Jim Molan's recent appearances (OpenAustralia.org)
Address | Death of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth Ii and Accession of His Majesty King Charles Iii | Senate debates
The incorporated speech read as follows Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II earned the admiration of generations through a life committed to selfless public service that stretched across the better...
The incorporated speech read as follows Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II earned the admiration of generations through a life committed to selfless public service that stretched across the better part of a century. For 70 years, she reigned as Australia's Head of State, and for other nations of the Commonwealth spread across the world's continents and oceans. She was a monarch who ruled with an empathetic heart and wisdom. And though the world changed around her, she remained steadfast in her devotion to God, her country, and to the Commonwealth. As the Leader of the Opposition, Peter Dutton, said, she embodied humanity's very best virtues and values; service and sacrifice, fortitude and humility, grace and generosity, forgiveness and empathy. In my lifetime, I swore two oaths to serve Her Majesty. The first, as a teenage officer cadet entering the Australian Defence Force, where I swore to resist Her enemies, and faithfully discharge my duties according to law. Later in life, I again committed to be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty, this time as a member of Her Australian Parliament. Throughout, for an exemplar of steadfast duty, courage, dignity and selflessness, I have needed to look no further than Her Majesty. From the young age of 21, the then-Princess dedicated her life to the service of the Commonwealth, declaring that her "whole life whether it be long or short shall be devoted to your service and the service of our great imperial family to which we all belong". And just a few years later, upon her coronation in 1952, the Queen reaffirmed her unwavering dedication to the Commonwealth, when she said, "l have in sincerity pledged myself to your service, as so many of you are pledged to mine. Throughout all my life and with all my heart I shall strive to be worthy of your trust." Not only did our Queen earn our trust, she also won our admiration. It was no secret she had a deep and abiding affection for Australia, visiting our country 16 times during her reign, and even sending her eldest son to school here. She paid visit to every state and territory, helped open our Parliament House and the Sydney Opera House, and attended the Commonwealth Games in Brisbane and Melbourne. You could say she saw more of this country than most Australians. Wherever she went, crowds choked the streets, cheering, clapping, waving their flags to express their adoration. And many Australians, young or old, will have their own story about Her Majesty. Yet for those that never had the privilege of meeting the Queen, she was still familiar to us all. And that is a real testament to the way in which she was able to connect even with the current generation; and her ability to transform herself during her reign and make the monarch relevant to each new generation. Her passing is the end of an era and carries special poignancy for those who served in uniform under the Sovereign's colours. She represented the greatest values of our country and Commonwealth, and all that we sought to defend. I join with all Australians in giving thanks for a life well lived and a duty extraordinarily well done. It has been my life's honour to serve our greatest modern Monarch. May our memories of our dear Queen continue to inspire the very best in us. And may she rest in peace.
I rise in this place this afternoon to address a particular issue, and that is the disjointed reporting and the use of language under the general theme of 'an aggressive China'. We see an awful...
I rise in this place this afternoon to address a particular issue, and that is the disjointed reporting and the use of language under the general theme of 'an aggressive China'. We see an awful lot of articles in the newspapers—of course, newspapers and other media, our main way of receiving information—where we have US generals, many, many of them, admirals and other officials coming to this country and warning of the progress that China has made in relation to its military capability: how it now has the largest army, the largest navy, the largest maritime militia and the largest sub strategic rocket force that the world has ever seen. China is out there, bullying and dominating, according to these many people, particularly in the western Pacific, and it's much more aggressive. We see nuclear powered torpedoes and we shake our heads in amazement. We think about the extraordinary technology, because we will get nuclear powered submarines in 20 years time but, all of a sudden, China has nuclear torpedoes. And they're saying that in 10 years time they'll have nuclear torpedoes. Speaker Pelosi, of course, wants to go to Taiwan, and if you want a trigger for a bad thing to happen then it seems to me that's a pretty good trigger. But one by one these things are of vague interest. Put them together and they are absolutely terrifying. It's a beautiful use of language if we talk about the 'massive failure of deterrence'. But what really is the massive failure of deterrence? The massive failure of deterrence is what is commonly referred to as 'war'—that's the massive failure of deterrence. It's quite a simple word, but the next question we have to ask is, 'What are we doing about it?' (Time expired)
National Security | Questions without Notice | Senate debates
Beyond what our agencies report in their threat assessments, are there any other risks you are aware of when considering Australia's national security?
How is the Liberal and National government working together to strengthen our national security and combat the threat of violent extremism?
My question is to the Attorney-General, Senator Cash. In light of the Director-General of Security's annual threat assessment speech yesterday, can you please update the Senate on how our...
My question is to the Attorney-General, Senator Cash. In light of the Director-General of Security's annual threat assessment speech yesterday, can you please update the Senate on how our security environment has changed in recent times?
Australian Natural Disasters | Questions without Notice | Senate debates
With the high-risk weather season in full force during the last few weeks, particularly in my state of New South Wales, can the minister please update the Senate on what support the government...
With the high-risk weather season in full force during the last few weeks, particularly in my state of New South Wales, can the minister please update the Senate on what support the government has provided to the communities recently affected by flooding across the country?
With COVID-19 restrictions still in place in some states and territories and a new variant of concern, what has the Commonwealth government done to prepare for the movement of essential personnel...
With COVID-19 restrictions still in place in some states and territories and a new variant of concern, what has the Commonwealth government done to prepare for the movement of essential personnel during COVID related border closures?
My question is to the Minister for Emergency Management and National Recovery and Resilience, Senator McKenzie. Can the minister update the Senate on what arrangements the Liberal and Nationals...
My question is to the Minister for Emergency Management and National Recovery and Resilience, Senator McKenzie. Can the minister update the Senate on what arrangements the Liberal and Nationals government has in place to ensure we are well prepared for bushfires, floods and other natural disasters this high-risk weather season.
In addition to managing individual offenders, Attorney, what is the government doing in relation to the organisations that plan, finance and carry out terrorist acts?
To the Attorney-General again: how does the recent passage of the high risk terrorist offenders legislation build on and expand the framework that is provided to our law enforcement and security...
To the Attorney-General again: how does the recent passage of the high risk terrorist offenders legislation build on and expand the framework that is provided to our law enforcement and security agencies to manage high risk offenders and protect Australians?
My question is to the Attorney-General, Senator Cash. Can the Attorney-General inform the Senate of how the Liberal and National government is protecting the Australian way of life and ensuring...
My question is to the Attorney-General, Senator Cash. Can the Attorney-General inform the Senate of how the Liberal and National government is protecting the Australian way of life and ensuring that Australians remain safe from ever-evolving threats of terrorism?
Independent National Security Legislation Monitor Amendment Bill 2021; Second Reading | Bills | Senate debates
I'm caught remarkably short today, because a lot of what I had to say to the Senate was based on the assumption that the Greens would reject the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor...
I'm caught remarkably short today, because a lot of what I had to say to the Senate was based on the assumption that the Greens would reject the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor Amendment Bill 2021. Instead, I thank Senator Thorpe for her support of the bill, although it leaves me with not much to say! When she spoke, Senator Thorpe pointed out to us the need for this legislation because of the 70 counterterrorism laws that this country has enacted in the last 20 years. I don't see it as a failure that those laws have not been used; I see it as an absolute triumph. Laws act both as a deterrent and as a punishment, and I think that's very, very important to realise. Senator Abetz went through a good deal of the detail of the bill. As a man who's been on the PJCIS for a very long time, he understands the value of this extraordinary committee, and later today the chair of that committee, Senator Paterson, will take us through the real detail of the bill. In the last 24 hours we've certainly had national security as a theme. It's been on the agenda as a theme, and it's a very important theme both internally in Australia and as an external activity facing external threats. In the last 24 hours we've had the high-risk terrorist offenders bill in which we balanced continuous detention orders with extended supervision orders. This is a manifestation of the flexibility that we need in order to react to any situation. Of course, once a court becomes involved, extended supervision orders can be applied to someone who's been jailed for terrorist offences and is coming out of that detention if there is a reasonable belief that the individual still holds very extreme views. The extended supervision order can be put on for three years. Even before the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (High Risk Terrorist Offenders) Bill 2021, we looked at the Security Legislation Amendment (Critical Infrastructure) Bill 2021. Really, that's legislation to defend ourselves against what is becoming a very common activity around the world—that is, an attack by unknown people on many occasions. But sometimes, as was pointed out to us by Senator Paterson yesterday, we know exactly who is doing this to us, why they're doing it and how they're doing it. What frightens me even more is that, where we don't know they have been, they have left the ability to turn things on and off at a time that suits them, and they will cause those activities to be turned on in a time of high crisis. The number of bills that we have brought into the parliament indicates that we are dragging Australia into the 21st century, and the dragging that this government has done has been fabulous over the last year. Since 2013, even since 9/11, we have led the world. We have been very effective. We've led the world in an awful lot of counterterrorist legislation, online safety legislation and anticyber legislation, which grants to those who have to protect us day and night the tools that they need in order to protect us. We recognise the new situation. We look back and we see 9/11, we see the attacks in London and we see the attacks in New Zealand; we understand the internal threat in countries. We understand the threats which are coming from an external source but are manifest in ransomware, in turning off east coast gas pipelines—which is a possibility—or water pipelines or attacking food companies. We understand all these things. We've got to move on and start recognising the new situation that we face in a much larger sense. So we're very, very good internally and we've now got to start recognising what's going on in relation to our strategic environment. For 75 years we have been an extraordinary country. Through the situations that we've faced, we have enjoyed, based on our alliances—and also based on our own work and on a good deal of luck—extraordinary security and great prosperity. Now things are different. Now we have a rising power in our region. In fact, we've got a number of powers in our region: China, Russia, Iran and North Korea, all of which are rising and three of which—pick any you like—are well and truly in the Indo-Pacific, in our area. The US is certainly a mighty power and will remain a mighty power, but the US has world responsibilities and it is well and truly time that we looked after ourselves. Internally, I think we are doing exactly that. The legislation that gives us power to look after ourselves internally is extraordinary, and we are having great achievements. Externally we have started far, far too late, but that doesn't matter. No government since the end of the Vietnam War has done what this coalition government has done since 2013 in relation to external defence. No-one has done as well as they've done. So, external threats are certainly one thing. We can always do better and I certainly advocate 24 hours a day that we should do better. Today we continue our record of looking at legislation which is very important to us. My experience of the PJCIS gave me great faith in the processes within that tremendous committee. I wish very sincerely that we had the equivalent of the PJCIS instead of the defence subcommittee, as a bipartisan report recommended a couple of years ago, that could do in the area of strategy and national security exactly what the PJCIS does in the area of intelligence and lower-level security. And the mechanisms that surround intelligence and security in the PJCIS—that surround this process and ensure we balance the greater general good with individual rights—are what we're here today to talk about. As Senator Abetz said, 'The essence is trust,' and, as the old saying goes: trust and verify. The background to this bill is that it amends the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor Act 2010, known as the INSLM Act, to allow the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor to report on own-monitor inquiries in standalone reports, clarify the reporting arrangements for the monitor following statutory reviews or referrals, and the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, and provide a framework for the engagement of staff, including contractors, to assist the monitor. The government is committed to ensuring Australia has a robust national security and counterterrorist framework to face internal and external threats. The Independent National Security Legislation Monitor is responsible for regularly assessing Australia's national security and counterterrorism laws to ensure that they remain appropriate to the country threat environment and that the objective of protecting national security is balanced against upholding the rights and freedoms of individuals. This bill will clarify reporting arrangements for the monitor and provide a framework for the engagement of staff to assist the monitor. The bill implements recommendations made by the former monitor and by the 2019 Comprehensive review of the legal framework of the national intelligence community, which the government accepted. Passage of the bill will ensure that the monitor's enabling legislation reflects the current operation of the position and assists the monitor in the performance of this role. I recommend this bill to the Senate.
Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (High Risk Terrorist Offenders) Bill 2021; Second Reading | Bills | Senate debates
Like other senators in this place, I rise to speak to the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (High Risk Terrorist Offenders) Bill 2021. I listened to other senators who have addressed this...
Like other senators in this place, I rise to speak to the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (High Risk Terrorist Offenders) Bill 2021. I listened to other senators who have addressed this bill. It always restores my faith when I hear reports from the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security. As explained to us by Senator Keneally, bipartisan support came out of the process within that committee. I spent some time on that committee in my first iteration within the Senate. It's an excellent committee. The way it gets bipartisan support for various bills is excellent. I was very happy to hear that Labor does support the bill. I listened to Senator Thorpe, and I thank Senator Thorpe for her contribution. I guess there has to be an objection from the Greens in relation to this, but I would say that a very solid argument can be made that we do need both continuing detention orders and extended supervision orders. They are two quite different functions and they give an extraordinary amount of flexibility to courts and other officials in how they handle terrorists who have been incarcerated but still hold extremist views. I think these powers are justified. It is very important that we look at these powers as a whole, as Senator Thorpe explained. When you do look at them in context, I think it is possible to see that both the CDO and ESO are of value and are needed. Senator Van spoke to us and reminded us that terrorism is a significant problem. There have been nine attacks and 21 disruptions. That's still a significant problem. Since 2001 there have been 92 convicted terrorists—50 of which are still incarcerated. He reminded us that the Director-General of ASIO spoke very strongly and openly about the impact of COVID on the terrorist situation in this country—ideologically motivated terrorist groups are there and they became more active during the COVID period. He also gave us examples of released offenders conducting terrorist activities. So I think that this is very relevant to every aspect of our life. The government is well and truly committed to ensuring the safety and security of all Australians. As we've seen and as we were reminded by Senator Van, the recent terrorist attacks in New Zealand, as well as the 2019 London Bridge attack and the 2020 Streatham attack in the UK, convicted terrorist offenders continue to pose a risk to the community at the end of their sentence. This bill enhances the safety and security of every Australian by creating what's been explained to us this evening, extended supervision orders, ESOs, to ensure that high-risk terrorist offenders can be appropriately managed in the community at the end of their custodial sentence. Part 1 of schedule 1 of the bill creates an extended supervision order scheme, for high-risk terrorist offenders, in division 105A of the Criminal Code. A state or territory supreme court would be able to make an ESO in relation to a convicted high-risk terrorist if satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the offender poses an unacceptable risk of committing a serious terrorism offence if released into the community at the end of their sentence. Under an ESO the court may impose any conditions that it is satisfied are reasonably necessary and reasonably appropriate and adapted for the purpose of protecting the community from unacceptable risk. ESOs would provide a less restrictive option—and this is the key for the Greens—if the court is not satisfied that a continuing detention order is necessary. It's important to realise that with the balances that exist in this bill the state or territory supreme court will be able to impose an ESO for up to three years at a time, if the court is satisfied, as I mentioned before, on the balance of probabilities, on the basis of admissible evidence, that the offender poses an unacceptable risk of committing a serious terrorism offence. One of the real benefits of this bill is that the court can impose any condition it likes, on an offender, that it considers proportionate to the risk the offender poses. Part 2 of schedule 1 amends the Crimes Act 1914, which relates to surveillance devices—and is referred to as the Surveillance Devices Act, SD Act—and the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 to extend the existing surveillance and monitoring powers that are available for control orders to apply to ESOs, including search warrants and warrants for various types of electronic surveillance. Law enforcement agencies will also be able to seek electronic surveillance warrants under the SD Act, to inform the AFP minister's decision whether to apply for an ESO or a CDO. Part 2 of schedule 1 also amends the National Security Information (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 to extend the court-only evidence provisions and the special advocate scheme that applies in control orders proceedings to ESO proceedings. It also amends the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 to exempt decisions made by the AFP minister under division 105A of the Criminal Code from judicial review under that act and to the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 to confirm that a condition imposed by an ESO or an action relating to electronic monitoring is not a prescribed administrative action for the purpose of the definition of an adverse security assessment under the act. The bill also provides agencies, therefore, with the necessary tools not just to apply ESOs but to monitor compliance with those orders and to protect sensitive, national security information within ESO proceedings. The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security has considered the bill and made 11 recommendations. The government is accepting 10 of those in full, in part or in principle. There is a part 3 to the bill, which makes minor consequential amendments to the Crimes Act to reflect the creation of ESOs. Schedule 2 of the bill contains amendments to provisions introduced by the Telecommunications Legislation Amendment (International Production Orders) Bill 2020, referred to as the IPO bill—international production orders. The IPO bill was passed by both houses on 24 June this year and received royal assent on 23 July. As the IPO bill was in parliament at the same time as the ESO bill, it was necessary to draft contingent amendments in this way. The IPO bill was introduced for a framework to facilitate Australia entering into cross-border access to data agreements with foreign countries for an effective and efficient pathway for Australian law enforcement agencies to obtain communications data and vice versa. The proposed Australia-United States CLOUD Act agreement is an example of this. This bill will amend the IPO framework to enable law enforcement agencies to obtain an international production order for the purpose of monitoring compliance with an ESO. The use and disclosure framework will also be amended to facilitate the use of information collected under an international production order to be used when making an application for a CDO or an ESO. This is a good bill. It's a bill which has function and which is relevant. Even in the context of everything else this government has produced to counter terrorism over many years, it's an adjunct to those things and I commend this bill to the Senate.
Security Legislation Amendment (Critical Infrastructure) Bill 2021; Second Reading | Motions | Senate debates
( Australia faces what is without doubt the most uncertain strategic environment it has faced since 1945. For the last 75 years Australia has achieved prosperity and security to a degree almost...
( Australia faces what is without doubt the most uncertain strategic environment it has faced since 1945. For the last 75 years Australia has achieved prosperity and security to a degree almost unheard of in human history.Much of that security and prosperity is due to the stabilising presence of the United States. I acknowledge, as someone who has worked with, trained and fought beside the United States, that the United States is far from a perfect power but it is a far better world power than many others. Australia has benefited from the relationship with the United States. But the world is changing and Australia is trying to change to accommodate the new world. The new world has characteristics of the old world. The new world is still based on power politics. The new world has nations and leaders who do not have as much of an interest in the world order as Australia does. The new world has powers like China who look back on the appalling way that the old world treated them and want to take that out on the new world—on our world. For 75 years, when most of our critical infrastructure was built, Australia knew that, because of our geographical location and because of our alliances, we faced no direct threat in this country. This was a luxury that we are only now really coming to appreciate. We now find that our region, the Indo-Pacific or the western pacific or whatever you want to call it, is pretty well the centre of the world's strategic environment and certainly the world's interest. Several things are happening in our region which make the Security Legislation Amendment (Critical Infrastructure) Bill 2021 and the government amendments in 2021 very important indeed. The first is that the military power of the United States to stabilise our region has fallen by 30 to 50 per cent since the end of the Cold War. This is admitted by the United States in how they express their national defence strategy. For a long period of time many of us have thought that the United States' power was infinite. It's not and we might find ourselves on our own. The second is that we've seen an increase in the military power of China, Russia, Iran and North Korea. China has the largest army, navy, maritime militia, integrated air defence and what are called substrategic rocket and missile forces in the world. Qualitatively they are approaching the standard of the United States. Let's not forget that Russia is a Pacific power with close military and economic links to China. Let's not forget that Iran is the source of just about every problem in the Middle East at the moment and is supposedly a month away from getting the bomb. Of course North Korea is an unpredictable nuclear power with an unpredictable leader. The third thing that is relevant to Australia's situation and this bill is that we in Australia have seen over the last two COVID years how vulnerable Australia is to outside influence, in terms of not just supply chain issues, which are terrifyingly real, but also an ability by external actors to reach into any country through cyberspace and impact on our day-to-day life. Much of our prosperity is due to our interconnected world. Much of the efficiency of how our country functions is due to that interconnectedness. Much of the way our security—internal and external—functions relies on cyberspace. The use of actual space, where satellites fly, depends on cyberspace for the transmission of data. The crossover between cyberspace and the real world is now what is important. At present we are probed in cyberspace thousands of times per day. Many of those probes are successful. Some are from criminals, some are from countries and some are malign actors that exist between criminals and nations. What we see today is nothing compared to what we might see in the lead-up to conflict or to war. We have not seen one country, such as China or Russia, apply their full cyber-resources to attacking another country through cyberspace. We have not seen it yet. We've seen small examples in the Baltic countries, probably by Russia. We have seen impacts on parts of India's electricity sector, probably by China. But we will only see the full cybercapability of certain nations applied to other countries in the lead-up to, or actually in, war. And the prospect of war in our region is real. China says it will reincorporate Taiwan, even if it has to use force. President Biden has reaffirmed US support for Taiwan, which makes the US policy of ambiguity even more ambiguous. These are worrying times. Australia, as a nation, is vulnerable, and this bill is one step in addressing our vulnerabilities. The level of cyberattacks on Australia's critical infrastructure is bad enough now, but in certain circumstances it could be much worse. Most of us are aware of the reliance of our hospitals, transport, financial systems and military systems on the internet, but what many don't realise is that many of our military systems rely on exactly the same civilian systems to pass data as do hospitals, transport and banks. Our infrastructure has never been more important than it is now, and we need this bill. Amendments to this bill will ensure that the government is well placed to assist entities and those responsible for critical infrastructure assets to respond to serious cyberattacks as the first step in strengthening Australia's critical infrastructure security. The reforms outlined in the amended bill will strengthen Australia's ability to respond to serious cyberattacks on critical infrastructure. This bill expands the definition of critical infrastructure to include energy; communications; financial services; the defence industry; higher education and research; data storage or processing; food and groceries; health care and medical; space technology; transport; and water and sewage sectors. It introduces a cyberincident reporting regime for critical infrastructure assets. It makes government assistance available to industry as a last resort, subject to appropriate limitations. Under this bill, government will be able to provide assistance immediately prior to, during or following a significant cybersecurity incident to ensure the continued provision of essential services. The Security of Critical Infrastructure Act 2018 strengthened the Australian government's capacity to identify and manage the national security risk of espionage, sabotage and coercion resulting from foreign involvement in Australia's critical infrastructure. The government amendment to this bill amends the Security of Critical Infrastructure Act 2018, and is the first phase. The second phase of these reforms will be implemented by further amending the Security of Critical Infrastructure Act 2018, capturing the remaining elements from the Security Legislation Amendment (Critical Infrastructure) Bill, and the risk management programs, systems of national significance and enhanced cybersecurity obligations of industry. Recommendations six to 14 of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security are currently being considered by the government. I recommend this bill to the Senate.
Migration Amendment (Strengthening the Character Test) Bill 2019; Second Reading | Bills | Senate debates
The second reason is to keep Australians safe. We've heard an awful lot about that. We've gone through the number of murders, the number of rapes and the amount of family violence. The second...
The second reason is to keep Australians safe. We've heard an awful lot about that. We've gone through the number of murders, the number of rapes and the amount of family violence. The second reason is to keep Australians safe, and that is the ultimate obligation of any government. The third reason is to support victims, such as rape victims and the family members of those who have been murdered. Any number of commendations for this bill have been given by people who made the simple statement that, if this bill had existed, their family member would not have been killed, raped or beaten. The fourth reason—I will limit my presentation to that at this stage—is respect for citizenship. We have an extraordinarily welcoming country. We give citizenship, after a period of time, to anyone who comes here legally and we are very, very generous in it. But it's not a right. It is a privilege for people who are prepared to obey Australian laws. That is what the character test is all about: whether you are, in fact, willing to obey Australian laws. This is, I believe, illustrated most specifically by the figures. A simple figure to begin with is that the Rudd-Gillard government only cancelled and refused a total of 1,128 visas on character grounds. We are very proud of the fact that, by contrast, after significant reforms in 2014, this government has already cancelled or refused visas to over 9,900 serious criminals. If people don't think that this was for serious crimes, then they really haven't looked at the detail of what is going on. Let me just run through it once again for the benefit of Labor and the Greens. Of the 9,900 cancellations and refusals, 216 were for murder and 1,372 were for sexual offences, including 905 for child sex and child pornography offences. So whose interests are we looking after by claiming the right of these non-Australian, noncitizen criminals to stay in this country? Are we looking after the families of those who were murdered? Are we looking after the 905 who had committed child sex and child pornography offences, or the 467 who had committed rape and/or serious sexual offences against adults? This is absolutely appalling. This is an incorrect focus, not where the mind of this country should be. It is faux civil rights and faux humanity to say that these people have any right to stay in this country. Four hundred and ninety-eight of the 9,900 had committed armed robbery. We are deeply concerned at the moment that, during the COVID-19 period, people have lost their income. We see time and time again not just the traumatic impact on individuals but the economic impact on individuals who have been subjected to armed robbery—nearly 500 cases amongst the 9,900 people who have had their visas refused or cancelled. There were 1,701 for drug offences There were 37 for kidnapping. There were 3,908 for other violent offences, including assault, grievous bodily harm, reckless injury, domestic violence, stalking, intimidation, use of a weapon and attempted murder. If they were Australian citizens, they would be treated differently, but they have elected not to be Australian citizens, regardless of how long they may have stayed in this country. They've elected not to become Australian citizens, and that's a decision that they have made, for the consequences of which they have to suffer. In conclusion, I say that this is an amendment bill that is worth supporting. It should be supported, if for no other reason than for the victims of those who have been deported—for the victims of those who have had their visas and the great privilege of Australian citizenship removed from them.
This is a very important amendment to a bill. I see it as a continuation of the support for border control and stopping the boats, which has been a totally successful aspect of how this country...
This is a very important amendment to a bill. I see it as a continuation of the support for border control and stopping the boats, which has been a totally successful aspect of how this country runs itself. I see it as a very important part of Operation Sovereign Borders, of which I was co-author and one of the people who made that policy work. This is probably the single most successful policy with regard to this country defining itself as a sovereign nation, and sovereign nations control their own borders. Greens and Labor got that appallingly wrong over a very long period of time. We have just heard Senator Faruqi say that these are political games we're playing, and all that we care about is exploiting newcomers to this country. What an appalling statement. What an absolutely appalling statement. I took part in Operation Sovereign Borders for the simple reason that Labor and the Greens had caused the deaths of 1,200 people through their incompetence in applying border controls. Time and time again, we have saved many multiples of that 1,200 that were lost at sea—women and children—who our sailors saw on a daily basis rotting in the sea and taken by sharks. This is an essential manifestation of being a sovereign country, and there are various reasons that we can look at as to why we should proceed with this bill, the Migration Amendment (Strengthening the Character Test) Bill 2019, and with this amendment. The first one is that it is a national security issue. The people of Australia must have faith that the borders will be controlled. Border control is not an easy policy; it is a difficult policy, and there are aspects of it which are very, very unpleasant. For the Australian people to have faith in how our borders are managed, it is critically important that we continue to maintain them. Criminals or non-Australians who do not subscribe to the Australian way of life, which is to obey the law, have no right to remain in this country. So that's the first point. I can hardly hear myself talk. I wonder if there could be some quiet, please?
National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Improving Supports for At Risk Participants) Bill 2021; Second Reading | Bills | Senate debates
I spoke earlier today on the humanitarian aspects of the National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Improving Supports for at Risk Participants) Bill 2021 and the protection of participants...
I spoke earlier today on the humanitarian aspects of the National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Improving Supports for at Risk Participants) Bill 2021 and the protection of participants from the kinds of disastrous and sickening deaths that we saw in the case of Ms Smith. I would like to continue now on one of the most important aspects of what we've been talking about today. We have been talking about participant experience of the NDIS, affordability and fairness. I'd like to speak for the remainder of my time on affordability and sustainability of the NDIS. As you know, the NDIS was established on a multipartisan basis, and all governments continue to share a firm commitment to achieving positive outcomes for all people with disability. We cannot ignore the fact that there are serious sustainability pressures facing the NDIS. The NDIS is funded by all states and territories and the Commonwealth, and that's an important point. Disability ministers commissioned work in August 2021, at the disability reform ministers' meeting, to develop an NDIS sustainability work plan to address sustainability pressures. The NDIS does need reform, but this can be done only by working together as a federation. We recognise that the scheme needs to continue to improve so that it can be fairer and more consistent for the future. The cost of the NDIS continues to increase at a much higher rate than was ever expected, which means that it's now facing sustainability challenges. All governments have made a commitment to tackling these issues, while ensuring that every eligible Australian who relies upon the NDIS continues to receive the support they need. This is about continuing NDIS growth but doing so sustainably. Both the number of participants and the scheme's overall budget will continue to grow, and NDIS participants with significant and permanent disability will continue to receive the reasonable and necessary support that they need. I would remind the opposition of their calls to implement these recommendations. Now that opportunity is before them, and now they can support this bill. I suggest they do just that. This bill should be about participants and not about politics. We seek multipartisan support in enabling these key changes to be implemented as soon as possible, to better protect participants from the risk of abuse and neglect. The bill is most important. It's about implementing key recommendations from an independent inquiry into the tragic death of NDIS participant Ms Smith so as to better protect NDIS participants who are at risk of harm, and we now call for the bill to be implemented.
COVID-19: Morrison Government | Matters of Public Importance | Senate debates
I have to admit that I found the MPI in its written form somewhat confusing, and Senator Gallagher has now clarified it a little bit. I thought that it had something to do with the Doherty...
I have to admit that I found the MPI in its written form somewhat confusing, and Senator Gallagher has now clarified it a little bit. I thought that it had something to do with the Doherty modelling. The Doherty modelling lies at the centre of everything that we're doing, but I think I may have missed any reference that she may have made to that. We are in a process of opening up safely, and I don't accept that we are less than transparent in what we're doing. We've all made sacrifices. It has taken a personal toll on Senator Gallagher, and we're aware of that, and I'm very sensitive to that. I have been a user of those same hospitals that Senator Gallagher was talking about, for uses other than COVID. In March of this year, when I started using them, I sent thanks both to Senator Gallagher—who was responsible, in her previous iteration, for the extraordinary cancer set-up that we have in the ACT—and to Senator Seselja, as someone who has worked in the ACT. So the hospitals are in use by others, and there will be a call on them. There is lots of information being shared. I don't want to trivialise the virus in any way, shape or form. I would be terrified as a parent if I had to nurse any of my children through this period of time. Senator Gallagher counsels us to be careful not to scaremonger, and that's very, very important. That's why accurate information is so important. Let's get the facts and the plans right. Let's not be paranoid about this. Let's not push it too hard. Let's get it right before we release the facts. We are in a process of suppressing the virus and delivering the vaccine. If there were something fundamentally wrong with what we're doing, we wouldn't see the results that we are seeing at the moment, which are quite extraordinary. Senator Gallagher mentioned the fact that we are vaccinating people at a quite phenomenal rate. Australia's first-dose vaccination rate is now higher than the rate in the US; it's higher than the rate in Germany; it's higher than the rate in Israel, which we all held up as being the paragon of COVID management; and it's higher than the OECD average In relation to the written MPI, about people being concerned that there may be a problem with the Doherty modelling, this must indicate that somewhere the modelling must have got it relatively right. More than 95 per cent of over 70s are protected with a first dose, and more than 85 per cent have received a second dose. Sixty-five per cent plus of the eligible population aged 16 and over are fully vaccinated—I think it's well into 68 per cent at the moment. There is a plan, and that plan is very important and it's being run. Basic to that plan is the modelling. The modelling must be good. It's certainly better than a lot of the alarmist climate change modelling, which has failed in the recent past. On both the health and economic fronts, Australia has fared better than most countries in dealing with COVID-19. For example, over 12 per cent of people in the USA, and 11 per cent of people in the UK, have had COVID. By contrast, 0.4 per cent of Australians have had COVID. That's not to trivialise it. It is to acknowledge that someone, somewhere, must be doing something right. Of the 38 developed OECD countries, Australia has had the second-lowest number of COVID-19 cases per capita. On a per capita basis, the UK and the USA have had over 40 times the number of COVID deaths. We say, with validity, that, if Australia had had the death rates of OECD countries, we would have had something in the order of 30,000 deaths. How can you criticise the modelling which lies at the centre of the plan if in fact we are achieving such success? While Australia has been doing it tough, and we know we've been doing it tough—we are all making sacrifices, and I acknowledge that Senator Gallagher has made a particular sacrifice, through her family—Australia's economy and its GDP have recovered to be larger than prior to the pandemic. That's extraordinary, ahead of any advanced major economy in the world. Australia was also the first advanced economy to have more people in work than prior to COVID. Nearly 900,000 jobs have been created since May last year, and our credit rating agencies and the IMF have acknowledged this very important fact, because the sacrifices that we are all making are reflected to an incredible degree in the economy of the nation. Turning to the written form of the matter of public importance, I need to talk a little bit about the Doherty modelling. In July 2021 the Prime Minister announced an agreement to formulate a four-step national plan to transition Australia's national COVID response. Senator Gallagher asked if there was a plan. There is a plan, and we are seeing that plan on a daily basis. To support the plan—because facts are important—the Doherty institute was commissioned to undertake modelling of COVID-19 infections and vaccinations to define target levels for transition to phase B and phase C of the four-step plan. Based on the results of the modelling and the recommendations of the COVID-19 Risk Analysis and Response Taskforce, in July 2021 national cabinet agreed to transition to phases B and C when 70 per cent and 80 per cent respectively of people aged 16 and older are vaccinated. Because jurisdictions are likely to have different case counts, different numbers of COVID, a sensitivity analysis was conducted for when vaccination thresholds are met—and this is part of the modelling process that was mentioned in the written version of the matter of public importance. This assessed the initial modelling results for low, medium and high numbers of infections at different coverage thresholds with either optimal or partial test, trace, isolate, quarantine—TTIQ, as they say in the profession—and combinations of public health and social measures, or PHSM, God help us all! This is what the MPI refers to, I think, when it refers to a 'small COVID outbreak'. That has been the sensitivity towards various levels of outbreak, and the sensitivity analysis was conduced. The overall conclusions of the initial modelling were found to remain valid even with a higher number of infections. This is very, very relevant to the MPI. They were valid, even with a high number of infections, at the time of transition. However, at 70 per cent coverage, with medium or high seeding, and partial TTIQ, the epidemic curve shifts to the left and the peak of daily new infections is considerably higher. We know that. As optimal TTIQ—test, trace, isolate and quarantine—cannot be sustained at higher caseloads, public health and social measures are required in those situations. So, by knowing the facts, by doing the modelling and by looking at the sensitivity for various scenarios, we can vary the TTIQ and the PHSM. The sensitivity analysis, of course, has been published on the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet website and the Doherty Institute site. This has cost us roughly $1½ million, as at December 2021, and an additional contract is currently being finalised for additional work for the national cabinet. So we do have a plan and that plan is in play, is being used and is successful. Certainly, aspects of modelling have been released, particularly the sensitivity aspects of the modelling. Further modelling is anticipated to consider the public health response, including different methodologies and key indicators for the TTIQ. The impact of vaccinations and responses in key populations—including Indigenous communities, culturally and linguistically diverse populations and schools—and border measures and quarantine, and how varying these may affect the risk of importation, are being considered in great detail. I think that answers the ideas that lie in the written version of the matter of public importance.
I start by acknowledging the feeling and the passion behind the contributions that have been made so far by all senators in this debate. There's a lot of similarity between this debate and the...
I start by acknowledging the feeling and the passion behind the contributions that have been made so far by all senators in this debate. There's a lot of similarity between this debate and the stillbirth issue that we dealt with so well many, many years ago. There is so much agreement on all of this because there needs to be agreement on so much of this. We've heard Senator Farrell speak, and he said that fundamentally Labor agrees with this bill, the National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Improving Supports for At Risk Participants) Bill 2021. They have some differences, but generally they agree with it. We have heard Senator Steele-John speak remotely, and the people that he represents—the people who know the NDIS because they are participants in the NDIS—are telling him certain things, and the intention is to make this situation much, much better. Again, Senator Hughes knows this issue from top to bottom and, as we all say to her, she could talk for days on this particular issue. Of course, Senator Griff took us through some of the appalling, sad, terrible details and agreed with Senator Hughes that the situation that applied to Ms Ann-Marie Smith was an incredible situation, and not just that; it was sad and unforgivable. As Senator Smith said, it was sickening. It's something which we cannot allow in this nation of ours or in the legislation that we put in place, which the parliament uses to express its humanity in respect of this situation. Let me try and put some context to this bill. The objective of the bill really revolves around the fact that it will strengthen the support and protections for people with disability by ensuring a clear and effective legislative basis for the NDIS Quality and Safeguards Commissioner's powers, for his or her compliance and enforcement arrangements, for the provider registration provisions and for efficient information sharing across government and government agencies. So that's the objective of the bill. I think what is particularly important at the moment is that we don't lose sight of the big picture, and this is a big picture. It is an enormous picture. If we're talking generally about a failure—and what a failure it was in one particular area, in the appalling tragedy of one particular person—we must always remember that the NDIS is one of the largest social reforms in Australia's history and probably in the world's history. It's a globally unique scheme and it's now eight years old. There is much to be proud of and much to celebrate, despite the fact that, as we acknowledge, we have had an appalling failure. The scheme is now available in all corners of Australia, and it illustrates the humanity of this place and of the Australian people. As at 30 June 2021, the NDIS was supporting more than 466,000 participants, with more than 52 per cent of these receiving supports for the very first time. It's always important to point out that you can only do this if you are a rich country. We are a rich country, and those riches depend on primary industry, including mining, and on the hard work of Australians. At the end of September, the 466,000 from June of this year had increased to 484,700 Australians. This compares to just 30,000 people in June of 2016. The participant satisfaction level is 77 per cent across the access, preplanning and plan review process. It's always the squeaky wheel that gets the oil, as they say, but 77 per cent have expressed satisfaction in what the NDIS is doing. The number of young people in residential care, something which has always been on everyone's mind, has dropped by 33 per cent since September 2017. After eight years of operation, now is the time to listen, to take the lessons and to learn from the lived experience. We need to listen to the comments of the senators who have spoken, passionately and with a good sense of equity, on this issue today, and we need to turn those lessons into an even better NDIS. We need to improve the participant experience, but not just the participant experience; we need to improve the affordability and fairness of the scheme. It's comforting to know that Labor supports this bill. Everything should be done to protect the participants. We have had those views put to us by a number of people today, and they're the right views. Let's have a very quick look at the principles behind the bill. The bill responds to a number of recommendations of the independent review which was caused by the tragic death of Ms Ann-Marie Smith in April 2020. That was conducted by the Hon. Alan Robertson SC, at the request of the commissioner, and it makes technical amendments to better support the operation of the NDIS commission, based on early implementation experience. All amendments seek to improve or clarify NDIS quality and safeguard arrangements to better protect participants from harm. The necessity and support for this bill are for the following reasons. The Robertson review made a number of recommendations to improve the NDIS quality and safeguards arrangements for at-risk participants. The bill addresses important recommendations around information sharing and reportable incidents, and a number of our senators have addressed this particular point. It provides for improved information sharing between the NDIS commission and the National Disability Insurance Agency to better protect people with disability. The present clauses in the NDIS Act establish a relatively high threshold for sharing information. They establish that the disclosure must be necessary to prevent or lessen a serious threat to an individual's life, health or safety. So that's a fairly high threshold. This bill enacts a less restrictive threshold in recognition of the Robertson review recommendation. The bill removes qualifiers like 'serious' or 'necessary' to ensure that any threat to life, health or safety is sufficient grounds for the recording, use or disclosure of protected NDIS commission information. It also amends provisions for disclosing information in a number of other specific situations, including the NDIS commission is able to disclose information to worker screening units and other agencies as required. The NDIS commission can publish and maintain information about historical compliance and enforcement action. The bill also provides for greater clarity around reportable incidents, including broadening the scope, and their reporting to the NDIS commission in the commission rules. There are a number of other technical amendments in this bill, and they're important. Currently, quality assurance of registered NDIS providers is undertaken by approved quality auditors who are engaged by providers directly. The market for quality auditors includes a wide range of experience levels and sector knowledge. As such, this bill will allow the commissioner to place conditions on the approval of quality auditors and makes explicit the commissioner's power to vary or revoke approval of quality auditors. These decisions of course will be reviewable. This bill makes a number of amendments to ensure consistency and procedural fairness in the application of the NDIS commission's regulatory response, including compliance notices and that compliance notices can be varied or revoked, and decisions in relation to these requests are reviewable decisions. Also, banning orders can now have conditions attached. The NDIS market is diverse, including non-profit organisations, large private companies and individuals running their own businesses. The NDIS Act recognises this by placing obligations on providers, workers and anyone who is engaged otherwise by the provider. However, there is some concern that this definition is not broad enough to cover the range of potential governance arrangements, and, for the avoidance of doubt, this bill ensures that obligations and regulatory responses also fall on the key personnel of a provider, which can include the CEO, the board of directors and any other relevant personnel. I hope that certainly satisfies the points that Senator Griff brought up. While the NDIS Act gives the commissioner the power to ban an NDIS provider or worker on the grounds that they are not suitable to deliver NDIS services and supports, it does not presently set out how suitability is determined for banning orders. The bill provides the power for the commissioner to make rules in relation to suitability for that purpose, aligning with existing provisions in relation to provider registration. The bill also clarifies elements of the process that providers must follow when registering to deliver NDIS services and support. This includes that applicants are able to withdraw applications and applications for renewal of registration are deemed to have been withdrawn if the registered provider in question becomes the subject of a revocation or a banning order during the renewal process. These amendments and other minor technical amendments will strengthen the support and protection for NDIS participants and ensure their wellbeing.
Covid-19 | Questions without Notice | Senate debates
Minister, what further measures will help to ensure confidence in our economic recovery and secure Australia's reopening in a safe and responsible way?