investigate some of the areas that I have just mentioned, and that is unacceptable. This government prides itself on being strong on crime and strong on security, but when it comes down to the test, when it comes down to laying its money on the table—it does not matter how many hundreds of millions of dollars it spends on spin—this government, by this document and by the reports emanating out of the Federal Police, is clearly abrogating its duty to adequately resource a key front-line agency in the fight against terrorism, the fight against narcotics, identity fraud and money trafficking. I am just wondering when the Prime Minister, who prides himself on being strong on these security matters, will actually take some direct action to fix these shortfalls.

We will continue to raise these matters and press these matters in parliament. I believe the AFP will be before the estimates committee tomorrow, where these and other issues will be raised. This is a structure, an organisation, which has serious operational concerns. If we do not fix this issue, if we do not provide accountability, then this organisation will continue not to be able to perform its domestic functions. We will not let the government off the hook with respect to this; we will continue to come into this place until the government assumes its responsibility to adequately support and adequately resource a key crime-fighting agency in this country.

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